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-IX-

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from the Utah Court of Appeals' affirmation of the Third
District Court's grant of judgment to Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial, Inc.
("Fairbourn") against Defendant American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American") in
the principal amount of $153,000.00 plus attorneys' fees and costs in the amount
of $45,001.00. This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Section 782a-4, Utah Code Annotated.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

The Court of Appeals erred in a case of first impression in adopting the

purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable
at closing" in a broker's listing agreement does not make closing of the underlying
real estate transaction a condition precedent to a broker's receipt of commission
where a majority of jurisdictions have expressly rejected such argument. A question
of "contract interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of
law" and the appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption
of correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations
omitted).
II.

Alternatively, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the phrase "all

commissions shall be due and payable at closing" in a broker's listing agreement
is unambiguous where there is a reasonable interpretation that such phrase means
that payment of the broker's commission is conditioned upon closing of the

E\Laurie\Amert»us\FairAppea(\SCBnefwpd
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I"

underlying real estate transaction. The trial court's interpretation of common law
is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d
777, 778-79 (Utah 1992).
III.

The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial capability

to close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American
was ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous is a
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic
Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991: Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234,
1251 (Utah 1998).
IV.

If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, the trial court erred in implying that

there was a meeting of the minds between American and Rochelle. A trial court's
determination of whether an enforceable contract exists is a finding of fact that will
not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson. 746 P.2d 264, 266-67
(Utah 1987).
V.

The trial court erred in its admission of parol evidence that contradicted the

plain language of the Purchase Agreement rather than clarified the Purchase
Agreement. The trial court's admission of parol evidence is a question of law that
is reviewed for correctness. Glauser Storage. L L C , v. Smedley. 2001 Utah Ct.
App. 141, If 14, 27 P.3d 565 (citations omitted).
VI.

The trial court erred in holding the alleged ambiguity of the Purchase

Agreement against American. The trial court's interpretation of common law is a

E\Laurie\Amerhous\FairAppeal\SCBnefwpd
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"Z"

conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P.2d 777,
778-79 (Utah 1992).
VII.

If the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous, the trial court erred in construing

the extrinsic evidence of the intent of American and Rochelle. The trial court's
construction of an ambiguous contract based on extrinsic evidence is a question of
fact that is reviewed under clearly- erroneous standard. West Valley City v. Majestic
InvestmtntCa, 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Craig Food Industries.
Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279, 283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
VIII.

The trial court erred in failing to apply Utah law, as set forth in Sproul v.

Parks, 116 Utah 368, 210 P.2d 436 (Utah 1949), to the Purchase Agreement
regarding who is a ready, willing, and able buyer.

A question of "contract

interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of law" and the
appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption of
correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations
omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances and rules which pertain to
this appeal are fully set forth in the addenda hereto where not fully set forth in the
body of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On March 28, 2000, Fairbourn filed a Complaint against American and
Armando J. Alvarez alleging breach of a Listing Agreement against both American
and Mr. Alvarez and breach of broker standards (including treble damages) and
tortious interference with economic relations against Mr. Alvarez. On April 5,2000,
American and Mr. Alvarez filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint which was
denied by the trial court on June 14,2000. On August 6 and 7,2001, the trial court
held a bench trial. On August 29, 2001, the trial court heard oral argument on
pre-trial and post-trial briefs. On October 29, 2001, the trial court entered a
Memorandum Decision which incorporated the trial court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law.

In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court granted

Fairbourn's claim for commission against American but denied its claims against
Mr. Alvarez. On November 9,2001, Fairbourn filed a Motion to Modify Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law seeking to increase the principal amount awarded
Fairbourn. On November 28, 2001, the trial court entered a Judgment which was
amended and restated in a subsequent Judgment entered by the trial court on
December 28,2001. On January 11,2002, American filed a Notice of Appeal. On
April 3, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment in favor of
Fairbourn, but on a theory not addressed at trial. On May 2, 2003, American
petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari which was granted on July
10,2003.

E \Laurie\Amerhous\FarAppeal\SCBrief wpd

Page -4-

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
In early 1999, Armando Alvarez ("Mr. Alvarez") approached James Fairbourn
("Mr. Fairbourn") of Plaintiff Fairbourn Commercial Inc. ("Fairbourn"), a real estate
brokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property located in West Jordan,
Utah (the "Property").

(R. 231; T. 53-54.)

Mr. Alvarez was acting as a

representative of Defendant American Housing Partners, Inc. ("American"). (R.
231 ;T. 9.)
American was wholly owned by Mr. Alvarez's brother, Sergio Alvarez. (R.
231; T. 9.) American had entered into an agreement to buy the Property from its
owners, the Coons. (R. 231; T. 39-41.) At the time that Alvarez began his
conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the City of West Jordan necessary to
develop the Property. (R. 231-2; T. 48-54.) These problems placed American's
purchase agreement with the Coons in peril. (R. 232; T. 82-87.)
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three
fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to
preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for
the Property who would pay the Coons' selling price, put some money in American's
pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. (R.
232; T. 38-87.) Mr. Fairbourn and Fairbourn were enlisted to aid American in the
third undertaking. (R. 232-33.) Mr. Fairbourn proposed that American seek a buyer
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for the Property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had received plat approval
but which had not been improved. (R. 232; T. 53-54,171-72, 306-07.)
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons
notified American that they were "ending and terminating any and ail agreements"
relating to the Property because American had failed to close. (R. 232; T. 82-83.)
In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate their contract of sale with
American through December 1, 1999. (R. 232; T. 85.) As American worked to
salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it
persuaded the City to approve the necessary zoning for the Property if American
would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's
proposed development. (R. 232; T. 247.)
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its
task. (R. 232.) Through a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson ("Mr.
Larson"), who later became employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn learned of a
potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. ("Rochelle").1 (R. 232-3; T. 309-10.)
Rochelle was an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a residential home builder in the Salt
Lake City area. (R. 233; T. 219, 310.)

1

Fairbourn therefore representep! both the seller, American, and the buyer,
Rochelle in this matter under a "dual agency" listing arrangement. Mr. Alvarez
was not representing American as a real estate agent in this transaction,
contrary to the statement of facts of this matter by the Court of Appeals.
Fairbourn at ^ 6 (Addenda "A", "B" and "C" attached hereto). (R. 234-35; T. 315.)
E \Uune\Amert>ous\FairAppeal\SCBnef wpd
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In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the
Property. (R. 233; R. 411, Ex. No. 1; T. 55-56.) Rochelle's proposal, presented in
the form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among
representatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn.

(R. 233; T. 57-60.)

Numerous elements of possible transactions were discussed at the meeting,
including a remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision concerning
the buyer's ability to perform. (R. 233; T. 59-60, 311-12.) Mr. Fairbourn, who
attended the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which American
found itself and recognized that American had a legitimate interest in securing a
buyer who could be counted on to perform. (R. 233; T. 312.)
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the Property. (R. 233;
R. 410, Ex. No. 2; T. 62.) The offer was presented through a preprinted Real Estate
Purchase Contract and a handwritten addendum. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 1.) It
was accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement (the "Listing
Agreement") which obligated American to pay Fairbourn a $1,500.00 per lot
commission if Rochelle bought the Property for $2,277,000.00 cash. (R. 233; R.
410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "D" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement indicates
that the Property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots." (R. 233; R. 410,
Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "D" attached hereto.)
The Listing Agreement also states that Fairbourn is to procure an offer from
Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set forth herein" and "upon any other
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terms or conditions acceptable to" American.

(R. 410;

R. 410, Ex. No. 3.;

Addendum "D" attached hereto.) The Listing Agreement further states that "all
commissions shall be due and payable at closing." (R. 410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum
"D" attached hereto, emphasis added.)
American rejected Rochelle's offer because it was inconsistent with what was
discussed at the prior meeting. (R. 233; T. 62, 312.) Rochelle presented a second
offer several days later which was met with a counteroffer. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No.
5; T. 63-64; Addendum "C" attached hereto.)

American's counteroffer was

presented in typewritten form and incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer
while adding several new provisions. (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C"
attached hereto.)

Among the new provisions was a term titled "Financial

Capability." (R. 233; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) This
term stated:
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement
by both parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence
of financial capability to close on the Property within the
time frame reference above. In the event Buyer is unable
to provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole option
cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any
further obligation to the other.
(R. 234;

R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) (Hereinafter this

paragraph shall be referred to as "Paragraph 3.")
Mr. Alvarez inserted Paragraph 3 into the counteroffer because under the
terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not contingent on its
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acquisition of financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase Contract;
therefore he wanted evidence of Rochelle's ability to perform. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex.
No. 5; T. 225-27; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) While the printed contract
provision regarding financing, when elected, excuses the buyer's duty to perform
if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified terms, the buyer is required
pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely application for
financing. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) If financing
is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract, a buyer may
nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with absolute
assurance" that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. (R. 234; R.
410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Mr. Alvarez believed that the
Paragraph 3 inserted into the counteroffer would serve as an equivalent substitute
for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to Rochelle because it did not
elect to make its purchase contingent on financing. (R. 234; R. 225-27.)
The parties met on August 30,1999, the day the counteroffer was accepted.
(R. 234; T. 88-90.) At the meeting they reviewed the terms of the sale and made
several changes to the counteroffer by interlineation. (R. 234; T. 90.) Before they
entered into the sales contract for the purchase of the Property for a purchase price
of $2,272,000, Paragraph 3 was discussed at the meeting. (R. 234; R. 410, Ex. No.
5; T. 89, 318-19; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) American expected Rochelle to
provide within fourteen days evidence of cash on hand, an existing line of credit
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available to fund the purchase, a loan commitment, or similar proof of Rochelle's
ability to fund the purchase. (T. 77, 100-02, 224-25.) Mr. Larson, a real estate
agent then employed by Fairbourn, who represented Rochelle under the terms of
a dual agency agreement, believed that Mr. Alvarez intended to require a letter from
Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan commitment. (R. 234-5; T. 400,
418.)
On or about September 10,1999, Rochelle provided American with a letter
from First Security Bank ("First Security") which stated that First Security "would not
expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans in the future"
regarding Rochelle but noting that "[a]n acquisition and development loan would be
subject to committee approval." (R. 235; R. 410, Ex. No. 7; Addendum "E" attached
hereto.) Prior to receipt of this letter American did not know that Rochelle intended
to fund the purchase price from a future loan, although Mr. Larson representing
Rochelle did as an employee of Fairbourn. (T. 195.)
American rejected the First Security letter as insufficient evidence of financial
capability to close, because the funding was conditioned upon approval of a loan
from First Security. (R. 235; T. 168-70.) Mr. Alvarez had previous experience with
First Security declining to make a loan after obtaining assurances of financing
without having first received a commitment. (T. 169-70.) As a result of further
communication between American and Fairbourn, Mr. Larson then asked First
Security to issue a binding loan commitment for the benefit of Rochelle. (T. 248,
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252-55.) Rochelle then provided American a second letter, dated September 17,
1999, from First Security which made reference to existing lines of credit (none of
which were available for acquisition and development of lots) and stated that an "A
& D loan is considered on it's [sic] own merits" and that a loan "would be contingent
upon the acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval." (R. 410,
Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum "F" attached hereto.) Again the letter did not specify
that Rochelle could obtain a loan, that it could do so on its own account or that it
could do it within the prescribed time frame. (R. 410, Ex. No. 11; T. 239; Addendum
"F" attached hereto.)
On September 21,1999, finding the second First Security letter unacceptable
as evidence of financial capability to close due to the contingency of committee
approval, American canceled the Purchase Agreement with Rochelle in writing. (R.
236; R. 410, Ex. No. 12.) Rochelle then reclaimed its earnest money deposit. (T.
283.)
Cy Simon ("Mr. Simon"), an employee of First Security, testified that loans to
Liberty and various Rochelle entities were all guaranteed by each other and its
principals because the bank was insecure about relying only upon one entity. (T.
232-34.) In the process of preparing the First Security letters and even though he
never spoke with Mr. Alvarez, Mr. Simon was asked to provide an absolute loan
commitment but he stated that he could not provide a binding commitment for the
bank. (T. 248.) Providing a loan to Rochelle would be contingent upon factors such
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as the economy, credit worthiness, interest rates, and the supply and demand for
lots. (R. 236; T. 236-38.)

Lines of credit mentioned in the September 17, 1999

First Security letter were not available to Rochelle or for acquisition of the Property.
(T. 249.)
When advised of the termination, Mr. Fairbourn apologized to Alvarez and
made no objection about the loss of the sale or a commission. (T. 186-87,194.)
Mr. Fairbourn acknowledged in his deposition, which was read into the record at
trial, that "we never did establish if Rochelle could perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr.
Larsen testified that he was embarrassed because his buyer could not perform. (T.
455-56.) Alvarez testified that he did not terminate the Purchase Agreement
because of any ill will to Mr. Larson or Mr. Fairbourn. (T. 196.) Mr. Fairbourn
concluded at his deposition, which was read into the record at trial, that American
had not acted in bad faith in terminating the Purchase Agreement. (T. 361-62.)
American eventually sold the Property to Leon Peterson. (T. 127.) American
did not commence negotiation with Mr. Peterson until after termination of the
Purchase Agreement with Rochelle and it was not an incentive for American to
terminate the Purchase Agreement as ruled by the trial court on the facts presented
at trial. (R. 493-94.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the
purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable
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at closing" in the Listing Agreement does not make the closing of the underlying
real estate transaction a condition precedent to broker's receipt of commission,
because a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have expressly rejected
such argument. Alternatively, the Listing Agreement is ambiguous with regard to
payment of commissions and such ambiguity should be held against Fairbourn as
the drafter of the Listing Agreement.
The trial court erred in finding that the language of Paragraph 3 of the
Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American, that required Rochelle to
produce evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement
of its financial capability to close the purchase, was ambiguous. The language
regarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 of the
Purchase Agreement has a plain and usual meaning and has been defined in case
law in this jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to its plain meaning and
applicable case law, Rochelle was not a "capable" and/or "able" buyer. Fairbourn
does not claim an alternative definition of Paragraph 3 but the trial court
nevertheless rewrote such paragraph.
If Paragraph 3 does not have a plain meaning, Rochelle and American had
vastly differing views of what was required to establish financial capability and
consequently Rochelle and American did not have a meeting of the minds
regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase Agreement.

If

Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its admission of parol evidence
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that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. If the language of Paragraph
3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in holding such ambiguity against American as
the drafter of the same. If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous regarding the "evidence of
financial capability to close," the trial court erred in construing the parol evidence
regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the Purchase
Agreement.
The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it
would find satisfactory. It also erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's
agent, Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial
ability to close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3.
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual
duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American an "able" buyer pursuant
to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v. Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 Utah
(1949).
ARGUMENT
I.
IN A CASE OF FIRST IMPRESSION, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN ADOPTING THE PURPORTED "MAJORITY RULE," THAT THE PHRASE
"ALL COMMISSIONS SHALL BE DUE AND PAYABLE AT CLOSING" IN THE
LISTING AGREEMENT DOES NOT MAKE THE CLOSING OF THE
UNDERLYING REAL ESTATE TRANSACTION A CONDITION PRECEDENT TO
BROKER'S RECEIPT OF COMMISSION, BECAUSE A MAJORITY OF
JURISDICTIONS HAVE REJECTED SUCH ARGUMENT.
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In a case of first impression, the Court of Appeals erred in adopting the
purported "majority rule," that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable
at closing" in the Listing Agreement does not make the closing of the underlying
real estate transaction a condition precedent to broker's receipt of commission,
because a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have expressly rejected
such argument. This issue found to be controlling by the Court of Appeals was not
argued before the trial court, nor was it briefed by the parties to the Court of
Appeals. The ruling by the Court of Appeals does violence to the plain language
of the Listing Agreement and actually adopts a minority position on this issue rather
than the majority view as stated by the Court of Appeals. The actual majority of
courts interpreting similar language have held that such language makes payment
of the commission to the broker conditioned upon the closing of the underlying real
estate transaction.
In adopting the purported "majority rule", the Court of Appeals cited three
cases to support its determination that such an interpretation is a majority view
regarding this issue. Fairbourn Commercial. Inc. v. American Housing Partners.
Inc.. 2003 Utah Ct. App. 98, 68 P.3d 1038 at fl 21, FN 3 (Addendum "A" attached
hereto). The Court of Appeals also cited two cases to set forth the purported
"minority rule." JdL Of the three cases cited by the Court of Appeals supporting its
decision, one has been subsequently overturned, one is an unpublished opinion
which should not be cited or used pursuant to Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of
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Judicial Administration and furthermore does stand for the proposition for which it
is cited by the Court of Appeals, and the third does not stand for the proposition for
which it is cited by the Court of Appeals ruling but rather holds that similar contract
language is ambiguous with such ambiguity to be held against the drafter of the
same. The two cases cited by the Court of Appeals for the purported "minority
position" do stand for the proposition that similar language is unambiguous and
conditions payment of commission upon the closing of the underlying real estate
transaction. American believes that this interpretation is in reality the majority view
of courts considering this issue.
Following is a detailed discussion and a presentation of the cases cited by
the Court of Appeals and a comparison of law demonstrating that the actual
majority position interpreting such phrase requires a closing before the broker's
commission is earned.
A.

Current Mew Jersey Law Holds That All Broker Listing
Agreements Contain an Implied Condition That a Commission is
Due Only if The Underlying Real Estate Transaction is
Consummated.

Current New Jersey law holds that all broker listing agreements contain the
implied condition that a commission is due only if the underlying real estate
transaction is consummated. Ellsworth Dobbs. Inc. v. Johnson. 50 N.J. 528, 236
A.2d843(N.J. Sup. Ct. 1967).
The Court of Appeals cited the 1937 New Jersey case Samuel R. Laden. Inc.
v. Lidgerwood Estates. Inc.. 15 N.J. Misc. 498,192 A. 425,428 (Essex County Ct.
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1937) to support its ruling adopting the purported "majority rule" that the phrase "all
commission shall be due and payable at closing" does not condition payment of
broker's commission upon the completion of the underlying real estate transaction.
However, Laden is not current law in the state of New Jersey, but was in fact
overturned by the New Jersey Supreme Court in 1967 by Dobbs. Dobbs. supra.
In Dobbs. the New Jersey Supreme Court departed from the traditional rule
that a broker is not an insurer of the underlying real estate transaction and held that
if the underlying real estate transaction is not consummated, the broker has no right
to commission from the seller. Dobbs at 855. Dobbs stands for the proposition that
all broker listing agreements contain an implicit condition that the underlying real
estate transaction be consummated before the broker earns his or her commission.
IdL
As discussed in Section I.F below, the Dobbs decision has proven to be a
landmark decision establishing the minority position that commission under a
broker contract is not earned absent a closing. See e.g.. Mulliken, When Does the
Seller Owe The Broker A Commission? A Discussion of the Law and What it
Teaches About Listing Agreements. 132 Mil. L. Rev. 265 (1991) (Addendum "G"
attached hereto); and Note, Arguing for the Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to
Real Estate Brokerage Contracts. 82 B.U. L. Rev. 195 (2002) (Addendum "H"
attached hereto). The Court of Appeals' reliance on New Jersey law is misplaced
in that New Jersey law currently holds that all listing agreements implicitly condition
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payment of the broker's commission upon consummation of the underlying real
estate transaction. Dobbs. supra.
B.

The Utah Court of Appeals Violated Rule 4-508 of The Utah Code
of Judicial Administration in Relying Upon an Unpublished
Opinion of a Connecticut Trial Court.

The Utah Court of Appeals violated Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration in relying upon the unpublished opinion of the Waterbury Superior
Court of Connecticut, Finno Dev.. Inc. v. Smedes Realty. No. CV010163687S, 2001
Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 995 (April 11, 2001). Fairbourn at U 21, F.N. 3.
Rule 4-508 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration states:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential
value and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except
for purposes of applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res
judicata, or collateral estoppel. . . For the purposes of this rule, any
memorandum decision, per curiam opinion, or other disposition of the
court designated "not for official publication" shall be regarded as an
unpublished opinion.
The Finno opinion has been designated by the Waterbury Superior Court as
an unpublished opinion, stating "this decision is unreported and may be subject to
further appellate review." Finno at * 1 . The Court of Appeals' reliance upon Finno
is therefore in violation of Rule 4-508 and the Finno opinion should have no or little
weight in resolving the current dispute.
C.

The Utah Court of Appeals Erred in Its Interpretation of The Finno
Opinion.

Even if Finno were not an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals erred
in its statement that it stands for the proposition that the phrase "due and payable
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at closing" is unambiguous and does not condition payment of commission upon
closing of the underlying real estate transaction. The court in Finno held that the
term "'listing agent shall be paid a 5% real estate commission by the seller directly
within 72 hours from the date of closing' . . . simply establishes the time for the
commission to be paid, i.e., within 72 hours of the closing." I d at *3-*4. The court
went on to hold that even if the disputed terms "were equally susceptible of two
different meanings, that favoring the party who did not draw up the contract will be
applied." ]dL at *5 (citations omitted).
In the dispute at hand, Fairbourn drafted the Listing Agreement and therefore
any ambiguity of the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at closing"
should be held against it pursuant to Finno as argued below in Section II.
Furthermore, the Listing Agreement states that "all commissions shall be due and
payable at closing." Fairbourn at % 21, F.N. 3 (emphasis added) (Addendum "A"
attached hereto). The use of the word "due" in the Listing Agreement further
clarifies that the commission to be paid Fairbourn would not be owing until closing
occurred. Such language was not contained in the listing agreement identified in
the Finno opinion. Finno at *3.
D.

The Utah Court of Appeals Erred in Its Interpretation of Nebraska
Law.

The Nebraska case law cited by the Utah Court of Appeals does not stand
for the proposition for which it was cited by the Utah Court of Appeals. Fairbourn
atfl 21 F.N. 3 (Addendum "A" attached hereto). The Utah Court of Appeals cited
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Don J. McMurray Co. v. Wiesman. 199 Neb. 494, 260 N.W.2d 196 (1977) to
support its adoption of the purported "majority rule" that the phrase "all commissions
shall be due and payable at closing" does not indicate that closing is a condition
precedentto a broker's receipt of commission. Fairboumat^21 F.N. 3 (Addendum
"A" attached hereto). However, McMurray does not support such conclusion, but
rather stands for the proposition that similar phrasing is ambiguous and should be
construed against the drafter of such language, as argued below in Section II. Id.
at 201-02.
The language contained in the broker agreement in McMurray is quite
different than the language of the Listing Agreement. McMurray involved a loan
transaction with relatively complex language regarding the payment of a brokerage
commission, as follows:
14. A 2% Good Faith Fee in the amount of $18,000.00 payable to Don
J. McMurray Co. is enclosed with the application. If a commitment is
issued based substantially in accordance with the terms and
conditions outlined in this application, this check would be cashed by
the Don J. McMurray Co. and you would be given full credit for this
amount at the time of final loan closing as the 2% fee which is our
charge for the handling of the loan. If a commitment is not issued
based substantially in accordance with the above terms and
conditions, then this check would be returned to you and there would
be no fee due or payable to Don J. McMurray Co. However, if a
commitment is issued on terms and conditions different than set forth
in this application, but still acceptable by you, then a fee in the amount
of 2% of the loan amount would be due and payable to the Don J.
McMurray Co. on the same basis as outlined above.
Id. at 198-99. The Supreme Court of Nebraska held that such language was
ambiguous as to whether payment of commission was conditioned upon closing of
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the loan. ja\ at 201. The Nebraska Supreme Court proceeded to rule that the trial
court had properly received extrinsic evidence regarding the interpretation of such
clause and noted that the "language of an ambiguous contract prepared by one
party is generally to be given such consideration as the other party would be fairly
justified in giving it." |cL at 202 (citations omitted).
A correct application of the legal reasoning stated in McMurray would hold
that the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at closing" is ambiguous
and should be held against the drafter, Fairbourn, as argued below in Section II.
The Court of Appeals has erred in citing McMurray for the proposition that the
phrase "due and payable at closing", is unambiguous and does not condition
payment of the broker's commission upon closing of the underlying real estate
transaction. Fairbourn at ^ 21 F.N. 3 (Addendum "A" attached hereto).
E.

A Majority of Courts Holding Similar Language to be
Nonambiguous, Have Held it to Mean That Payment of Broker's
Commissions is Contingent Upon Closing of The Underlying Real
Estate Transaction.

A majority of courts holding that language similar to that contained in the
Listing Agreement to be unambiguous, have held that such language conditions
payment of the broker's commission upon closing of the underlying real estate
transaction.
The two cases cited by the Court of Appeals for the purported "minority
position" do stand for the proposition cited by the Court of Appeals. (As argued
herein, American believes that this interpretation is in reality the majority view of
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courts considering this issue.) In Arvida. the broker agreement stated that "a
commission is payable at the closing of the real estate transaction." Arvida Realty
Sales. Inc. v. William R. Tinnerman & Co.. 536 So.2d 1041, 1042 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1988). The Fourth District Court of Appeals in Florida held that such "language
is clear and unambiguous, and as a matter of law, means no closing, no
commission." idL. (citations omitted). The Fairbourn Listing Agreement states that
"all commissions shall be due and payable at closing." Fairbourn at ^ 21, F.N. 3
(emphasis added) (Addendum "A" attached hereto). The use of the word "due" in
the Listing Agreement further clarifies that the commission to be paid Fairbourn
would not be owing until closing occurred. Such language was not contained in the
listing agreement referred to in the Arvida opinion. I d
In Doss, the broker's agreement stated that the commission "is payable to
[broker] only upon a sale/closing." Doss v. Moses & Sloan P'ship. C.A. No. L-88212,1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 845, at * 5 (March 17,1989). The Sixth Appellate Court
of Appeals of Ohio held that such language conditions the broker's right to payment
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Id* at *5.2
The majority of courts interpreting phrases similar to "all commissions are
due and payable at closing" to be unambiguous, hold that the broker's commission

2

The language contained in the broker agreement in Doss appears to be
more consistent with the Court of Appeals' reasoning that in order for such
language to create a condition, it must contain words "such as: only, unless,
until, or i f rather than the language contained in the Listing Agreement before
the Court. Fairbourn. supra at fl 22.
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is conditioned upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Berman v.
Hall. 275 Md. 434, 340 A.2d 251, 252-53 (Md. 1975) (listing agreement stating that
commission was "to be due and payable upon the settlement" denotes something
more than a postponement of time for payment, and means that the commission
is not due until settlement and not payable until then); Hodges v. Lewis. 112
Cal.App.2d 526, 527-29, 246 P.2d 676 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1952) (a listing
agreement stating that a commission would be paid "upon final consummation of
said sale" means that no commission shall be considered as earned until the
happening of the specified event); Aimes v. Wesnofske. 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E.
436, 436 and 438 (1931) (a listing agreement that indicates one-half of the
commission is "to be paid on the closing of title" means that if closing does not
occur there is no duty of the seller to pay broker the half commission); Silhouette
Realty. Inc. v. Welson. 265 N.Y.S.2d 193, 24 A.D.2d 212, 213-14 (1965) (an oral
listing agreement where the broker testified that commission was to be paid "'at the
closing' or 'on the closing' or 'when they closed'" means payment of commission
was conditioned upon the actual closing); Hamerick v. Cooper River Lumber Co..
223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E.2d 575, 576 and 578 (1953) (a purchase agreement that
states the seller will pay the broker a commission "on date of settlement" means
that the commission is contingent upon closing of the underlying transaction which
is the meaning such contract language would have conveyed to the ordinary
businessman and no good reason appears why it should not be given such
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construction); Home Fed. Sav. and Loan Assoc, of Palm Beach v. Illustrated
Properties Realty. 465 So.2d 1244, 1245 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (broker
agreement stating that commission is "due and payable upon closing" is clear and
unambiguous and as a matter of law means that no commission is owed unless the
underlying real estate transaction closes); Clark v. Provident Trust Co. of
Philadelphia. 329 Pa. 421,198 A. 36, 37-39 (1938) (where a broker sent a letter to
seller stating that commission "is to be considered as earned and payable only
when settlement is finally completed," such language means that payment of
commission is conditioned upon the occurrence of closing); and Nicoud v. Boley.
211 Wis. 431, 248 N.W. 452, 453-54 (Wis. 1933) (a brokerage agreement that
states the commission is "to be paid on the day the conveyances are executed"
means that payment of the commission is dependent upon the execution of the

conveyances).
In 1968, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals stated as follows regarding the
state of the law in the U.S. regarding this issue:
It has been held that the employment in such contracts of words such
as 'when', 'after', or 'as soon as' or 'when the sale is completed' or
'upon delivery of the deed and payment of the consideration' or 'at the
date of passing title' or 'upon consummation of deal', or such similar
language clearly indicates a promise is not to be performed except
upon fulfillment of the condition. Probably one of the leading cases
directly supporting the interpretation of the contract here involved is
Aimes v. Wesnofske. 255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931), which was
concerned with the promise by the sellers of land under a written
contract to pay a broker a certain sum of money 'on the closing of title.'
The court, after a complete examination of the authorities throughout
the nation, held that such a promise was not merely one to pay on the
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date fixed by the contract for the closing of title, but one to pay such a
commission only if the closing of title should occur.
O'boyle v. Dubose-Killeen Properties. Inc.. 430 S.W.2d 273, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.
1968) (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (a sale agreement that stated "upon
closing of title" seller would pay broker commission conditioned payment of
commission upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction).
More recently in 1983, the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida held
regarding the state of the law on this issue that:
Although there are some cases to the contrary,... the great weight of
authority holds that contractual provisions for payment of a brokerage
commission at the time of sale, closing, or settlement render such
occurrence a condition precedent to the obligation of payment.
Harding Realty. Inc. v. Turn berry Towers Corp.. 436 So.2d 983, 984 (Fl. Dist. Ct.
App. 1983) (emphasis added) (a broker agreement that states the broker is entitled
to commission "at time of closing" means that the broker was employed to effect a
sale rather than to simply obtain a ready, willing and able buyer).
In fact, after extensive research of this issue, counsel for Fairbourn has been
unable to find any currently valid case law supporting the position of the Court of
Appeals ruling in this matter. There appears to be no. support for continuation of
even a "minority rule."
As indicated by the above-referenced case law, the actual majority position
regarding the interpretation of language similar to "all commissions shall be due
and payable at closing" is that closing is a condition precedent to payment of the
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broker's commission. The Court of Appeals' decision is not supported by the cases
cited in its opinion and should be overturned by this Court adopting the actual
majority position on this issue.
F.

This Court Should Adopt The New Jersey Rule That All Listing
Agreements Contain The Implied Condition That a Commission
is Due Only if The Underlying Real Estate Transaction is
Consummated.

Though not required to overturn the Court of Appeals' decision in this matter,
American urges this Court to reverse its holding in Bushnell and adopt the New
Jersey Rule that all listing agreements contain the implied condition that a
commission is due only if the underlying real estate transaction is consummated.
Numerous jurisdictions have found persuasive the public policies behind the
New Jersey Rule and have either adopted the New Jersey Rule as set forth in
Dobbs or expressly approved it, including Alaska, Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa,
Kansas, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, and
Vermont. Drake v. Hc^gy, 713 P.2d 1203 (Alaska 1986); Potter v. Ridge Realty
Corp.. 28 Conn. Supp. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969); Rodgers v. Hendrix. 92 Idaho
141, 438 P.2d 653 (1968); Mullenger v. Clause. 178 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1970);
Winkelman v. Allen. 214 Kan. 22, 519 P.2d 1377 (1974); Tristam's Landing. Inc. v.
Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727 (1975); Ehley v. Cady. 687 P.2d 687, 212
Mont. 82 (Mont. 1984); Cornett v. Nathan. 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976);
Ferrara v. Firsching. 533 P.2d 1351, 91 Nev. 254 (Nev. 1975); Goetz v. Anderson.
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274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978); Sesterv. Commonwealth. Inc.. 256 Or. 11,470 P.2d
142 (1970); Staab v. Messier. 128 Vt. 2380, 264 A.2d 790 (1970).
In addition, this rule has long been the law of the state of Maryland. Keener
v. Harrod. 2 Md. 63, 56 Am. Dec. 706 (1852). Colorado has codified the New
Jersey Rule as follows:
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding
a purchaser who is ready, willing and able to complete the purchase
by the owner until the same is consummated or is defeated by the
refusal or the neglect of the owner to consummate the same as agreed
upon.
Colo. Rev. Stat. §12-61-201 (1973).
Though still a minority rule, the New Jersey Rule as set forth in Dobbs has
been largely praised by commentators for public policy reasons as it is consistent
with the common expectation of sellers that a commission is paid to brokers from
proceeds of the sale of the real property. See e.g.. Mulliken, When Does the Seller
Owe The Broker A Commission? A Discussion of the Law and What it Teaches
About Listing Agreements. 132 Mil. L. Rev. 265 (1991) (Addendum "G" attached
hereto); and Note, Arguing for the Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to Real
Estate Brokerage Contracts. 82 B.U. L. Rev. 195 (2002) (Addendum "H" attached
hereto).
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly rejected the New Jersey Rule as set
forth in Dobbs. holding that in Utah there is not an implied condition in all broker
contracts that the underlying real estate transaction must close in order for a broker
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to be entitled to a commission. Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. v. Nielson. 672 P.2d 746,
751 (Utah 1983).
The public policies and facts of this case demonstrate why this Court should
reverse its holding in Bushnell and hold that all broker listing agreements contain
the implied condition that a commission is due only if the underlying real estate
transaction is consummated. Public policy considerations support adoption of the
New Jersey Rule because a typical businessman, or homeowner selling his home,
would expect the phrase "all commissions are due and payable at closing" to mean
that if the closing did not occur, no commission would be paid the broker. As
neither party in this matter raised this issue at the trial court level nor briefed this
issue to the Court of Appeals on appeal, both the parties, their counsel, and the trial
court judge interpreted the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable at
closing" as meaning Fairbourn's commission was contingent upon closing of the
underlying real estate transaction. The disputed issues heard at trial and briefed
on appeal to the Court of Appeals were all based on this interpretation of the phrase
and American's alleged wrongful termination of the Purchase Agreement.
As demonstrated by the actions of the parties in this matter, it is the
commonly held perception that if there is no closing of a real estate transaction,
there are no funds due a real estate broker. Adopting the New Jersey Rule would
conform Utah law with the common perception of parties buying and selling
property in the state of Utah and would eliminate claims for real estate commissions
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by any unscrupulous real estate agent who is aware of the current common
misperception of Utah law interpreting listing agreements and providing a buyer he
knows will not be able to perform. The New Jersey Rule "produces a result that is
more consistent with the realities of a real estate transaction and the expectations
of property owners in those transactions." Arguing for the Minority Rule at 221
(Addendum "H" attached hereto). Utah law as it currently stands places the burden
of risk of a real estate transaction failing on the property owner rather than the real
estate agent who is more familiar with the risk and therefore better prepared to
minimize such risk. ig\ at 207-08 (citations omitted).
The New Jersey Rule provides an incentive to real estate brokers to stay
involved with the real estate transaction until they actually close rather than moving
on to the next transaction immediately after the buyer and seller of real property
have reached an agreement. Ja\ at 221. Current Utah law places the duty of
investigating the financial capability of the buyer on the property owner rather than
the broker. ig\ at 208 (citations omitted). As a real estate professional, a broker is
better suited to bear this burden than most sellers of real estate. ]cL (citations
omitted).
As sellers of real property contemplate that a broker's commission will be
paid from proceeds of the sale, current Utah law forces real property owners to pay
for brokers' fees on failed transactions, though such funds are not readily available
to the seller due to the failure of the transaction. Furthermore, the additional burden
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placed on real estate brokers under the New Jersey Rule to see the transaction
through to completion would render the commissions earned by a real estate agent
more commensurate with the services actually being provided by the real estate
agent. Ig\ at 224 (citations omitted).
This Court should adopt the New Jersey Rule, overturning its rejection of the
same in Bushnell. which would render the Court of Appeals' interpretation of the
phrase "all commissions are due and payable at closing" moot. Such a ruling would
require the courts of the State of Utah to interpret listing agreements consistent with
what the public and typical businessman would expect in entering into such
contracts.
II.

ALTERNATIVELY, THE LISTING AGREEMENT IS AMBIGUOUS AND
SUCH AMBIGUITY SHOULD BE HELD AGAINST THE DRAFTER OF THE
LISTING AGREEMENT, FAIRBOURN.
Alternatively, the Listing Agreement is ambiguous with regard to payment of

commissions and such ambiguity should be held against the drafter of the Listing
Agreement, Fairbourn.
Several courts have held that language similar to the phrase "all commissions
are due and payable at closing" as contained in the Listing Agreement is
ambiguous and should be held against the drafter of the agreement. Fineberg
Bros. Agency. Inc. v. Berted Realty Co.. Inc.. 124 A.D.2d 549 507 N.Y.S.2d 694
(1986) (where the letter of broker to seller stated that broker's commission was "due
and payable in full upon closing," the ambiguity in such disputed language must be
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resolved against the broker who prepared it); and McMurray. supra at 502 (the
language of an ambiguous contract prepared by one party is generally to be given
such consideration as the other party would be fairly justified in giving it).
Potentially the phrase in questions may be interpreted to mean either that (1)
payment of a commission is conditioned upon closing or (2) it merely indicates date
of payment, not that commission is conditioned upon closing. "A contract is
considered ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and intention of
the parties are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach
two or more plausible meanings." C.J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted).

"[T]he general rule of contract

interpretation [is] that ambiguous language is to be construed against the drafter."
Jones. Waldo. Holbrook & and McDunnough v. Dawson. 923 P.2d 1366, 1372
(Utah 1996).
In the case at hand, Fairbourn drafted the Listing Agreement and therefore
any ambiguity contained in the phrase "all commissions shall be due and payable
at closing" should be held against Fairbourn. J& The ambiguous statement should
therefore be held to mean that payment of commissions to Fairbourn is conditioned
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction. Because no closing occurred
in this matter (as American was entitled to terminate the Purchase Agreement),
Fairbourn is not entitled to commission based on the terms of the Listing
Agreement. The Court of Appeals' decision should therefore be overturned.
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III.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE TERM
"EVIDENCE OF FINANCIAL CAPABILITY TO CLOSE" CONTAINED IN
THE PURCHASE AGREEMENT.
The Court of Appeals did not address any of the issues raised by Fairbourn

on appeal of the trial court's ruling, stating "[i]t is unnecessary for us to consider
each of these arguments, however, because there are proper grounds to affirm."
Fairbourn at fl 14. The remaining arguments of this brief are therefore related to
the rulings of the trial court in this matter.
The trial court erred in its interpretation of the language of the Purchase
Agreement between Rochelle and American that required Rochelle to produce
evidence within fourteen days of the execution of the Purchase Agreement of its
financial capability to close the purchase. The trial court ruled that such language
was ambiguous, admitted parol evidence to ascertain the intent of the parties, held
the ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same, and further held that
American failed to clarify the ambiguity when Rochelle requested clarification. (R.
231-40; Addendum "B" attached hereto.)
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Finding That The Phrase "Evidence of
Financial Capability to Close" is Ambiguous.
i.

Legal Standard.

The trial court erred in finding that the phrase "evidence of financial capability
to close" contained in the Purchase Agreement between Rochelle and American
was ambiguous. A trial court's determination that a writing is ambiguous is a
conclusion of law that is reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic
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Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1313 (Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234,
1251 (Utah 1998).
"The primary rule in interpreting a contract is to determine what the parties
intended by looking at the entire contract and all of its parts in relation to each other,
giving an objective and reasonable construction to the contract as a whole." Sears
v. Riemersma. 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-08 (Utah 1982). "A contract is considered
ambiguous if the words used to express the meaning and intention of the parties
are insufficient in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more
plausible meanings." C. J. Realty. Inc. v. Willey. 758 P.2d 923, 928 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) (citations omitted). "[A] contract provision is not necessarily ambiguous just
because one party gives that provision a different meaning than another party does
[, t]o demonstrate ambiguity, the contrary positions of the parties must each be
tenable." R & R Energies v. Mother Earth Industries. Inc.. 936 P.2d 1068,1074
(Utah 1997) (citations omitted). "Where a contract is plain and unambiguous, it
does not become ambiguous by reason of the fact that in its operation it will work
hardship upon one of the parties thereto and a corresponding advantage to the
other." 17A Am. Jur. 2D Contracts § 338.
If the language of a contract "is clear and is not susceptible of more than one
interpretation, the ordinary plain meaning of the words must be used." Bryant v.
Desert News Publishing Co.. 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d 355, 356 (1951). "The
contract must be looked at realistically in the light of the circumstances under which
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it was entered into, and if the intent of the parties can be ascertained with
reasonable certainty it must be given effect." Maw v. Noble. 10 Utah 2d 440,443,
354 P.2d 121, 123 (1960). In Maw the Utah Supreme Court held that though the
contract in question was silent on an issue, the parties were subject to the effects
of the language of the contract "which would reasonably and naturally follow." i d
at 123.

Parol "evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain

language of the contract." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778
(Utah 1977). In Commercial, the Utah Supreme Court overturned a district court's
construction of contract language where it required "the substitution of the word 'or'
for the word 'and.'" ig\ In so ruling, the Court stated "[a]ll words used by the parties
must, if possible, be given their usual and ordinary meaning and effect." Ig\
ii.

The Purchase Agreement Language is Not Ambiguous.

Paragraph 3 of the Counter-Offer to the Purchase Agreement, that was
incorporated into the final Purchase Agreement, states as follows:
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of financial
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West
Jordan]. In the event [Rochelle] is unable to provide said evidence,
[American] shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither
party shall have any further obligation to the other.
(R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) (Hereinafter this paragraph
shall be referred to as "Paragraph 3.")
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There are therefore three (3) elements required by the plain language of
Paragraph 3: (1) within fourteen days of execution of the Agreement; (2) Rochelle
is required to supply American; (3) with evidence of its financial capability to close
on the Property, by paying $2,277,000 within fourteen days of final plat plan
approval.

The primary financial obligation imposed upon Rochelle to close on the

property is the payment of $2,277,000. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached
hereto.) There is no ambiguity in this requirement. The plain and ordinary meaning
of the words used in Paragraph 3 require Rochelle to produce evidence within
fourteen (14) days of execution, that Rochelle was capable of paying the purchase
price of $2,277,000. The terms "capable" and/or "able" are not subject to ambiguity
as argued in the following Subsection IIIAiii. Rochelle needed to provide evidence
within fourteen days of execution of the Purchase Agreement that it had the ability
to pay this amount.
Hi.

Rochelle Was Not a "Capable" And/or "Able" Buyer.

The language regarding the financial capability of Rochelle as contained in
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement has been defined in case law in this
jurisdiction as well as others. Pursuant to applicable case law, Rochelle was not
a "capable" and/or "able" buyer.
The terms "capable" and "able" are synonyms and may be used
interchangeably.

Black's Law Dictionary defines "capable" as "[sjusceptible;

qualified; fitting; possessing legal power or capacity. Able, fit or adapted for."
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Black's Law Dictionary 107 (Abridged Fifth Ed. 1983). Black's defines "able"
through the definition of ability as "[cjapacity to perform an action or service; exu to
support spouse and family. Financial ability is usually construed as referring to
pecuniary ability." i d at 2. Merriam Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition
1998) defines "capability" as the quality or state of being "capable" which is in turn
defined as "having legal right to own, enjoy, or perform."
In the matter of Winkelman v. Allen. 519 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1974), the Kansas
Supreme Court overturned a jury verdict in favor of a broker seeking recovery of
commission for producing a "ready, willing and able buyer" because the proposed
purchaser's financial ability to perform did not meet the definition of an "able" buyer.
After a review of the law in numerous jurisdictions, the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that the degree of proof required to show financial capability of an "able"
buyer is a showing that "the purchaser is able to command the necessary funds to
close the deal on the date agreed upon." ] d at 1384 (citations omitted). In noting
that the term "command" is important, the court stated the "cases uniformly hold
that the purchaser cannot show ability by depending upon third persons in no way
bound to furnish funds." icL at 1385 (citations omitted). Citing the Supreme Court
of Minnesota in Shell Oil Co. v. Kapler/235 Minn. 292, 50 N.W.2d 707 (1951), the
court quoted with approval the following as an excellent discussion of a buyer's
financial ability in connection with a real estate transaction:
Generally speaking, a purchaser is financially ready and able to buy:
(1) If he has the needed cash in hand, or (2) if he is personally
E:\Lauf1e\Amertious\FalrAppeal^CBriefwpd
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possessed of assets—which in part may consist of the property to be
purchased—and a credit rating which enable him with reasonable
certainty to command the requisite funds at the required time, or (3) if
he has definitely arranged to raise the necessary money-or as much
thereof as he is unable to supply personally-by obtaining a binding
commitment for a loan to him for that purpose by a financially able third
party, irrespective of whether such loan be secured in part by the
property to be purchased.... [I]t is clear—in the light of the purpose
of the rule—that where the purchaser relies primarily, not upon his own
personal assets, but upon the process of a contemplated loan or loans
to be made to him by a third party, he is financially able to buy only if
he has a definite and binding commitment from such third party loaner.
Even though the third party is financially able, his promise is of no
avail unless made for an adequate consideration.
id. at 1385 (quoting Shell Oil at 712-130) (emphasis added); See also Potter v.
Ridge Realty Corporation. 28 Conn. Super. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969).
The Utah Supreme Court has in spirit adopted this same rationale in Sproul
v. Parks. 116 Utah 368,210 P.2d 436 (Utah 1949). In Sproul. a real estate broker
asserted a claim for a commission against the owners of real property under the
terms of a listing agreement. The listing agreement provided for the payment of a
commission to the broker if he was to find a buyer who is ready, able, and willing
to buy. I d at 437. The Utah Supreme Court concluded from the buyer's testimony
that the buyer intended to obtain funds for the purchase of the property out of the
proceeds of the sale of his own property, i d at 438. The Court stated:
Even if defendants had been presented with a written acceptance of
their counter-offer within the listing period, which never occurred, they
would be entitled to assume that the purchaser then was financially
able to perform, not that he might become able sometime in the future.
The provisions in the broker's listing contract obligates the owner to
pay a commission if a sale is procured or a purchaser is procured who
is ready, able and willing to perform. That does not mean a purchaser
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who will not be ready for some time nor one who must sell his home
first.
i d (emphasis added) (citing Cottingham v. Smith. 28 Cal.App.2d 345, 82 P.2d 479
and Willis v. Page. 19 Cal.App.2d 508, 65 P.2d 944 (1937)).
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle did not present
American with documentation of its assets or existing credit lines but rather
intended to obtain a loan secured by the Property from which it would satisfy the
balance of the purchase price at the closing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum
"B" attached hereto at page 4.) As evidenced by the two letters prepared by First
Security, Rochelle could not demonstrate within the initial 14 days of the Purchase
Agreement a current ability to close the purchase but was dependent upon a nonbinding expression of willingness from First Security that sometime in the future, it
might make a loan to Rochelle to purchase the Property, dependent upon
numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "E" and "F" attached
hereto.)
Just as there was no binding commitment for a loan from First Security, there
was no evidence of a binding commitment from the other Rochelle and Liberty
entities to guaranty a loan to Rochelle (a condition to First Security's loan), nor
other evidence that Rochelle was financially "able" to purchase the Property, such
as cash on hand or the availability of a letter of credit. Consequently Rochelle did
not demonstrate that it had a current ability to purchase; at best Rochelle
demonstrated a future contingent ability to purchase the Property.
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Even Mr. Larsen agreed that his obligation was to provide an "able" buyer,
one who has the substance or the "resource to close the deal." (T.445-46.) That
substance or resource to close was not present within fourteen (14) days of the
contract and because of the undisputed peril American found itself in nearly losing
the purchase from Coons, American did not bargain to wait months for a closing to
determine its presence.
The trial court's construction of the word "capable" requires that the disputed
language be interpreted to mean it is a "probable" or "likely" event and rewrites the
contract rather than interprets the contract by its plain meaning. Rochelle was not
a "capable" and/or "able" buyer, American terminated the Purchase Agreement in
good faith, and Fairbourn is therefor not entitled to commissions.
iv.

Fairbourn Does Not Claim an Alternative Definition of Paragraph
3 But The Court Nevertheless Rewrote it.

Fairbourn did not argue an alternative definition of Paragraph 3 before the
trial court, but asserted that the term "evidence of financial capability to close" was
ambiguous because the Purchase Agreement did not further "define that term or
the scope thereof." (R. at 125.) Fairbourn further argued that in any event, the two
letters provided by First Security were sufficient to meet the requirement of the
ambiguous language and that American's termination of the Purchase Agreement
for Rochelle's failure to provide the same was in bad faith. (R. at 125-28,173-75.)
By contending that the two First Security letters meet the necessary proof of
financial capability, Fairbourn necessarily argues that the "likelihood of future loan
Page -39-

approval" is sufficient evidence of present (14 day) capability. Thus Paragraph 3
is rewritten by both Fairbourn and the trial court to read as follows:
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both
parties, [Rochelle] shall supply [American] with evidence of [a
likelihood of obtaining future loan proceeds sufficient] financial
capability to close on the Property within the time frame referenced
above [14 days from final plat plan approval by the City of West
Jordan].
Read in this manner, proof of present capability and proof of a likelihood of
obtaining a future loan have significantly different and conflicting meanings. The
likelihood of closing a loan in the future, conditioned upon the satisfaction of the
Bank's conditions, is not the same as proof, within 14 days, of the capability to pay
$2,277,000 at closing. By inclusion of the terms "likelihood" or similar terms such
as "probable" or "more likely than not" the Court rewrote Paragraph 3 and nullified
the plain and ordinary meaning of the parties' agreement.
Such an argument is the same as made in Commercial where the Utah
Supreme Court stated that parol evidence cannot "vary or contradict" the plain
language of the contract. Commercial at 778. The effects of Paragraph 3 that
"reasonably and naturally follow" do not support modifying the language with the
term "likelihood" or similar phrases. Maw at 123.
Admittedly Paragraph 3 imposed a heavy burden upon Rochelle to prove its
ability to close, one that Rochelle could not meet. Such a burden on Rochelle,
regardless of its weight, does not render Paragraph 3 ambiguous.
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B.

If Paragraph 3 is Ambiguous, The Trial Court Erred in Construing
The Ambiguity.
i.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Hold That There Was no
Meeting of The Minds Between American And Rochelle
Regarding The Purchase Agreement.

Though briefed by American, the trial court did not expressly rule in its
Memorandum Decision whether or not there was a meeting of the minds between
American and Rochelle when they entered into the Purchase Agreement. (R. 22526; R. 231-41.)

If Paragraph 3 is indeed ambiguous, there is evidence that

Rochelle and American had vastly differing views of what was required to establish
financial capability and consequently Rochelle and American did not have a
meeting of the minds regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase
Agreement. Therefore, if there is no enforceable contract, Fairbourn has no claim
to commissions under the Listing Agreement.
A trial court's determination of whether an enforceable contract exists is a
finding of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Davies v. Olson.
746 P.2d 264, 266-67 ( Utah 1987). In overturning such a ruling by a trial court this
Court must find that the evidence is insufficient "viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley Citv at 1313. In order
to allow this Court to conduct a meaningful and expedient review of the evidence,
the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings."
Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993). In marshaling the
evidence, the challenging party "must present, in comprehensive and fastidious
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order, every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial." Moon v. Moon. 973
P.2d 431, 437 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). After constructing this array of competent
evidence, the challenging party "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence . . .
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the
evidence is clearly erroneous." West Valley City at 1315.
If after parties enter into a contract, "circumstances disclosed a latent
ambiguity in the meaning of an essential word by which one of the parties meant
one thing and the other a different thing, the difference going to the essence of the
supposed contract, the result is that there is no contract."

17A Am. Jur. 2D

Contracts § 31. In Davies. after detailed review of contract negotiation, the Utah
Court of Appeals has previously upheld a finding there was no meeting of minds
regarding the contract price "[gjiven the disparity in the testimony regarding the
contract price." Davies at 267. "[A]n honest difference of understanding as to what
the contract was is fatal to reformation, for in such case there is no meeting of the
minds of the parties and no pre-existing agreement to which the written instrument
can be conformed." Ingram v. Forrer. 563 P.2d 181,182 (Utah, 1977).
In marshaling the evidence, there were six witnesses who testified in this
matter. Mr. Alvarez testified on behalf of American, Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson
testified on behalf of Fairbourn, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner testified on behalf of
Rochelle, and Mr. Simon testified on behalf of First Security. (Mr. Alvarez T. 8-229;
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Mr. Fairboum T. 303-390; Mr. Larson T. 390-468; Mr. Clark T. 259-285; Mr.
Gardner T. 286-302; Mr. Simon T. 229-258.)
Because the court did not state its decision on this issue, it is presumed that
only the witnesses testifying on behalf of American and Rochelle would proffer
relevant evidence regarding meeting of the minds regarding Paragraph 3 of the
Purchase Agreement. Mr. Clark testified that Mr. Alvarez did request proof of ability
to perform in their initial meeting, but did not request or expect a binding loan
commitment or letter of credit, and that Rochelle wouldn't have been able to have
cash available within two weeks. (T. 262-64, 274.) Mr. Clark also testified that Mr.
Alvarez asked for "just a letter from a lender that states that more than likely you will
be credit worthy and that sort of thing." (T. 270.) He also indicated that during the
meeting, he told Mr. Alvarez that Rochelle was "not going to be able to get anything
approaching a loan approval because we won't be able to get appraisal on the
property and that sort of thing, and the sort of things that the lender is going to
need." (T. 270.)
Mr. Gardner testified that his understanding of Paragraph 3 was that Rochelle
would provide a letter from its bank discussing the banking relationship, what
banking lines Rochelle had, and how much business Rochelle had done with the
bank. (T. 289-90.) Mr. Gardner further testified that he believed the initial letter
provided by First Security satisfied the requirements of Paragraph 3. (T. 293.)
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In contrast, Mr. Alvarez testified that he expected that Rochelle would provide
cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit or its equivalent to satisfy Paragraph 3. (T.
77,167-68.) Mr. Alvarez based this belief on Rochelle's purchase of the Property
not being contingent upon financing and his urgent need to verify Rochelle's current
ability to close. (T. 225-27.)
As noted above, American and Rochelle had extremely different
understandings of what Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement required. The trial
court found credible Mr. Clark's testimony regarding Rochelle's inability to provide
cash, a loan commitment or a letter of credit with fourteen days of execution of the
Purchase Agreement, as he cites the same in his Memorandum Decision as a
basis or his ruling.3 (R. 235; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 5.) The trial
court however disregarded the testimony of Mr. Alvarez where he indicated he had
a vastly different understanding of the requirements of the Listing Agreement.
The fatal flaw in the trial court's finding is that although Rochelle was unable
to provide evidence of its financial capability in the form of proof of available cash,
a loan commitment or letter of credit within fourteen days of the execution of the
Purchase Agreement, a different party with the financial capability sought by Mr.
Alvarez could have provided American evidence of the same within fourteen days.4
3

It is this finding of the Court that confirms that American was justified in
terminating the Agreement. Rochelle could not provide the evidence required by
Paragraph 3.
4

Mr. Clark's testimony is consistent with the fact that Rochelle couldn't
produce the evidence required by Paragraph 3 within 14 days.
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For example, if Rochelle had cash available in an account, it could have produced
evidence of those funds within fourteen days. If RocheHe had an existing line of
credit it could use to purchase the Property, it could have produced evidence of
such line of credit within fourteen days. If Rochelle had other assets available or
if its bank could issue a letter of credit, it could have produced evidence of the same
easily with fourteen days. It is precisely this type of evidence of current financial
ability to close that American expected to receive within fourteen days of execution
of the Purchase Agreement. (T. 77,100,102,105,167-68, 225-27.)
The trial court failed to rule whether there was a meeting of minds, though the
issue was briefed by American.

(R. 225-226; R. 231-41.)

Because of the

materiality of Paragraph 3, and the completely different understandings of the same
of American and Rochelle, there was no meeting of the minds between American
and Rochelle regarding an essential and material element of the Purchase
Agreement, and therefore no enforceable contract.
ii.

The Trial Court Erred in Its Admission of Parol Evidence That
Contradicted The Plain Language of Paragraph 3 of The
Purchase Agreement.

If Paragraph 3 is ambiguous, the trial court erred in its admission of parol
evidence that contradicted Paragraph 3 rather than clarified it. The trial court's
admission of parol evidence is a question of law that is reviewed for correctness.
Glauser Storage. L L C , v. Smedley. 2001 Utah Ct. App. 141, fl 14, 27 P.3d 565
(citations omitted).
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If an integrated contract is found to be ambiguous, parol evidence may be
admissible "only in the very limited situations where it is needed to clarify—not
contradict—any ambiguous terms in the agreement." Jd at U 21 n. 2. (emphasis in
original) (citing Hall v. Process Instruments & Control. Inc.. 890 P.2d 1024, 1026
(Utah 1995). "Parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show
what the entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from
contradicting, the writing." Webb v. R.O.A. Gen.. Inc.. 804 P.2d 547, 551 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991) (emphasis in original) (quoting Stanger v. Sentinel Sec. Life Ins. Co..
669 P.2d 1201, 1205 (Utah 1983)). Though parol evidence may be admitted to
show the intent of the parties if contract language is vague or uncertain, "such
evidence cannot be permitted to vary or contradict the plain language of the
contract" and all words used in a contract must "be given their usual and ordinary
meaning and effect." Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair. 565 P.2d 776, 778 (Utah
1977) (citations omitted).
As noted above in Section III.A, the plain language of Paragraph 3 of the
Purchase Agreement contains three elements: (1) within fourteen days of execution
of the Agreement; (2) Rochelle is required to supply American; (3) with evidence of
its financial capability to close on the Property within fourteen days of final plat plan
approval. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) Rochelle therefore
had fourteen days to provide American evidence of its financial capability. The trial
court received into evidence, and based its ruling in part, on testimony that Rochelle
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could not produce evidence of its ability to pay $2,277,000 in the form of "available
cash, a loan commitment, or letter of credit because none of this evidence could
have been obtained from a bank within the 14 days allotted for its production." (R.
235; Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 5.) David Clark, owner of Rochelle
and a licensed realtor, stated that cash, letter of credit, or firm commitment within
fourteen days of execution "wouldn't be possible[, i]t just isn't the way it works out
there, to be able to get that type of thing within two weeks." (T. 260, 263-64.)
Claiming ambiguity when Rochelle admittedly could not provide the required
proof, the trial court then received evidence in the form of testimony from David
Clark, Mr. Fairboum, Mr. Larsen, and Mr. Gardner and the letters of First Security,
that future contingent loans, a mere probability, was sufficient to establish
Rochelle's current financial capability.

Such testimony contradicts the plain

language of Paragraph 3. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached hereto.) The
plain meaning of such language is that Rochelle was to have proof, within 14 days,
of money readily available to actually close the sale. All of the parol evidence
allowed by the trial court would render Paragraph 3 meaningless and force
American to wait until closing before it would know if Rochelle could perform.
American clearly bargained to receive within fourteen days' evidence that Rochelle
could perform and the trial court's consideration of parol evidence and its
subsequent ruling nullifies this provision.
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Though the trial court was correct in finding testimony credible that a binding
loan commitment could not be obtained within fourteen days, it's finding that a party
cannot obtain proof that it has available cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit,
sufficient assets to secure a loan, or other evidence within fourteen days is incorrect
on its face and contradicts reason, logic and the plain language of Paragraph 3. (R.
235; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at page 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.)
If Rochelle had cash available in an account at its bank, it could have
produced evidence of those available funds. If Rochelle had an existing line of
credit it could use to purchase the Property, it could have produced evidence of
such line of credit within fourteen days. If Rochelle had other assets available or
if its bank could issue a letter of credit, it could have produced evidence of the
same, easily within fourteen days. It is precisely this type of evidence of current
financial ability to close that American expected to receive within fourteen days of
execution of the Purchase Agreement. (T. 77, 100, 102, 105, 167-68, 225-27.)
Proof of anything less than readily available funds, is not evidence of the capability
to close and is therefore inconsistent with the usual and ordinary meaning of the
words contained in Paragraph 3. (R. 410, Ex. No. 5; Addendum "B" attached
hereto.)
iii.

The Trial Court Erred in Holding Any Ambiguity in Paragraph 3
Against American.

If the language of Paragraph 3 is indeed ambiguous, the trial court erred in
holding such ambiguity against American as the drafter of the same. The trial
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court's interpretation of common law is a conclusion of law that is reviewed for
correctness. Trujillo v. Jenkins. 840 P. 2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). The trial court
cited Jones Waldo Holbrook and McDunnough v. Dawson. 923 P. 2d 1366,1372
(Utah 1996) and Simonsen v. Travis. 728 P. 2d 999, 1002 (Utah 1986) for the
proposition that an ambiguous contract is held against the drafter of the document,
stating that Paragraph 3 was ambiguous and that American failed to clarify its
meaning when asked by Rochelle. (R. 237-38; Addendum "B" attached hereto at
pages 7-8.)
Both Jones Waldo and Simonsen are easily distinguished from this matter
because they dealt with fact situations involving parties with unequal bargaining
power and the party with greater power being the sole drafter of the ambiguous
agreement. In the case at hand, both parties had equal bargaining power and both
participated in the drafting of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 231-35; Addendum "B"
attached hereto at pages 1-5.) In Jones Waldo, the Utah Court of Appeals held that
a written attorney fee agreement was subsequently modified by an oral agreement
between the parties. Jones Waldo at 1372-73. In construing the oral agreement
against the attorney, the Court of Appeals stated that it "is the general rule that in
construing a contract between attorney and client, doubts are resolved against the
attorney and the construction adopted which is favorable to the client" and that
"because of the confidential nature of the attorney-client relationship, compensation
agreements made during the existence of that relationship are closely scrutinized
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and construed most strongly against the attorney." JdL at 1372 (citations omitted).
In Simonsen. the Utah Supreme Court held that a release drafted solely by an
insurer contained ambiguous language regarding release of both medical and
property damage claims when the insured had previously refused to sign a release
unless it was limited to only her property damage claims. Simonsen at 1002. In so
ruling, the Court stated that a general release "must at a minimum be
unambiguous, explicit, and unequivocal." ]dL (citations omitted).
In the case at hand, the Purchase Agreement was heavily negotiated by both
Rochelle and American with both parties drafting language contained in the final
version of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 233-34; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at
pages 3-4.)

This case is similar to the facts of Nunn v. Chemical Waste

Management. Inc.. 856 F.2d 1464 (10th Cir. 1988) where the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that any ambiguity in a business acquisition agreement would not be
held against the drafter because the "rule that contracts are to be construed against
the draftsperson is simply inapplicable in this case in which the parties brought
equal bargaining power to the negotiation table." Nunn at 1469. Both Rochelle and
American were real property developers and well-versed in contract negotiation and
drafting. (R. 231-35; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at pages 1-5.) Four different
versions were circulated between the parties before being executed by both
Rochelle and American. (R. 233-34; Exhibit "B" attached hereto at pages 3-4.)
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This Court should construe the language of Paragraph 3 in light of the
circumstances in which it was entered into without strictly construe the language
of Paragraph 3 against American because both parties participated in the drafting
of the Purchase Agreement and had equal bargaining position.
iv.

The Trial Court Erred in Construing The Extrinsic Evidence of
The Intent of American And Rochelle.

If Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement is ambiguous regarding the
"evidence of financial capability to close," the trial court erred in construing the parol
evidence regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the
Purchase Agreement. The trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract
based on extrinsic evidence is a question of fact that is reviewed under clearlyerroneous standard. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,
1313 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); Craig Food Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279,
283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In overturning such a ruling by a trial court this Court
must find that the evidence is insufficient "viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the trial court's construction." West Valley City at 1313. As noted in
Section III. B. i above, the challenging party "must marshal all the evidence in
support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863 P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App.
1993).
In this matter, the trial court heard testimony from six witnesses. Mr. Alvarez
testified on behalf of American, Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson testified on behalf of
Fairbourn, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner testified on behalf of Rochelle, and Mr. Simon
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testified on behalf of First Security. (Mr. Alvarez T. 8-229; Mr. Fairbourn T. 303390; Mr. Larson T. 390-468; Mr. Clark T. 259-285; Mr. Gardner T. 286-302; Mr.
Simon T. 229-258.)
Both Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson had a financial interest in the outcome of
this action as agents of Fairbourn. (T. 306-09; 436-37.) Fairbourn represented
both Rochelle and American as set forth in the dual Listing Agreement. (T. 315; R.
410, Ex. No. 3; Addendum "D" attached hereto.)
Testimony regarding the intent of the parties regarding Rochelle's evidence
of financial capability to close varied broadly during the course of the bench trial.
The testimonies of Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were all
fairly consistent, with the testimony of Mr. Alvarez sharply contradictory.

Mr.

Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez had
requested proof of Rochelle's ability to-perform during their meetings. (T. 312-19;
T. 404-18; T. 262-63; T. 289-92.)

However, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark,

and Mr. Gardner testified that Mr. Alvarez made no requests for cash, a binding
loan commitment, or a letter of credit during their meetings. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T.
263; T. 289-90.)

Mr. Clark testified that it would have been impossible to have

produced anything too strong financially within two weeks of signing the Purchase
Agreement. (T. 264.) Mr. Clark testified that Mr. Alvarez indicated during the
August 1999 meeting that all he needed was a letter from a lender that stated it was
more likely than not that Rochelle would receive a loan. (T. 268-69.) Mr. Fairbourn,
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Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner thought that the first letter provided by First
Security was more than sufficient to meet the evidence of proof of financial
capability to close as required by the Development Agreement. (T. 320; T. 420; T.
273; T. 293.) Mr. Fairbourn's testimony at trial was contradicted by his earlier
deposition testimony, which was read into the record, that he believed that "we
never did establish if Rochelle could perform or not." (T. 373-74.) Mr. Fairboum
further testified that American did not have an obligation to negotiate after the
fourteen day period had expired. (T. 375.) Mr. Gardner did not include language
regarding proof of Rochelle's financial ability to close in the first draft of the contract
proposed to American because he did not think it was a key point of the deal. (T.
292.) Mr. Larson testified that it was clear during the discussions in the August
1999 meeting that Rochelle would be borrowing money to fund the purchase. (T.
402-03.)
All of the witnesses involved with the negotiations of the Purchase Agreement
agreed that American was in a precarious situation regarding the Property subject
to the Purchase Agreement and wished to be able to close quickly with a
dependable buyer. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01; T. 261-63; T. 289.) The trial
court's memorandum decision accurately characterizes this evidence:
American had entered into an agreement to buy the West
Jordan property from its owners, the Coons. At the time that Mr.
Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had
encountered considerable obstacles in gaining the approvals from the
city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property. These
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problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in
peril.
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead
on three fronts: the effort to gain municipal approval of its development
plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with the Coons;
and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the
Coons' selling price, put some money in American's pocket, and free
American from its entanglements with West Jordan officials. Mr.
Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third
undertaking. He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property
marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had received plat approval but
which had not been improved.
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999
when the Coons notified American that it was "ending and terminating
any and all agreements" relating to the property because American
had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate
its contract of sale with American through December 1, 1999. As
American worked to salvage the deal with the Coons it scored a
success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the
necessary zoning for the property if American would acquire an
adjacent parcel of property owned by an opponent of American's
proposed development.
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the
performance of its task. Through a contact with real estate agent
Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn
learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was
an affiliate of Liberty Homes, a major residential home builder in the
Salt Lake City area.
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to
buy the property. Rochelle's proposal, presented in the form of "an
official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among representatives
of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of
possible transactions were discussed at the meeting, including a
remark by Mr. Alvarez that any deal must include a provision
concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended
the meeting, was aware of the exigent circumstances in which
American found itself and recognized that American had a legitimate
interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform.
(R. 231-33; Addendum "A" attached hereto at pages 1-3.)

E \Laurie\Amerhous\FalrAppeal\SCBrief wpd

Page -54-

The trial court then compared the language requiring Rochelle to provide
evidence of financial capability to close with the language contained in paragraph
7.2 of the purchase agreement regarding a financing contingency which is form
language in the standard Utah real estate purchase contract. (R. 234) Section 7.2
was inapplicable regarding the Purchase Agreement between American and
Rochelle because Rochelle's purchase was not contingent upon Rochelle obtaining
financing. (T. 406.) However, the standard language of 7.2 states that even if a
buyer is unable to obtain financing, the buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller
perform by "providing the seller with absolute assurance that the proceeds required
to close the sale are available." (R. 234; T. 406; R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C"
attached hereto.) In addition, the Purchase Agreement has a total purchase price
of $2,277,000, closing was to occur within fourteen days after American received
plat plan approval from the city of West Jordan, and the purchase price was due in
cash at closing. (R. 410 at Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.)
The trial court then disregarded both the exigent circumstances and the
testimony of Mr. Alvarez regarding what Rochelle was to provide under Paragraph
3. It then construed Paragraph 3 and the Purchase Agreement in accordance with
the arguments of Fairbourn. (R. 236; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 6.)
The trial court's construction is clearly erroneous in that it determined that the
language regarding Rochelle's production of evidence of financial capability to close
was somehow inferior to the "absolute assurance" language found in paragraph 7.2
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of the Purchase Agreement. Such language, along with the purchase price and
closing requirements contained in the Purchase Agreement, demonstrate that
Rochelle was to provide evidence of its closing ability within two weeks of the
execution of the Purchase Agreement. Despite uncontroverted testimony from the
negotiators of the Purchase Agreement that American needed to close quickly and
with a financially strong buyer, and uncontroverted testimony that Rochelle's
purchase of the Property was not contingent on financing, the court erred in holding
that the intent of the parties was to not require Rochelle to provide absolute
assurance to American that it had that ability to close.
The language and context in which the Purchase Contract was negotiated
are much more credible evidence than the evidence of witnesses who have a
financial stake in the outcome of this matter (Mr. Fairbourn and Mr. Larson) or
witnesses that lost out on a potentially profitable transaction (Mr. Clark and Mr.
Gardner).

The construction of the Purchase Agreement by the trial court is

therefore clearly erroneous regarding Rochelle's duty to provide evidence of
financial capability to close and should therefore be overturned.
a.

The Trial Court Erred in Holding That American Failed to
Communicate, or Subsequently Clarify. What it Would
Consider Proof of Rochelle's Financial Ability to Close.

The trial court erred in determining that American failed to communicate to
Rochelle its expectations of the evidence of Rochelle's financial capability that it
would find satisfactory. (R. 237.) The trial court further erred in determining that
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American failed to provide Rochelle any meaningful clarification of its interpretation
of what would be sufficient evidence for the benefit of Rochelle. (R. 237.)
If the terms of the purchase agreement are ambiguous regarding the
"evidence of financial capability to close" the trial court erred in construing the parol
evidence regarding the intent of American and Rochelle when entering into the
Purchase Agreement. The trial court's construction of an ambiguous contract is a
question of fact that is reviewed under clearly erroneous standard. Craig Food
Industries. Inc. v. Weihing. 746 P. 2d 279,283 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). In overturning
such a ruling by a trial court this Court must find that the evidence is insufficient
"viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction."
West Valley City at 1313. As noted in Section III. B. i above, the challenging party
"must marshal all the evidence in support of the findings." Robb v. Anderton. 863
P.2d 1322, 1328 (Ut. Ct App. 1993).
Though Mr. Simon produced the two letters from First Security which were
to be the evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to close, both Mr. Alvarez and Mr.
Simon testified that they did not communicate directly with each other regarding the
evidence of financial ability that American would find sufficient. (T. 145-46; T. 16869; T. 200; T. 237-38) Therefore, any communications from American to First
Security regarding what American would find as sufficient evidence of financial
capability to close would have been communicated from American through either/or
Fairbourn and Rochelle to Mr. Simon at First Security.
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Consistent with the trial court's ruling, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark
and Mr. Gardner all testified that though Armando requested proof of Rochelle's
financial ability to perform, he did not mention cash, a binding loan commitment, or
a letter of credit before the initial letter. (T. 318-19; T. 404; T. 263; T. 289-90.)
Furthermore, Mr. Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner all
consistently testified that even after American had rejected the initial letter from First
Security that American never clarified that it sought evidence of cash, a letter of
credit or a firm loan commitment from First Security would be sufficient. (T. 274; T.
282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 386-87; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.)
Furthermore, all four initially thought that both letters from First Security were more
than sufficient to meet the purchase agreement's requirement that Rochelle provide
American evidence of its financial ability to close. (T. 53-75; T. 306-10; T. 400-01;
T. 261-63; T. 289.)
Mr. Alvarez's testimony completely contradicted the testimony of Mr.
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark, and Mr. Gardner. Mr. Alvarez testified that he
specifically requested that Rochelle provide cash, a line of credit, a letter of credit.
(T. 59-60; T. 503-06; T. 529-30.) Mr. Alvarez testified that after the initial letter from
First Security Bank, he clarified to Mr.Tairbourn that he required evidence in the
form of cash, or an existing line of credit. (T. 174; T. 224-25; T. 503-06.) The trial
court disregarded this testimony, holding that American "declined to provide any
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meaningful clarification of [its] interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle." (R. 237;
Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 7.)
The fatal flaw in the court's reasoning is that it did not acknowledge Mr.
Simon's testimony. Mr. Simon at First Security was the only truly "independent"
witness in this matter regarding what was communicated to him regarding
American's requirements for evidence of Rochelle's financial ability. Mr. Simon
testified with respect to the first letter requested from First Security Bank, that he
could not provide Rochelle with an unconditional commitment letter and was unsure
whether one was requested or not. (T. 246-47.) When the initial letter was rejected
by American, Mr. Simon testified that someone acting on Rochelle's behalf
requested an absolute loan commitment which he was not able to provide. (T. 248,
252.) Furthermore, Mr. Simon's consistent pretrial deposition testimony was read
into the record where he stated that his understanding was that American was
wanting an absolute commitment from First Security "again" after rejecting the first
letter. (T. 253-54.)
In summary, Mr. Alvarez requested that Rochelle provide evidence of cash,
a line of credit, or a loan commitment. (T. 274; T. 282-83; T. 321; T. 356; T. 38687; T. 420-24; T. 439; T. 447; T. 451-52; T. 459-64.) Though the testimonies of Mr.
Fairbourn, Mr. Larson, Mr. Clark and Mr. Gardner were that Mr. Alvarez had
requested no such evidence, Mr. Simon at First Security had the same
understanding as Mr. Alvarez: that American required an absolute commitment
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regarding Rochelle's financial ability to close the purchase. (T 246-48, 252.)
Though Mr. Alvarez only spoke with Mr. Fairbourn regarding clarification of
Paragraph 3 of the Purchase Agreement after the first letter from First Security, that
same request somehow reached the ears of Mr. Simon at First Security who was
unable to provide such evidence of Rochelle's financial capability. The trial court's
conclusion that American had failed to communicate what it required from Rochelle
is clearly erroneous in light of the independent testimony of Mr. Simon, that he had
a clear understanding of what American was requesting, he was just unable to
provide it.
b.

The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Impute Rochelle's
Agent's Understanding of The Financial Capability Clause
to Rochelle.

The trial court erred in failing to impute the knowledge of Rochelle's agent,
Mr. Larson, to Rochelle regarding what evidence of Rochelle's financial ability to
close Rochelle needed to provide American to satisfy Paragraph 3. Imputation of
an agent's knowledge to a principal is a conclusion of law by the trial court that is
reviewed for correctness. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co.. 818 P.2d
1311,1313 (Utah 1991); Jeffs v. Stubbs. 970 P. 2d 1234,1251 (Utah 1998).
Under Utah law, personal knowledge of an agent is imputed to the principal
"concerning a matter as to which . . . it is his duty to give the principal information."
Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co.. 811 P.2d 151, 157 (Utah 1991).

"An agent's

knowledge of matters within the scope of his or her authority is imputed to his or her

E:\Uurie\Amertous\FairAppeaf\SCBrief.wpd

Page -60-

principal, for it is presumed that such knowledge will be disclosed to the principal."
Maoris v. Sculptured Software. Inc.. 2001 UT 43, ^ 21, 24 P.3d 984 (citing FAM Fin.
Corp. v. Hansen Dairy. Inc.. 617 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Utah 1980).
In the matter at hand, Marshall Larson acted as Rochelle's real estate agent
regarding the purchase of the Property and was associated with Fairbourn during
the events relevant hereto. (T. 390-92.) At trial, Mr. Larson testified that after
American rejected the initial First Security letter, his understanding was that Mr.
Alvarez of American was "saying that he needs some kind of credit lines or
something stronger: and that American requested evidence that's "got to have
something about lines of credit." (T. 420-21.) When Mr. Larson met with Mr. Simon
of First Security to obtain stronger evidence, he testified that he had indicated that
such evidence "has got to have something credit or something mores substantial"
and that Mr. Simon indicated he couldn't "make any guarantees." (T. 423-24.) Mr.
Larson further testified that he jokingly requested Mr. Simon "to give me a
guarantee and have it notarized that you will give me the money." (T. 450.)
As Rochelle's agent, such knowledge and understanding is imputed to
Rochelle.5 The trial court's conclusion that American "declined to provide any
meaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle" is not
consistent with the testimony of Rochelle's agent regarding the same. (R. 237;

5

As a dual agent, all knowledge of Mr. Fairbourn about American's needs
should also be imputed to Rochelle.
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Addendum "A" attached hereto at page 7.) Imputation of such knowledge to
Rochelle mandates reversal of the trial court's ruling in favor of Fairbourn.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT FAIRBOURN HAD
PRODUCED AN "ABLE" BUYER.
The trial court erred in failing to find that Fairbourn had met its contractual

duties under the Listing Agreement to provide American an "able" buyer, a condition
precedent to earning commission, pursuant to Utah law as set forth in Sproul v.
Parks. 116 Utah 368, 210 P. 2d 436 Utah (1949). (See Larson testimony at page
445-46 where he agrees that he must provide a willing and able buyer.) Though
this issue was raised and briefed before the trial court, the trial court did not mention
it its Memorandum Decision. (R. 219-21; R. 231-40.) A question of "contract
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence [is a] matter of law" and the
appellate court accords "the trial court's interpretation no presumption of
correctness." Lee v. Barnes. 1999 UT Ct. App. 126, fl 7, 977 P.2d 550 (citations
omitted).
The Listing Agreement between Fairbourn and American states that
Fairbourn is to procure an offer from Rochelle "at the price and upon the terms set
forth herein" and "upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to" American. (R.
410, Ex. No. 3.; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) Those terms include the financial
capability of Rochelle as contained in Paragraph 3 which is therefore a condition
precedent to Fairbourn earning commissions and has been defined in case law in
this jurisdiction as well as others as argued above in Section III. A. iii. As the Utah
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Supreme Court stated in Sproul. an able buyer "does not mean a purchaser who
will not be ready for some time." Sproul. at 438.
The Court of Appeals mistakenly characterized American's arguments on this
issue that the phrase a "ready, willing, and able buyer" would need to be
incorporated into the Listing Agreement, which the Court indicated would be an
inappropriate rewriting of the Listing Agreement. Fairbourn at fl 14 F.N. 1. As set
forth in the preceding paragraph, the Listing Agreement incorporates the terms and
conditions of the Purchase Agreement. (R. 410, Ex. No. 3; Addendum "D" attached
hereto.) Fairbourn therefore had the duty to procure a buyer, Rochelle, who could
"[wjithin Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties . . . supply
[American] with evidence of financial capability to close on the Property." (R. 410,
Ex. No. 5; Addendum "C" attached hereto.) The express language of the Listing
Agreement incorporates the financial capability condition of the Purchase
Agreement located in Paragraph 3 and is therefore a condition precedent to
Fairbourn earning commission.
In the case at hand, the evidence is undisputed that Rochelle intended to
obtain a loan from which it would satisfy the balance of the purchase price at the
closing of the purchase. (R. 234; Addendum "B" attached hereto at page 4.) As
evidenced by the two letters prepared by First Security, Rochelle could not
demonstrate within the 14 day period a current ability to close the purchase but was
dependent upon a non-binding expression of willingness from First Security that
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sometime in the future it might make a loan to Rochelle to purchase the Property,
dependent upon numerous factors. (R. 410, Ex. Nos. 7 and 11; Addenda "E" and
"F" attached hereto.) Rochelle did not demonstrate within 14 days that it had a
current ability to purchase; at best Rochelle demonstrated a future contingent ability
to purchase the Property. Because Rochelle was not able to satisfy the condition
precedent set forth in Paragraph 3 evidencing that it was an "able" buyer, American
was entitled to terminate the Purchase Agreement.

Because this condition

precedent was not satisfied, Fairbourn failed to procure a buyer on terms
acceptable to American and is therefore not entitled to commissions.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court (i)
overturn the Court of Appeals, (ii) hold that Appellees' commission was conditioned
upon closing of the underlying real estate transaction, (iii) reverse the judgment of
the trial court, and (iv) remand this matter to the trial court for calculation and award
of Appellant's attorneys' fees and costs due under the Listing Agreement both at
trial and on appeal.
DATED this

7^

day of August, 2003.

DENNIS K. POOLE
JOHN L. ADAMS
POOLE & ADAMS, L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following
this ^ f j d a y of August, 2003:

Neil R. Sabin [2840]
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C.
1100 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELL
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ADDENDA
Addendum "A"
Fairbourn Commercial. Inc. v. American Housing Partners. Inc.. 2003
UtahCt.App. 98, 68 P.3d 1038
Addendum"B"
Memorandum Decision. Dated October 29, 2001 granting Fairbourn
Commercial, Inc. against American Housing Partners, Inc.
Addendum "C"
Real Estate Purchase Contract between Rochelle Properties, LC and
American Housing Partners, Inc. dated August 30,1999
Addendum "D"
Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement between Fairbourn
Commercial Inc. and American Housing Partners, Inc. dated August
13,1999
Addendum "E"
Letter from First Security Bank dated September 10,1999
Addendum "F"
Letter from First Security Bank dated September 17,1999
Addendum "G"
Mulliken, When Does the Seller Owe The Broker A Commission? A
Discussion of the Law and What it Teaches About Listing Agreements,
132 Mil. L Rev. 265 (1991)
Addendum "H"
Note, Arguing for the Minority Rule: An Efficient Approach to Real
Estate Brokerage Contracts, 82 B.U. L. Rev. 195 (2002)
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t>
Court of Appeals of Utah.
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL, INC, a Utah
corporation, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS, INC, a
Delaware corporation, Defendant and
Appellant.
No. 20020060-CA.
April 3, 2003.
Real estate broker brought action against real estate
developer to recover sales commission from the sale
of real property pursuant to listing agreement signed
by the parties. The Third District Court, Salt Lake
Department, Ronald E. Nehring, entered judgment in
favor of broker in the amount of $153,000 plus
attorney fees and costs. Developer appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Jackson, P.J, held that closing was
not condition precedent to payment of commission.

interpretation no presumption of correctness.
[3] Brokers <@^>63(2)
65k63(2)
Real estate broker, by procuring and presenting to
real estate developer an offer to buy developer's real
property, performed its contractual duties under terms
of listing agreement, and was thus deserving of
commission "in cash at closing," even though closing
ultimately did not occur; absent words widely
recognized as conditional, listing agreement phrase,
"due and payable at closing," did not create condition
precedent to broker's commission, but rather merely
established time for commission to be paid.
[4] Brokers <®^40
65k40
A "listing agreement" is a contract between a real
estate broker and a seller.
[5] Contracts <@^ 147(2)
95kl47(2)

Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Contracts <©=> 176(1)
95kl76(l)

When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to the
contract's four corners to determine the parties'
intentions, which are controlling.
[6] Contracts <®=* 147(2)
95kl47(2)

[1] Contracts <®=> 176(3)
95kl76(3)
A contract's interpretation may be either a question of
law, determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic evidence of
intent.
[2] Appeal and Error <©=> 842(8)
30k842(8)
[2] Appeal and Error <@^ 1008.1(10)
30kl008.1(10)
If a contract is not integrated or is ambiguous and the
trial court finds facts regarding the parties' intent
based on extrinsic evidence, the Court of Appeals will
not disturb the findings unless they are clearly
erroneous; however,
questions
of
contract
interpretation not requiring resort to extrinsic
evidence are matters of law, and on such questions
the Court of Appeals accords the trial court's
Copr. © West 2003 No Claim

[6] Evidence <®^=>448
157k448
If the language within the four corners of the contract
is unambiguous, then a court does not resort to
extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and a
court determines the parties' intentions from the plain
meaning of the contractual language as a matter of
law.
[7] Brokers <®=*63(1)
65k63(l)
[7] Brokers <§=> 64(1)
65k64(l)
Absent a contractual provision which conditions the
right to a commission on the performance or part
performance of the buyer, the broker is not an insurer
of the subsequent performance of the contract and is
Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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68P.3d 1038
(Cite as: 68 P.3d 1038)
not deprived of his right to a commission by the
failure or refusal of one party to perform.
[8] Brokers <®^>63(2)
65k63(2)
[8] Brokers <©^>64(2)
65k64(2)
If a broker's listing agreement imposes unconditional
liability for broker's fees or is silent on the matter, a
court will not imply a condition making such fees
contingent on either the buyer's or seller's
performance of the purchase contract.
[9] Brokers <®=*64(1)
65k64(l)
Absent a contractual provision to the contrary, a real
estate broker, whose commission is due at closing, is
entitled to full commission at closing regardless of the
buyer's subsequent performance.
[10] Brokers <§==>63(2)
65k63(2)
[10] Brokers <®^>64(2)
65k64(2)
The phrase in a broker's listing agreement, "at
closing," by itself, is not a condition precedent to a
broker's receipt of commission.
*1039 Dennis K. Poole and John L. Adams, Salt
Lake City, for Appellant.
Neil R. Sabin, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before JACKSON, P.J., and GREENWOOD, and
ORME. JJ.
OPINION
JACKSON, Presiding Judge:
K 1 American Housing Partners, Inc. (American)
appeals from a judgment awarding Fairbourn
Commercial, Inc. (Fairbourn) a real estate
commission of $153,000 plus attorney fees and costs
in the amount of $45,001. We affirm.

BACKGROUND
1) 2 In September 1998, American, an experienced
real estate developer, entered into a contract to

purchase real property in West Jordan, Utah (the
property) from a group of sellers (the Coon Group).
Armando Alvarez (Alvarez), a licensed real estate
broker, handled all the transactions for American,
which is owned by Alvarez's brother.
t 3 In early 1999, Alvarez approached Jim Fairbourn
(Jim) of Fairbourn, a real estate brokerage, seeking
assistance in selling the property. At the time Alvarez
began his conversations with Jim, American had been
unable to gain the approvals from the City of West
Jordan necessary to develop the property. Because of
the delay in city approval, the Coon Group and
American signed an Addendum to the sales contract
extending the closing date until April 5, 1999. In
April 1999, the city denied the zoning application.
K 4 In June or July 1999, Alvarez solicited Jim to
help him find a buyer for the entire property due to
his frustrations with the city. In late July 1999, the
Coon Group threatened to terminate its agreement to
sell the property because American had failed to
close. In late August 1999, the Coon Group agreed to
reinstate their contract of sale with American through
December 1, 1999. In the meantime, the city
approved the necessary zoning for the property
contingent on American acquiring an adjacent parcel
of property owned by an opponent of American's
proposed development.
U 5 In August 1999, Marshall Larson (Larson), an
agent for Fairbourn, obtained an interested buyer for
the property. The buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C.
(Rochelle), was an affiliate under common control
with Liberty Homes, Inc., a large Utah homebuilder.
On August 6, 1999, David C. Clark (Clark), *1040
manager of Rochelle, signed a letter of intent to
purchase the property for $23,000 per lot.
K 6 Fairbourn represented American in the
transaction and Larson represented Rochelle under a
"dual agency" agreement. After receipt of the letter
of intent, a meeting occurred in American's office.
Those present were Alvarez, Jim, Larson, Clark, and
Irv Gardner (Gardner) of Rochelle. The meeting
included a discussion of American's expectations
regarding Rochelle's ability to perform.
% 7 On August 13, 1999, Rochelle made an offer to
buy the property. The offer was presented to
American on a preprinted Real Estate Purchase
Contract with a handwritten addendum. The offer
was accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale
Agreement (Listing Agreement), identifying Rochelle
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as the prospective buyer The Listing Agreement
provided for payment to Fairbourn of a $1,500 per lot
commission based on the sale of the 99 lots at a price
of $2,277,000 Alvarez signed the Listing Agreement
but rejected the offer
U 8 Rochelle presented a second offer several days
later American submitted a written counteroffer (the
Purchase Contract) that incorporated the terms of the
second offer and added several new provisions
Among the new provisions was a term entitled
"Fmancial Capability," which provided
Within Fourteen days after execution of this
Agreement by both parties, Buyer shall supply
Seller with evidence of financial capability to
close on the Property within the time frame
referenced above In the event Buyer is unable to
provide said evidence, Seller shall at its sole
option cancel this Agreement and neither party
shall have any further obligation to the other
f 9 On August 30, 1999, Alvarez, Jim, Larson, and
Clark met and reviewed the Purchase Contract,
including the "Financial Capability" clause, which
required evidence withm fourteen days of signing
After initialing a change regarding the closing of the
Purchase Contract, the seller and buyer signed
K 10 Pursuant to the Fmancial Capability clause,
Rochelle arranged for a letter from Cy Simon
(Simon), a construction loan officer of First Security
Bank, to be delivered to American Alvarez rejected
the letter as satisfying the requirement of "evidence of
financial capability " Rochelle then arranged for a
second letter, dated September 17, 2000, to be sent
from the Bank providing more detail as to the
availability of credit lines and amounts of current
loans m place
% 11 Alvarez also rejected the second letter, and on
September 21, 1999, he telephoned Fairbourn to
inform it that he was rejectmg the letters and
terminating the Purchase Contract The sole reason
Alvarez gave for rejectmg the letters was that they did
not comply with the Fmancial Capability provision of
the Purchase Contract Rochelle then recovered its
earnest money deposit, and Alvarez sold the property
to another purchaser
T| 12 Fairbourn filed suit m the Third District Court
agamst American to recover its sales commission
pursuant to the Listmg Agreement On December 18,
2001, the trial court entered judgment agamst
American for the sum of $153,000 plus attorney fees

Page 3

and costs American now appeals
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
[1][2] U 13 American challenges the trial court's
determination that Fairbourn was entitled to a
commission under the terms of the Listmg
Agreement Specifically, American challenges the
trial court's interpretation of the Listmg Agreement's
language that Fairbourris commission was due at the
closmg of the Rochelle sale
A contract's interpretation may be either a
question of law, determined by the words of the
agreement, or a question of fact, determined by
extrinsic evidence of mtent If a contract is not
mtegrated or is ambiguous and the trial court
finds facts regardmg the parties' mtent based on
extrinsic evidence, we will not disturb the
findings unless they are clearly erroneous
However, [qjuestions of contract interpretation
not requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are
matters of law, and on such questions *1041 we
accord the trial court's interpretation no
presumption of correctness
Schmidt v Downs, 775 P 2d 427, 430 (Utah
Ct App 1989) (alteration m original) (quotations and
citations omitted)
f 14 American also challenges the trial court's initial
determination that the terms of the Purchase Contract
are ambiguous, the court's taking of extrinsic
evidence, and its factual findings based on the
evidence admitted [FN1] Fairbourn defends each
link m the trial court's approach It is unnecessary for
us to consider each of these arguments, however,
because there are proper grounds to affirm See
Buehner Block Co v UWC Assocs, 752 P 2d 892,
895 (Utah 1988) ("[W]e may affirm trial court
decisions on any proper ground(s), despite the trial
court's havmg assigned another reason for its
ruling ") Specifically, the meaning of the Purchase
Contract is not the dispositive issue m this appeal
Rather, the dispositive issue is whether Fairbourn is
entitled to a commission under the terms of the
Listmg Agreement
Thus, American's arguments
based on the Purchase Contract fail to distinguish its
separate contractual obligations to Fairbourn under
the Listmg Agreement See Robert Langston, Ltd v
McQuame, 741 P 2d 554, 558 (Utah CtApp 1987)
(reversmg trial court's denial of commission to real
estate broker where trial court confused seller's
obligation to buyer with its separate obligation to
broker) Because the terms of the Listmg Agreement
are dispositive of American's obligations to pay
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Fairbourn a commission, we need not analyze the
ambiguities of American's Purchase Contract with
Rochelle. [FN2]
FN1. American also argues the trial court
improperly applied Utah law regarding who
is a "ready, willing, and able buyer,"
phraseology often employed in listing
agreements. The Listing Agreement in this
case, however, does not contain this
language. Thus, we cannot read it into the
agreement. See Bakowski v. Mountain
States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT 62,K 19, 52 PJd
1179 ("We will not make a better contract
for the parties than they have made for
themselves.
Nor will we avoid the
contract's plain language to achieve an
'equitable' result."); Utah Farm Bur. Ins.
Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47,K 6, 980 P.2d 685
(stating courts "may not rewrite [a] contract
... if the language is clear") (internal
quotations and citations omitted) (omission
in original).
FN2. American also contends the trial court
erred in not holding Fairbourn to the
standard of a fiduciary with relation to
American. American asserts it raised this
issue in closing arguments, which were not
recorded. However, the trial court did not
mention the argument in its memorandum
decision. We cannot rely on American's
assertion that is unsupported by the record
on appeal, and therefore, we cannot
consider this issue on appeal. See State v.
Marquez, 2002 UT App 127,1 ?> 54 P.3d
637 (refusing to address an argument not
preserved in the trial court).
ANALYSIS
[3][4][5][6] % 15 A listing agreement is a contract
between a real estate broker and a seller. See
generally Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manias, 699
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985).
When interpreting a contract, a court first looks to
the contract's four corners to determine the
parties' intentions, which are controlling. If the
language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, then a court does not resort to
extrinsic evidence of the contract's meaning, and
a court determines the parties' intentions from the
plain meaning of the contractual language as a
matter of law.
Bakowski v. Mountain States Steel, Inc., 2002 UT
62,1116, 52 P.3d 1179.

% 16 In this case, the Listing Agreement's language
regarding Fairbourn's commission is clear and
unambiguous. It provides:
IF, AT ANY TIME, WITHIN SAID PERIOD,
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures,
or presents an offer to purchase said property
from [Rochelle], at the price and upon the terms
and conditions set forth herein, or at any other
price or upon any other terms or conditions
acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission
equal to $1,500.00 per lot.
According to this plain language, American agreed
to pay Fairbourn a commission if it procured or
presented an offer from Rochelle to purchase under
the price, terms, and conditions in the Listing
Agreement. The price stipulated in the Listing
Agreement was $2,277,000 and the terms were "Cash
at Closing."
*1042 K 17 On August 30, 1999, American and
Rochelle entered into a Purchase Contract. Under the
terms of the Purchase Contract, Rochelle agreed to
pay American $2,277,000 cash at closing for the
property. Thus, Fairbourn procured or presented an
offer from Rochelle that satisfied the requirements of
the Listing Agreement and was accepted by
American. Accordingly, Fairbourn performed its
contractual duties under the Listing Agreement and is
entitled to its commission from American.
[7] H 18 American contends Fairbourn is not entitled
to a commission because the Listing Agreement
conditioned the receipt of commission on completion
of the sale of the property to Rochelle. The general
rule in Utah is that "[a]bsent a contractual provision
which conditions the right to a commission on the
performance or part performance of the buyer, the
broker is not an insurer of the subsequent
performance of the contract and is not deprived of his
right to a commission by the failure or refusal" of one
party to perform.
Robert Langston, Ltd. v.
McQuarrie, 741 P.2d 554, 557-58 (Utah
Ct.App.1987). The Listing Agreement provides:
ALL COMMISSIONS shall be due and payable
at closing....
[8] 1| 19 If a broker's listing agreement imposes
unconditional liability for broker's fees or is silent on
the matter, a court will not imply a condition making
such fees contingent on either the buyer's or seller's
performance of the purchase contract. See Bushnell
Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 P.2d 746, 751 (Utah
1983) (refusing to adopt minority rule, which
conditions broker's
commission on buyer's
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performance if contract does not expressly condition
liability for commission); Robert Langston Ltd., 741
P.2d at 558 n. 7 (refusing to condition broker's
commission on parties' performance where contract
did not contain conditional language).
[9] \ 20 Thus, we must determine whether the phrase
"due and payable at closing" creates a condition
precedent to Fairbourn's entitlement to commission or
whether it merely establishes the time for the
commission to be paid. In Utah, absent a contractual
provision to the contrary, a real estate broker, whose
commission is due at closing, is entitled to full
commission at closing regardless of the buyer's
subsequent performance. See Bushnell Real Estate,
Inc., 672 P.2d at 748-51 (affirming trial court's award
of commission to broker because listing agreement,
which provided commission was due at closing, did
not condition broker's receipt of commission on
buyer's performance).
[10] \ 21 However, Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. and
Robert Langston Ltd. do not address the precise
question of whether a real estate broker, whose
commission is due and payable at closing, is entitled
to commission when a closing does not occur. This is
a matter of first impression in Utah. The majority
rule, [FN3] which we now adopt, is that the phrase "at
closing," by itself, is not a condition precedent to a
broker's receipt of commission.
FN3. See, e.g., Finno Dev., Inc. v. Smedes
Realty, No. CV010163687S, 2001 WL
420584, at *1, 2001 Conn.Super. LEXIS
995, at *3 (April 11, 2001) (holding that
contract providing commission was to be
paid within 72 hours of closing did not
condition the payment of commission on the
closing);
Don J. McMurray Co. v.
Wiesman, 199 Neb. 494, 260 N.W.2d 196,
200-01 (1977) (contract providing
commission was "due and payable ... at the
time of loan closing," did not condition the
broker's commission on the actual loan
closing);
Samuel R. Laden, Inc. v.
Lidgerwood Estates, Inc., 15 N.J. Misc.
498, 192 A. 425, 428 (1937) ("In order to
absolve a party from the payment of
commissions, it must clearly appear by the
contract with his broker that the payment of
commissions was made contingent upon the
actual transfer of title.")
(Internal
quotations and citation omitted.). But see
Arvida Realty Sales, Inc. v. William R.
Tinnerman & Co., 536 So.2d 1041, 1042
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1988) (holding brokers
were not entitled to commission where

agreement provided commission was
payable at closing of real estate transaction
because brokers did not produce clients that
closed); Doss v. Moses & Sloan P'ship,
C.A. No. L- 88-212, 1989 WL 25537, at *2,
1989 Ohio App. LEXIS 845, at *5 (March
17, 1989) (determining broker's right to
payment was subject to an express condition
where owner promised to pay commission
on closing of the deal).
f 22 The majority rule accords with the presumption
in Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. that a broker is entitled
to commission and is not an insurer of the buyer's
performance. *1043 See Bushnell Real Estate, Inc.,
672 P.2d at 748-51. Moreover, American and
Fairbourn could have included in the Listing
Agreement words widely recognized as conditional,
such as: only, unless, until, or if. [FN4] The fact that
they chose not to include such conditional language
indicates they did not intend Fairbourn's commission
to be conditioned on the closing of the deal.
Accordingly, we hold Fairbourn is entitled to a
commission.
FN4. These words have been recognized by
other jurisdictions as making a broker's
commission conditional. See Harbour Inn,
Inc. v. Kagan, 343 So.2d 1353, 1355
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1977) (denying brokerage
fees where commission was to "only be paid
upon ... the actual consummation of the
loan"); Kay v. Sperling, 83 So.2d 881, 882
(Fla.1955) (denying brokerage fees where
commission was not to be paid " 'unless and
until a deal [was] consummated'") (citation
omitted); William A. White & Sons v. La
Touraine-Bickford's Foods, Inc., 50 A.D.2d
547,
375
N.Y.S.2d
351, 352
(N.Y.App.Div.1975) (denying brokerage
fees where agreement provided " 'if a sale is
consummated by yourself a commission ...
will be paid'") (citation omitted).
CONCLUSION
% 23 Fairbourn is entitled to a commission because it
procured an offer from Rochelle to purchase the
property according to the terms and conditions of the
Listing Agreement. The phrase "at closing" did not
condition Fairbourn's receipt of a commission on the
actual closing, it merely indicated when the
commission was due. Affirmed.
K 24 WE CONCUR: PAMELA T. GREENWOOD,
Judge, and GREGORY K. ORME, Judge.
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC., a Utah
corporation
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Plaintiff,
CASE NO. 000902534
vs.

JUDGE RONALD E. NEHRING

AMERICAN HOUSING PARTNERS INC.,
a Delaware corporation, and ARMANDO J.
ALVAREZ, an individual
Defendants.

On August 6th, 7th, and 29th' 20011 presided over a bench trial in this matter. Following the
conclusion of the trial, I took the case under advisement. Now, having fully considered the
arguments of counsel, submissions of the parties and the applicable legal authority I render the
following Memorandum Decision which incorporates my Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
In early 1999, defendant Armando Alvarez approached James Fairbourn of plaintiff
Fairbourn Commercial Inc., a real estate brokerage, for assistance in selling a parcel of real property
located in West Jordan, Utah. Mr. Alvarez was acting on behalf of defendant American Housing
Partners, Inc. He was also a licensed real estate broker.
American was wholly owned by Armando Alvarez's brother, Sergio. American had entered
into an agreement to buy the West Jordan property from its owners, the Coon's. At the time that

ftftfi^l
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Alvarez began his conversations with Mr. Fairbourn, American had encountered considerable
obstacles in gaining the approvals from the city of West Jordan necessary to develop the property.
These problems placed American's purchase agreement with the Coons in peril.
During the first seven months of 1999, American pressed ahead on three fronts: the effort to
gain municipal approval of its development plan; the effort to preserve the purchase agreement with
the Coons; and the effort to find a buyer for the property who would pay the Coon's selling price,
put some money in American's pocket, and free American from its entanglements with West Jordan
officials. Mr. Fairbourn and his company were enlisted to aid American in the third undertaking.
He proposed that American seek a buyer for the property marketed as "paper lots" - lots which had
received plat approval but which had not been improved.
The pressure on American to act mounted in late July 1999 when the Coons notified
American that it was "ending and terminating any and all agreements" relating to the property
because American had failed to close. In late August 1999, the Coons agreed to reinstate its contract
of sale with American through December 1,1999. As American worked to salvage the deal with the
Coons it scored a success with West Jordan when it persuaded the city to approve the necessary
zoning for the property if American would acquire an adjacent parcel of property owned by an
opponent of American's proposed development.
In this uncertain setting, Fairbourn moved ahead with the performance of its task. Through
a contact with real estate agent Marshall Larson, later to become employed by Fairbourn, Fairbourn
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learned of a potential buyer, Rochelle Properties, L.C. Rochelle was an affiliate of Liberty Homes,
a major residential home builder in the Salt Lake City area.
In early August 1999, Rochelle made a preliminary proposal to buy the property. Rochelle's
proposal, presented in the form of "an official notice of intent" letter, led to a meeting among
representatives of American, Rochelle, and Fairbourn. Numerous elements of possible transactions
were discussed at the meeting, including a remark by Mr. Alavarez that any deal must include a
provision concerning the buyer's ability to perform. Mr. Fairbourn, who attended the meeting, was
aware of the exigent circumstances in which American found itself and recognized that American
had a legitimate interest in securing a buyer who could be counted on to perform.
On August 13,1999, Rochelle made an offer to buy the property. The offer was presented
through a pre-printed Real Estate Purchase Contract and handwritten addendum.

It was

accompanied by a Single Party Listing and Sale Agreement which obligated American to pay
Fairbourn a $1,500.00 per lot commission if Rochelle bought the property for $2,277,000.00 cash.
The Listing Agreement indicated that the property contained "approx (sic) 99 undeveloped lots."
American rejected Rochelle's offer. Rochelle presented a second offer several days later
which was met with a counter offer. American's counter offer was presented in typewritten form
and incorporated the terms of Rochelle's second offer while adding several new provisions. Among
the new provisions was term titled "Financial Capability." This term stated:
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Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both
parties, buyer shall supply to seller with evidence of financial
capability to close on the Property within the time frame reference
above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall
have any further obligation to the other.
Mr. Alvarez inserted the Financial Capability term into the counter offer because under the
terms of the proposed sale Rochelle's duty to perform was not contingent on its acquisition of
financing pursuant to paragraph two of the Purchase Contract. While this contract provision, when
elected, excuses the buyer's duty to perform if he is unable to obtain financing under the specified
terms, the buyer is required pursuant to paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase Contract to make timely
application for financing. If financing is unavailable on the terms agreed to in the Purchase Contract,
a buyer may nevertheless insist that the seller perform by "providing Seller with absolute assurance"
that the proceeds required to close the sale are available. Mr. Alvarez believed that the Financial
Capability term would serve as a substitute for these "buyer's undertakings" which did not apply to
Rochelle because it did not elect to make its purchase contingent on financing.
The parties met on the day the counter offer was accepted. At the meeting they reviewed the
terms of the sale and made several changes to the counter offer by interlineation. The Financial
Capability clause was discussed at the meeting. Marshall Larson, a real estate agent employed by
Fairbourn but who represented Rochelle under the terms of a dual agency agreement, believed that
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Mr, Alvarez intended to require a letter from Rochelle's bank in the form of an unofficial loan
commitment.
Acting on this interpretation, Mr. Larson contacted Cy Simon, a construction loan officer at
First Security Bank and sought a letter to provide evidence of financial capability. Mr. Simon and
First Security had a banking relationship with Liberty and Rochelle. Although Mr. Larson asked Mr.
Simon to provide a loan commitment, I do not find that Mr. Alvarez expressed to anyone at anytime
his intention that only a binding loan commitment or letter of credit would satisfy his definition of
adequate financial capability. The participants in this transaction shared considerable experience and
sophistication in real estate development and financing. I credit the observation made by David
Clark, the owner of Liberty Homes who negotiated on behalf of Rochelle, that he would have taken
note of a demand that the evidence be in the form of proof of available cash, a loan commitment, or
letter or credit because none of this evidence could have been obtained from a bank within the 14
days allotted for its production. The letter, which Mr. Simon prepared for American on behalf of
Rochelle, stated, "I would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development loans
[to Rochelle] in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy."
Mr. Alvarez rejected Mr. Simon's letter. Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn, who was acting
as American's agent under the dual agency agreement, that the evidence from First Security must
reference a line of credit and that the contents of Mr. Simon's letter was "not what we had
discussed." Mr. Fairbourn met with Mr. Larson and Mr. Simon for the purpose of discussing the
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contents of a second "evidence" letter. Mr. Simon prepared a letter dated September 17,1999 which
referenced credit lines held by Liberty and Rochelle and, while making allowance for predictable
guarded banker rhetoric, painted a positive picture of Rochelle's financial strength.
On September 21,1999, Mr. Alvarez told Mr. Fairbourn that he had rej ected the second letter
and that American was terminating the purchase contract because Rochelle had failed to provide the
necessary evidence of financial capability.
The merits of Fairbourn's claim that American's termination of the purchase contract was
wrongful turns on the outcome of an analysis of the Financial Capability clause. I find that the
provision is ambiguous. The language of the clause gives no guidance to either the quantity or
quality of evidence which Rochelle must produce to demonstrate financial capability. Despite Mr.
Alvarez's contention that the provision was drafted as a substitute for paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase
Contract, it has none of the precision of, for example, the "absolute assurance" language found in
that paragraph.
The extrinsic evidence relating to the Financial Capability clause yields the conclusion that
Rochelle reasonably interpreted the clause in a manner consistent with paragraph 7.2 of the Purchase
Contract to the extent that it required evidence that First Security Bank make a commitment to loan
Rochelle money "subject only to changes of conditions in the Buyer's credit worthiness and to
normal loan closing procedures."
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Although Mr. Fairbourn, who represented American throughout the aborted transaction, was
aware of the circumstances which made a strong buyer important to American, he could not have
been expected to draw from this knowledge the details of the financial capability evidence that Mr.
Alvarez presumably knew but did not communicate either to Mr. Fairbourn or Rochelle. By
contrast, Mr. Alvarez had ample reason to know what Rochelle's interpretation of the Financial
Capability clause was. The pre-printed Purchase Contract gives legal expression to the respective
interests of buyers and sellers in the face of the practical business reality that most real estate
transactions involve financing, provided either by the seller or by a third party. In this transaction
between experienced developers, it could not have come as a surprise to Mr. Alvarez to receive the
first letter from Mr. Simon. Even if Mr. Alvarez had been surprised by the contents of the letter, he
was in an advantaged position to remedy what he then knew to be Rochelle's misapprehension of
his expectations for evidence of financial capability. He nevertheless declined to provide any
meaningful clarification of his interpretation for the benefit of Rochelle.
Mr. Alvarez drafted the Financial Capability clause on behalf of American. American was,
therefore, wholly responsible for its ambiguity. The existence of the ambiguity should have become
apparent to Mr. Alvarez upon receiving Mr. Simon's letter, and his knowledge of the ambiguity
coupled with his responsibility for it created an obligation for Mr. Alvarez to clarify the ambiguity.
He failed, however, to do this and it is therefore appropriate in this setting to invoke the principle
that words used in an agreement are construed against the drafter. Jones, Waldo. Holbrook &
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The propriety of turning to this rule

of contract interpretation is buttressed in this case by equitable considerations. In Simonson v.
Travis, 728 P.2d 999 (Utah, 1986), our Supreme Court construed the language of a release against
the defendant's insurer after the plaintiff sought clarification of an ambiguity in the release and the
adjuster's explanation was inadequate. The Court found that it would be inequitable to enforce the
release against the plaintiff when the "defendant was wholly responsible for the ambiguity and the
subsequent ambiguous explanation." Id. at 1002.
Accordingly, I find that American breached the terms of its listing agreement with Fairbourn.
Fairbourn is entitled to the benefit of its bargain, or $1,500.00 for 99 lots resulting in a total damage
award against American of $148,500.00 together with an award of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs..
I reject Fairbourn's claim for relief against Mr. Alvarez based on alleged violations of Utah
law governing the regulation of those engaged in the real estate business, Utah Code Ann. §§61-2-124 (2000). Fairbourn insists that it has a private right of action against Mr. Alvarez pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §61-2-17 (4) which states,
If any person receives any money or its equivalent, as commission,
compensation, or profit by or in consequence of a violation of this
chapter, that person is liable for an additional penalty of not less than
the amount of the money received and not more than three times
the amount of money received, as may be determined by the court.
This penalty may be sued for in any court of competent jurisdiction,
and recovered by any person aggrieved for his own use and benefit.
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The misconduct which gives rise to a cause of action under this section is limited to acts
performed by persons regulated under Chapter 2 of Title 61 in the course of their business as a real
estate agent or broker. I decline Fairbourn's invitation to broadly interpret this provision to reach
all business activities of a licensed agent or broker. Such a reading of §61-2-17 would lead to the
clearly irrational result of exposing everyone holding a real estate license for treble damages for
their acts of dishonestly, or lapses in integrity irrespective of whether the conduct occurred in
connection with their activities as an agent or broker.
Mr. Alvarez was not acting as a real estate agent in this transaction and his conduct is not
subject to the imposition of the penalty provision of §61-2-17.
Finally, Fairbourn argues that Alvarez improperly interfered with its economic relations by
breaching the Purchase Contract with Rochelle in order to enter into a more lucrative contract with
another party. In order to recover damages under the tort of interference with prospective economic
relations a plaintiff must prove "(1) that the defendant intentionally interfered with the plaintiffs
existing or potential economic relations, (2) for an improper purpose or by improper means, (3)
causing injury to the plaintiff." Leigh Furniture v T. Richard Isom 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982).
Plaintiff fails to prove that Alvarez intentionally interfered with Fairbourn's economic
relations with American for an improper purpose or by improper means. While I have concluded
that the terms of the Purchase Agreement should be construed against defendant, I am unwilling to
ascribe an outright "intentional" or "improper" label to Alvarez's conduct. A deliberate breach of
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contract in and of itself does not constitute an improper means. Id. at 309. A tort action only exists
if the interference with business relations is not an incidental consequence of the breach— but an
actual motive therefor.

Id. at 310. In this case I am unable to make that conclusion and

consequently plaintiffs cause of action against Alvarez for tortious interference with economic
relations is denied.
Dated this ^ ?

day of October, 2001.

l^^^J^fj,
RONALD E. NEHRING
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum Decision,
to the following, this^)day of October, 2001:

Neil R. Sabin
Attorney for Plaintiff
60 E. South Temple, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dennis K. Poole
John L. Adams
Attorneys for Defendants
4543 South 700 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
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INVESTMENT-rNDUS TRIAL-COMMERCIAL
This is a legally binding Contract The Bu>er and Seller may legally agree in writing to alter
or delete provisions of this form If you desire legal or tax advice consult your attorne) or tax law)er
_
_EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
e Buyer F^utHfrtLCL I/^JM&Q f /'£-S"
L^doffers to purchase the Propert) described below and deliver as Earnest
7
»ney Deposit $ Sp£>V*
in the form of tfj ^C^
to
the Brokerage to be deposited within three business days after Acceptance by all parties of this Offer to Purchase
the Title/Escrow Company identified below
okerage or Title/Escrow Company £&jj£Z&«3frt/~^^
SZXuJfc^, Ctf
ceiyed by
on this date
Phone Number
fitje^Escrow Company for deposit no later than
^Jr_ (date)
Other
fiWMU^OjlU^
fa,
3 tVt?5
4t*££g_ ntL(7*t&ft lte£^T3tiLCC0
0FFER T O

PROPERTY

AftWK

y//HL£e

SH&htt//</d\)

PURCHASE

. Aftfedtr

*_ f k,dTS

dress / W C ^ T ~?%M ? Q .
£ D &D iJC^T
^ City loe^T
C&ptbtoJ County S C^
State
Uf7f/fr legal description of Property see Q attached Addendum #
Q preliminary title report when available as provided below
I 1 INCLUDED I f_MS Unless excluded herein this sale shall include all fixtures presently attached to Property The following personal property
ill also be included in this sale and conveyed under a separate Bill of Sale with Warranties as to title
4/^^h
1 2 EXCLUDED ITEMS These items are excluded from this sale
/(//^
PURCHASI^PRICE AND FINANCING Buyer agrees to pay for Property as follows
£_ /7lXO» " Earnest Money Deposit
Loan Proceeds
• Representing the liability to be assumed b> Buyer under an existing assumable loan • with Q without Seller being released of
liability in tins approximate amount with Q Bu>er Q Seller agreeing to pay any loan transfer and assumption fees Any net differences
between the approximate balance of the loan shown abo\e and the actual balance at Closing shall be then adjusted in • cash Q other
•
From new institutional financing on terms no less favorable to Buyer than the following Interest rate for first period prior to
adjustment if any
%, Amortization period
, Term
Other than these, the loan terms shall be the best
obtainable under the loan for which Bu>er app'ies below
Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum)
Other
1fQT?dit #Vb, Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing
-

\017tmp. Total Purchase Price(Se£ /H^^i/Au/*^
CLOSING This transaction shall be closed on or before S.C€. / H A ^ O o s u % shall occur when (a) Buyer and Seller have signed and delivered to each
er (or to the Title/Escrow Company) all documents required by this Contract by Lender by written escrow instructions signed by Buyer and Seller, and by
jhcable law, (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents have been delivered to the Escrow/Title Company in the form of collected or cleared
ids and (c) the deed which Seller has agreed to deliver under Section 6 has been recorded Buyer and Seller shall each pay one half of the escrow Closing
, unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated as
forth in this Section All deposits on tenancies shall be transferred to Buyer at Closing Prorations set forth in this Section shall be made as of Q date of
>sing Q date of possession other
POSSESSION Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer w ithin
T~"/_^Q
hours after Closing
CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCLOSURE At the signing of this Contract the Listing Agent J)m f*ie&&n£-4j
represents __T Seller
Buyer, and the Selling Agent /??/tf>S>jfrtti
Z+pSihf repraents Q Seller .feCBuyer Buver and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Contract
tten disclosure of agency relationship was provided to her/him ^ X ^ B u y e r s initials (
) Sellers initials
TITLE TO PROPERTY AND TITLE INSURANCE (a) SeTIeTnas, or shall have at Closing, free title to Property and agrees to convey such title to
yer by JST^general Q special warranty deed, free offinancialencumbrances as warranted under Section 10 6 (b) Seller agrees to pay for, and furnish Buyer
"losing with a current standard from Owners policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price, (c) the title pohc) shall conform with
ler's obligations under subsections (a) and (b) above Unless otherwise agreed under Section 8 4 die commitment shall conform with the title insurance
rimitment provided under Section 7 1
Q Buyer elects to obtain a full coverage extended ALTA policy of title insurance under section 6(b) The cost of tins coverage, above that of a standard
Tier's policy shall be paid for by Q Buyer £) Seller Also the cost of a full-coverage ALTA survey shall be paid for by %( Buyer • Seller
SPECIFIC UNDERTAKINGS OF SELLER AND BUYER
7 1 SELLER DISCLOSURES Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Seller Disclosures no later than the number of calendar days indicated below
ch shall be after Acceptance
O (a) a Seller Property Disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller
"p> (b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 6, to be issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller
including copies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commitment
__________-$
<£ (c) a copy of all loan documents relating to any loan now existing which will encumber Property after Closing
________X>
£1 (d) a copy of all leases and rental agreements now in effect with regard to Property together with a current rent roll
£> (e) operating statements of Property for its last
full fiscal years of operation plus the current fiscal year through
, certified by Seller or by an independent auditor
O (f) tenant Estoppel agreements
er agrees to pay any charge for cancellation to the title commitment provided under subsection (b)
If Seller does not provide any of the Seller Disclosures within the time periods agreed above, Buyer may either waive the particular Seller Disclosure
Jirement by taking no timely action or Buyer may notify Seller in writing within /O calendar days after the expiration of the particular disclosure lime
od the Seller is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section J 6 are at Buyer's disposal The holder of the Eainest Money Deposit
II, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return to Buyer the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of further written authorization
n Seller
7 2 BUYER UNDERTAKINGS. Buyer agrees to
O (a) Apply for approval of the assumption or funding of the loan proceeds described in Section 2 by completing, signing, and
delivering to the Lender the initial loan application and documentation required by the Lender and by paying all fees as required by the
lender, appraisal fee included, no later than
calendar days after Acceptance, and
0 (b) No later than
calendar days after Acceptance obtain from the Lender to whom application is made under subsection
(a) a written commitment to approve the assumption of the existing loan or to fund the new loan subject only to changes of conditions in
Buyers credit worthiness and to normal loan closing procedures, or, if Buyer elects, providing Seller with absolute assurance, within
the same time frame, that the proceeds required for funding the Total Purchase Price are available
se Buyer Undertakings are at the sole expense ol Buyer and are material elements of this Contract for the benefit of both Buyer and Seller
If Buyer does not initiate any Buyer Undertakings and provide Seller with written confirmation in the time agreed above, Seller may either waive the
ticular Buyer Undertaking requirement by taking no time!) action or Seller may notify Buyer in writing within
calendar days of the expiration of
particular undertaking time period that Buyer is in Default under this Contract and that the remedies under Section 16 are at Sellers disposal The holder of
Earnest Money Deposit shall upon receipt of a copy of Seller's written notice deliver to Seller the Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of
her written authorization from Buyer
—
7 3 ADDITIONAL DUE DILIGENCE Buyer shall undertake the following Addition Due Diligence elements at its own expense and for its own
efit^for the purpose of complying with the Contingencies under Section 8
(a) Ordering and obtaining an appraisal of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 7 2,
^(b) Ordering and obtaining a survey of the Property if one is not otherwise required under Section 6,
(c) Ordering and obtaining a physical inspection report regarding, and completing a personal inspection of the Property,
£f (d) Ordering and obtaining any environmentally related study of the Propert), _. _ i~ A AfiftWi
M **~/ - 0\,c /„/j_v __ p/J<L<£~
fif (e) Requesting and obtaining verification that the Property complies with all applicable federal, state, and local laws, ordinances, and requlations with
m-A i - — _ m n anA . _ . - ,

- „ U!_

*_ ~ f . U „

D~~-_-+

iigence matters in Section 7. Buyer's discretion, however, for approving the terms of the loan under subsection 7.2 (b) is subject Buyer's covenant with
,ard to minimally acceptable financing terms under Section 2.
8.1. Buyer shall have
calendar days after the times specified in Section 7.1 and 7.2 for receipt of Seller Disclosures and for completion of Bu>cr
dertakings to review the content of the disclosures and the outcome of the undertakings. The latest applicable date under Section 7.1 and 7.2 applies for
npleting a review of Additional Due Diligence matters under Section 7.3.
8.2 If Buyer objects, Buyer and Seller shall have
calendar days after receipt of the objections to resoKe Buyer's objections. Seller may. but shall
be required to, resolve Buyer's objections. Likewise. Buyer is under no obligation to accept any resolution proposed b\ Seller. If Buyer's objections are not
olved within the stated time, Buyer may void this Contract b> providing Seller written notice within the same stated lime The holder of the Earnest Money
posh shall, upon receipt of a copy of Buyer's written notice, return Buyer's Earnest Money Deposit without the requirement of any further written
horization from Seller. If this Contract is not voided by Buyer, Buyer's objection is deemed to have been waived. This waiver, however, does not affect
rranties under Section 10.
8.3 If Buyer does not deliver a written objection to Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure, Buyer Undertaking, or Due Diligence matter within the time
ivided in Section 8.1 that item will be deemed approved by Buyer.
8.4 Resolution of Buyer's objections under Section 8.2 shall be in writing and shall become part of this Contract.
SPECIAL CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to: ££&
Ah>b£&/teUa<P\
i terms of attached Addendum # /
are incorporated into this Contract by this reference.
SELLER'S LIMITED WARRANTIES. Seller's warranties to Buyer regarding the Property are limited to the following:
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of the Property to Buyer, it will be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings:
10.2 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the plumbing, plumbed fixtures, cooling, heating, ventilating, electrical and sprinkler.
Ih indoor and outdoor), systems, appliances, and fireplaces in working order;
10.3 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller;
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Proper!) in working order aiid in compliance
h governmental regulations;
10.5 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property;
10.6 At Closing, Seller will bring all financial obligations encumbering the Property which are assumed in writing by Buyer current and all such
igations which Buyer has not so assumed will be discharged;
10.7 As of Closing, Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of a building, environmental, or zoning code violation regarding the Property which
; not been resolved.
VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. After all contingencies have been removed and before Closing. Buyer may conduct a
alk-through" inspection of the Property to determine whether or not items warranted by Seller in Section 10.1, 10.2, 10.3 and 10.4 are in the wan anted
idilion and to verify that items included in Section I.I are presently on the Property. If any item is not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair,
replace it as necessary or, with the consent of Buyer and if required by Lender, escrow an amount at Closing to provide for such repair or replacement,
yer's failure to conduct a "walk-through" inspection or to claim during the "walk-through" inspection that the Property does not include all items referenced
Section 1.1 or is not in the condition warranted in Section 10, shall constitute a waiver of Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 and of the warranties contained in
:tion 10.
. CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, no new leases entered into, and no substantial
srations or improvements to the Property shall be undertaken without the prior written consent of Buyer.
, AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person signing this Contract on its behalf
nrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller and the heirs or successors in interest to Buyer or Seller. If Seller is not the vested Owner of
Property but has control over the vested Owner's disposition of the Property, Seller agrees to exercise this control and deliver title under this Contract as if it
\ been signed by the vested Owner.
COMPLETE CONTRACT. This instrument together with its Addenda, any attached Exhibits, and Seller Disclosures constitutes the entire Contract
ween the parties and supersedes all prior dealings between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except by the written agreement of the parties.
, DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties agree that any dispute or claim relating to this Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of the Earnest
Dney Deposit and the breach or termination of this Contract, shall first be submitted to mediation in accordance with Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller
jdiation Rules of the American Arbitration Association. Each party agrees to bear its own costs of mediation. Any Agreement signed by the parties pursuant
the mediation shall be binding. Jf mediation fails, the procedures applicable and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section
ill prohibit Buyer seeking specific performance by Seller by filing a complaint with the court, serving it on Seller by means of summons or as otherwise
"milted by law, and recording a lis pendens with regard to the action provided that Buyer permits Seller to refrain from answering the complaint pending
diation. Further, the parties may agree in writing to waive mediation.
. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to either retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or to return the Earnest Money
posit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults, in addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit, Buyer may elect to either accept from
Her as liquidated damages a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit or sue Seller for specific performance and/or damages. If Buyer elects to accept the
uidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon demand. Where a Section of this Contract provides a specific remedy, the
rties intend that the remedy shall be exclusive regardless of rights which might otherwise be available under common law.
. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney's fees.
. DISPOSITION OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 7.1, 7.2 and 8.2; (b)
>arate written agreement of the parties, including an agreement under Section 15 if (a) does not apply; or (c) court order.
. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing.
. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this transaction. Extension must be agreed to in writing by all
rties. Performance under each Section of this Contract which references a date shall be required absolutely by 5:00 P.M. Mountain Time on the stated date.
. COUNTERPARTS AND FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. This Contract may be signed in counterparts, and each counterpart bearing an original
mature shall be considered one document with all others bearing original signature. Also, facsimile transmission of any signed original document and rejnsmission of any signed facsimile transmission shall be the same as delivery of an original.
. ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Buyer or Seller, responding to an offer or counter offer of the other: (a) signs the offer or counter offer where
ted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or the other party's agent that the offer or counter offer has been signed as required.
. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to ourchase the Property on the above terms and conditions If Seller does not accept this
fer by ^ f'tTO
U A.M. <G£p.M. Mountain Time / p l < £ / / *>T~ / / £ Wff'.
this offer shall lapse and the holder of the Earnest Money
sposit shall return it to Buyer.
'

ryer's Name (please print)

/

Offer Reference Date "

Phone Number

ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION/COUNTER OFFER
\ '
] Acceptance of Offer to Purchase: Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above.

>ller's Name (please print)

Dale

eller's Signature

Notice Address

Time

'

v

'

Phone Number

ADDENDUM NO. 1
TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHACE CONTRACT.
THIS IS AN ADDENDUM to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an Offer Reference Date of 8/12/99 , including all prior addenda and counter offers, between Rochelle
Properties, L. C, as Buyer, and
American Housing - Utah,
as
Seller, regarding the Property know as West Jordan Meadows Subdivision located at approximately 7800
South and 5200 West, West Jordan City, Utah. See Exhibit A to be attached. The following terms are
hereby incorporated as part of the REPC, and to the extent these terms modify or conflict with any
provisions of the REPC, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC not modified shall remain
the same:
Earnest Money. The Earnest Money, in the amount of $5,000.00 shall be deposited with Merrill Title
Company within four (4) business days of acceptance of this offer and addendum and held in an interest
bearing account for the benefit of the buyer.
Purchase Price. The total purchase price shall be $23,000.00 per lot, -"paper" lot stage, final platted, city
council approved and recordable, - multiplied by approximately 99 lots, for a total purchase price of
approximately $2,277,000.00. Thefinaltotal purchase price may be adjusted according to the final
number of lots approved by West Jordan City and shall be calculated by multiplying thefinalnumber of
lots by $23,000.00 per lot. The total size of each lot shall not be less than 12,000 sq. feet
Purchase Price Inclusions. The Seller shall provide to Buyer the following items and complete the
following conditions as part of the purchase price. 1) Thefinalcity council approved plat as described
above, which shall include three separate phases with approximately the same number of lots per phase. 2)
All engineering and construction plans and drawings, including, but not limited to, street, sewer and water
plans and profiles, grading and drainage plans, 3) All water rights that may be required by the City of West
Jordan. 4) All major infrastructure constructed to the perimeter of subject property, including, but not
limited to streets, sewer and water and utilities so as to allow buyer to connect to and extend such facilities
to service the lots included in this agreement. 5) Approval from the city of West Jordan to obtain early
building permits for the construction of no more than two model homes to be constructed concurrent with
the installation of subdivision improvements.
Due Diligence. Buyer shall have a 30 day feasibility period in which to investigate and analyze all
information relative to the subject site and project, which shall include, but is not limited to the following
items, 1) A commitment of title insurance per paragraph 7.1 of the attached REPC agreement. 2) A
Geotechnical Study of subject property to be paid by seller. 3) A Phase I Environmental Investigation to be
paid by seller. 4) Applicable street and utility plans and profiles, 5) grading and drainage plans, 6) All
agreements, requirements, stipulations and conditions required by the city of West Jordan in connection
with the plat approval, including zoning requirements. 7) A list of all applicable impact, design,
reimbursement, inspection and permit fees. 8) Seller and or engineers' estimates of improvements costs,
and required city bond amounts, 9) City development agreement and CC& R's if applicable.
The due diligence period shall begin upon delivery by Seller to Buyer of all the above cited plans,
documents and information.
During the feasibility period, if buyer determines, at its sole discretion, that any unacceptable condition
exists relative to the above described plans and information, then buyer shall notify seller in writing and in
the event seller is unable or unwilling to resolve said unacceptable condition, then this contract shall be null
and void and all earnest money and interest shall be released to buyer.
Closing The closing shall take place within sixty days of thefinalplat approval by the city of West Jordan,
which shall be no earlier than October 15,1999. Withinfifteendays offinalplat approval buyer shall pay
over to seller an additional $25,000.00 earnest money which shall be non-refiindable, but applicable to the
purchase price at closing In the event thefinalplat is not approved and ready for recording by December

jit Z-^-7f

31, 1999, then buyer shall have the right to either cancel this contract, in which case the earnest money and
interest shall be returned to buyer, or extend this contract up to an additional 360 days.
Commissions. Buyer and Seller acknowledge that their principals and associates are real estate brokers
licensed to do business in the State of Utah. Buyer shall not be responsible to pay any real estate
commission in regard to this transaction. Buyer understands and agrees that Seller shall pay a $500.00 per
lot commission to its designated Broker/agent.
jX] Seller [ ] Buyer shall have until
fT.' Da f ] AM \ft PM Mountain Time
g*—/&-9?
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the provisions of Section 23 of the REPC.
Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.

lx;]Buyer [ ] Seller Signaatre

Date "Time

//

[ ] Buyer [ ] Seller Signature

Date Time

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION

CHECK ONE:

[ ] ACCEPTANCE: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this
ADDENDUM.
[ ] COUNTEROFFER: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of
attached ADDENDUM NO.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

[ [ REJECTION: [ ] Seller [ ] Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, EFFECTIVE JUNE 12,1999. IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY
APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

Counter Offer to Real Estate Purchase contract dated August 16, 1999 including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, between Rochelle Properties LC as Buyer and American Housing Partners Inc
as Seller regarding the property located at approximately 7800 So 5300 West, West Jordan, Utah.
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of this Agreement.
1.

EARNEST MONEY
Buyer shall deposit the sum of $50,000 as Earnest Money Deposit. Said deposit shall
become non-refundable to Buyer after the lapse of the Due Diligence Period as outlined
below except for default by seller..

2.

CLOSING
The Closing shall occur within Fourteen (14) days after Seller receivesfinalsite plan /
approvalsfromthe City of West Jordan Planning CommiooioR. &/T~y CotLtJCl L, /

3.

FINANCIAL CAPABILITY
Within Fourteen days after execution of this Agreement by both parties, Buyer shall
supply to Seller with evidence offinancialcapability to close on the Property within the
timeframereferenced above. In the event Buyer is unable to provide said evidence, Seller
shall at its sole option cancel this Agreement and neither party shall have any further
obligation to the other.
DUE DILIGENCE
Buyer shall complete its investigation ("Due Diligence") within a Twenty One (21) day
period following execution of this Agreement. Buyer shall remove all contingencies at
the completion of the Due Diligence Period. Removal of contingencies shall be in writing
and delivered to Seller on or before the end of the Due Diligence Period.
PARTIES TO AGREEMENT
Seller, American Housing Partners, Inc. a Delaware Corporation, and ("Owners"), are
parties to an Agreement of Purchase and Sale Agreement dated September 9, 1998, as
amended (the '"Purchase Agreement"), pursuant to which Seller has agreed to purchase
and Owners have agreed to sell certain real property, located in the City of West Jordan,
Salt Lake County, Utah, generally composed of approximately 41 acres of land , located
approximately 7800 S 5300 W.
Buyer (Rochelle Properties LC) and Seller have agreed that, for the price and subject to
the terms and conditions herein addressed, at Close of Escrow and concurrently with and

immediately following Seller's acquisition of the Property from Owners, Buyer will
purchase the Property from Seller and Seller will sell the Property to Buyer.

APPROVAL COSTS
Prior to the date of this Agreement Seller has commenced, and continuing until Close of
Escrow Seller will continue, to apply for, process and seek to obtain various governmental
approvals for the development of the Property for residential purposes. Such activities are
anticipated to benefit and expedite Buyer's use and development of the Property following
the Close of Escrow, as well as Seller's use and development of the Property if Close of
Escrow does not occur. Accordingly, in addition to the Purchase Price, at Close of
Escrow Buyer shall deliver to the Title Company and Title Company shall deliver to Seller
the amount of the costs and expenses paid or incurred by Seller after September 1, 1999,
with respect to any governmental approvals of the development of the Property for
residential purposes, such as (without limitation) Civil Engineering, City Processing and
Permit Fees and Blueprints (the "Approval Costs"). Costs are estimated not to exceed
$15,000.

SELLER INVESTIGATIONS
Buyer acknowledges that, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, Owner has made only
limited information available to Seller, and since execution and delivery of the Purchase
agreement Seller has conducted limited investigations with respect to the Property.

REMAINING HOMES AND LOTS
Buyer hereby acknowledges that Two (2) single family homes currently exist on the
Property, these are currently assigned lot numbers 68 and 96. Said single family homes
shall be retained by Seller. In addition, Seller shall retain ownership of One (1) additional
single family lot (currently lot number 43). Seller shall be responsible for improvement
costs of said lot. Cost not to exceed $14,000.00, or if Buyer prefers, sales price shall be
reduced by $14,000 and Buyer shall be responsible for the improvement costs of said lot.

ARMANDO ALVAREZ BROKER, DECLARATION
Armando Alvarez, Vice President of American Housing Partners Inc. is a real Estate
Broker licensed in the State of Utah and California.

10.

EXTENDED DATE OF ACCEPTANCE
Extend acceptance of offer dated August 16, 1999 to 5:00 P.M. August 25, 1999

Buyer shall have 5:00 P.M. Mountain Time August 30, 1999 to accept this Counter Offer. Unless
so accepted, this Counter Offer shall lapse.
Seller:
AMERICAN HOUSING! PARTNERS INC.

J
By: Armando Alvarez V.P.
Date: 8-25-1999
Buyer:
ROCHELLE PROPERTIES LC

Date:

V^O'97
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SINGLE PARTY
LISTING AND SALE AGREEMENT
IN CONSIDERATION OF the service agreed to be performed by FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. in
endeavoring to effect a sale or exchange of the real estate described below in this agreement, I hereby grant
unto FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. the right to sell or exchange said property for a period of 180 days
from the date hereof and thereafter until withdrawn by written notice.
IF, AT ANY TIME, WITHIN SAID PERIOD, FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures, or presents an offer
to purchase said property from the registered party listed below, at the price and upon the terms and
conditions set forth herein, or at any other price or upon any other terms or conditions acceptable to me, I
agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per lot
IF AT ANY TIME within the said period FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. procures or presents an offer
from the registered party listed below, to enter into joint venture or partnership at a price or terms or
conditions acceptable to me, I agree to pay a commission equal to $1,500.00 per lot
ALL COMMISSIONS shall be due and payable at closing or at the time of consummation of the marriage of
the joint venture.
IF, within twelve (12) months after expiration of this agreement, the property is acquired by the registered
party listed below l agree to pay as soon as sale or exchange of said property is consummated, a
commission to FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. equal to $1500.00 per lot
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. will be representing both owner and the
prospective buyer, and owner consents to that dual representation.
IN CASE OF the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a
reasonable attorney's fee and all costs of collection.
IT IS UNDERSTOOD that FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. shall have the right to enter said premises at
any reasonable time of day, for the purpose of inspecting or showing the same to a prospective customer.
THE PROPERTY covered by this agreement is situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, to wit:
Approx 41 acres at 7800 South 5300 West West Jordan, approx 99 undeveloped lots
THE SALE PRICE IS: $2,277,000.00
THE TERMS ARE: Cash at Closing
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC. HEREBY REGESTERS Rochelle Properties, LC or any of their agents
or associates as being exposed to the disposition of your property as described above.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned agree to the above terms and acknowledge receipt of a copy of
this Agreement.
ACCEPTED exclusively for
FAIRBOURN COMMERCIAL INC.

James B. Fairbourn, Principal Broker

Owner

(Name^

August 13, 1999
(Name)
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September 10, 1999

To:

American Housing Partners

Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans
to Liberty Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Current commitments
are in the mid-seven figures.
I would not expect having difficulty making acquisition and development
loans in the future, barring something unforeseen in the economy.
An acquisition and development loan would be subject to committee
approval, and final plat approval.
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility
connections, and all signatures needed for recording of the plat.
Sincerely,

Cy Simoi:
Construction Loan Officer

TabF

September 17, 1999

To:

American Housing Partners

Over several years we have been making acquisition and development loans to Liberty
Homes and the various Rochelle entities. Liberty has existing lines available of
$5,000,000 for construction loans and improved lot acquisitions. These lines have
current commitments of $2,199,900.
In addition, there are other lot loans and A&D loans with total commitments of
$2,531,500.
These numbers and commitments should in no way be construed to imply any
maximum or minimum lending capacity. Each A&D loan is considered on it's own
merits,
This type of lending is considered "asset based". Therefore the project itself is an
important consideration; i.e. costs, configuration, pricing, timing, etc.
In addition to current commitments, barring something unforeseen in the economy, this
loan officer does not foresee a problem of First Security Bank lending approximately $4
million to Liberty or Rochelle for a future project. This would be contingent upon the
acquisition and development loan receiving committee approval and the project having
final plat approval.
The final plat approval assumes final bonding numbers, confirmed utility connections,
and all signatures needed for recording of the plat.
We look forward to continuing the excellent relationship we have enjoyed with Liberty
Homes and the Rochelle entities.
Sincerely,

Cy Simon ^
Construction Loan Officer

- ™ ^ r^.iu onf* stypet Sandy, Utah 84070
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WHEN DOES THE SELLER OWE THE
BROKER A COMMISSION?
A DISCUSSION OF THE LAW AND
WHAT IT TEACHES ABOUT
LISTING AGREEMENTS
by Steven K. Mulliken*

^ (

I. INTRODUCTION
Attorneys often are troubled when real estate agents complete
•sales agreements for both parties to a transaction. This offends attorneys because it appears to be a conflict of interest, it provides
.the potential for overreaching and abuse, and it may constitute the
unauthorized practice of law. Despite those concerns, the practice
ts quite common.
The seller's listing agreement with a real estate agent is another
area wiih great potential for abuse. Though this situation does not
iK«w? similar questions of the unauthorized practice of law (the real
estate agent is a party to the agreement), it does present problems
^overreaching and potential difficulties for the seller. A significant
number 0 f cases have litigated listing contracts.1 The greatest number
e cases
^i
* nv °ive litigation concerning whether the seller owes
^ b r o k e r a commission.2 Unfortunately, the average home buyer
hfe* 1VOt c o n s u * t an attorney before employing a broker to sell a
^:*Use Rather, most consult attorneys after problems with real estate
|ff*its a n ^ - Many of these problems could be minimized or avoided
| g ^ g ^ ^ ^ drafting of the listing agreement.
l a

"
t!r
f Colonel, Judge Advocate General's Corps (USAR). Currently assigned
» * n iHdividua; mobilization augmentee to the Administrative and Civil Law Div
^ i m i ^ ^ t ^ d v o c a t e General's School, U.S. Army Partner in the law firm of Sher^^ll-Law ry -.'• ' 0 r a ( *° Springs, Colorado. Formerly Instructor, Administrative and
U w Office^T 1 ° D ; T h e J l i d g e A d v o c a t e General's School, 1984-1987; Administrative
•• i ^»I9S3' < ?
! a l C o u n s e l > a n d C h i e f of Military Justice, Fort Carson, Colorado,
^ l ^ t M a i t o n ^ P r A " S S i s t a n c e 0 f f i c e r > F o r t Carson. Colorado, 1980-1981; Commander,
^ & i r v Acaden C e i n - ? P ^ n y ' M i i i t a r y D i s t r i c t of Washington, 1976. B.S., United States
!
University of Southern California, 1976; J.D., St.
^ ^ n i v t ^ r v y ' ^972;
' r t ' " * M.S.S.M.
•"" "
-•980; LL.M., University of Virginia School of Law, 1986.
as
Cases m U n i t e d
^ m e n u rev i i
States courts that have litigated listing
"Wmmi^r
i s n< ? a h ° V t 2 0 0 c a s e s i n a ten-year period from 1974 to 1983. While
>l
XC:essive i n
S^fctf the issu - f,
^seif, the litigated cases likely represent a small perS ^ £ Rohan afT}< f! a r o s e : a s m a n y more undoubtedly were settled before trial.
» S | I h ^ "
Goklstein & C: Bobi«, Real Estate Brokerage Law & Practice § 4.01

CI rn

-x

1ILITARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 132

This article surveys the law concerning when a real estate broker
:arns a commission and focuses on when a seller may be liable for
, commission even though the property did not sell. It discusses the
raditional rule that a broker earns a commission when he or she
•rings to the seller a purchaser ready, willing, and able to meet the
erms in the listing agreement. 3 The article also examines the minoriy rule that a commission is owed only if a sale occurs and title passes,
mless the failure of the sale to go through is the fault of the seller.4
decent cases examining the issue are analyzed to determine whether
ny trends can be identified. Lastly, the article provides guidance
or practitioners concerning drafting or reviewing listing agreements.

I. WHEN DOES THE REAL ESTATE AGENT
EARN A COMMISSION—THE
TWO DOMINANT THEORIES
A seller negotiating with a prospective real estate agent must determine when the real estate agent earns a commission. Will the commission be due when a contract for sale is signed, or only after closmg? What happens if the buyer defaults or cannot get financing? Proably few sellers consider these questions before signing a listing
greement. Unfortunately, they frequently become critical concerns.

A. THE MAJORITY RULE: FINDING A
READY, WILLING, AND ABLE BUYER
Most jurisdictions follow the rule that the broker earns a commision when he or she brings to the buyer a purchaser who is ready,
rilling, and able to buy the property on the terms set out in the listing
greement. 5 While the parties clearly are free to modify that common law rule in their agreement, 6 if they fail to do so, a commission
may be earned even though a sale never takes place. 7 Similarly, a
Hd. § 4.02(1).
*Id. § 4.03; see also Annotation, Modern View as to Right of Real Estate Broker to
?cover Commission From Seller-Principal Wlicre Buyer Defaults Under Valid- Conact of Sale, 12 A.L.R. 4th 1083, 1094 (1983).
5
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(1). The author lists 25 jurisdictions that have adopted
te traditional rule concerning when the commission is earned. See also Annotation,
ipra note 4, at 1090-93.
6
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(2). Because the seller generally is not represented during
igotiations with the real estate agent, and because agents use form listing agreements
•epared by their counsel, it is unlikely that the common law will be altered in favor
the seller.
T h i s situation frequently occurs when the buyer defaults prior to closing. In that
rent, many jurisdictions would hold that the broker earned his commission when
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full commission generally will have been earned even if the purchaser
defaults on payments shortly after closing.8
Many of the cases that hold that a commission is earned merely
by producing a ready, willing, and able buyer involve situations in
which the seller has backed out of the deal. For example, in Hollinger v. McMichael,9 the seller signed a listing agreement with a
broker that included a provision for a six-percent commission. The
broker brought the seller a written offer, which was accepted and
later modified to adjust the price to reflect the cost of points charged
the seller because of FHA financing. When the broker called the seller
to arrange closing, the seller indicated that the deal was off. The
court found that the broker had earned his commission when he
"procured a purchaser able, ready and willing to purchase the seller's
property on the terms and conditions specified in the contract of
employment." 10
The general rule appears logical in cases in which the seller is to
blame for the deal's failure. That same rule, however, also can result
in liability for a commission when the deal fails through no fault of
the seller. For example if, after the sales contract is signed, the purchaser is unable to get financing, the seller generally is still liable
for a commission, even though no sale results.11 The theory is that
the seller is capable of investigating the financial backing of the prospective purchaser and accepts the purchaser by entering into a binding agreement 12 The reality of most residential purchases, including
the short time period most offers remain open, makes this theory
more fiction than fact. Regardless, the seller frequently will be responsible for paying the commission in these circumstances although
the deal never closes.
Liability for a commission also may occur in other instances that
are not necessarily the result of seller bad faith, such as when a joint
owner of the property becomes unable or unwilling to complete the
transaction,13 or when the seller has a defect in title.14
*See, eg., Taylor v. Weingart, 693 R2d 1231 (Mont. 1984).
9
177 Mont. 144, 580 R2d 927 (1978).
l0
Id.y 580 R2d at 929.
"Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.02(3).
l3

See Guillotte v. Pope Quint, Inc., 349 So. 2d 62 (La. Ct. App. 1977). In Guillotte
sband entered into a listing agreement to sell the house. The wife did not sign
the agreement because she was in the hospital at the time with mental problems. The
broker was informed of her hospitalization, but may not have known that it was because
°f mental problems. The wife later refused to sell the property and thus no sale occurred. The court held that the broker had found a willing buyer and was entitled
«.> his commission. Accord Joiner v. Lockart, 350 So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App.), cert, denied.
:d52_S0. 2d 240 (La. 1977).
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CLOSING

i 1967, in the case of Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson}70 the
3reme Court of New- Jersey took the lead and reversed the tradinal rule. Dobbs involved the failure of closing because of the finan1 inability of the buyer. A contract for sale was signed that called
$2500 in payments prior to closing. Those payments were made,
: the buyer was unable to arrange financing to complete the sale.
:er tying up the property for a year, the seller released the buyer
m the contract. The real estate agent sued the seller and the buyer
his commission. The Supreme Court of New Jersey departed from
; traditional rule and held as follows:
When a broker is engaged by an owner of property to find a
purchaser for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he
produces a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms
fixed by the owner, (b) the purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owrner to do so, and (c) the purchaser completes
the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the contract. If the contract is not consummated
because of lack of financial ability of the buyer to perform or
because of any other default of his,. . . there is no right to commission against the seller.16
Dther jurisdictions have found the New Jersey rule persuasive, with
urts in a number of jurisdictions expressly adopting the Dobbs posin.17 Additionally, at least one jurisdiction imposes the rule by
ttute.18
50 N..I. -528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
Id., 236 A.2d at. 855 (emphasis added).
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.03(2); see also Annotation, supra note 4, at 1088. The
•)\ving jurisdictions have either adopted or expressly approved the Dobbs holding:
;tz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978), Potter v."Ridge Realty Corp., 28 Conn,
•p. 304, 259 A.2d 758 (1969); Rogers v. Hendrix, 92 Idaho 141, 438 P.2d 653 (1968);
ilenger v. Clause, 1789 N.W.2d 420 (Iowa 1970); Winkelman v. Allen, 214 Haw. 22,
P.2d 1377 (1974); Tristram's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 367 Mass. 622, 327 N.E.2d 727
7b); Cornett v. Nathan, 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976); Sester v. Comnwealth, Inc., 256 Or. 11, 470 P.2d 142 (1970); Staab v. Messier, 128 Vt. 2380. 264
d 790 (1970). For an in depth discussion of the Dobbs case, see Note, Ellsworth
)bs, Inc. v. Johnson: A Reexamination of the Broker--Buyer-Seller Relationship in
o Jersey, 23 Rutgers L. Rev. 83 (1968).
While the New Jersey case was a trend setter in the judicial arena, at least one
slature had foreseen the problem and legislatively eliminated it before Dobbs. Since
3, Colorado statutes have provided the following concerning when the broker can
m a commission:
No real estate agent or broker is entitled to a commission for finding a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase by the owner
until the same is consummated or is defeated by the refusal or neglect of the
owner to consummate the same as agreed upon,
o. Rev. Stat. •§ .12-61-201 (1973).

8
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The New Jersey rule clearly is the superior rule. It more accurately reflects the understanding of the parties, and works equity. While
a number of jurisdictions have not adopted the New Jersey rule expressly, courts often attempt to reach the result of the rule through
other doctrines. Although a seller can be found liable for a commission when title does not close, courts are hostile to this result and
generally avoid imposing liability on a seller when the sale falls
through, unless the failure of the sale was the seller's fault. Thus,
most courts examine whether the seller was guilty of bad faith.

C. LIABILITY FOR A COMMISSION IS
GENERALLY LIMITED TO SITUATIONS
IN WHICH THE DEAL CLOSES OR
THE SELLER DEFAULTS
If a real estate transaction fails to close because of the fault of the
seller, courts often will find that a commission is owing. When the
seller is not at fault, courts will avoid imposing liability on the seller
for a commission by employing any number of doctrinal approaches.
The primary doctrines are discussed below.
1. Construction of the Listing Contract to Require a Sale
Perhaps not surprisingly, one way courts frequently impose the
New Jersey rule is by construing the listing agreement to require that
a sale or exchange occur before liability for a commission arises. In
some instances this is clearly legitimate, such as when the listing
agreement uses language that clearly calls for a sale. Listing agreements in New York, for example, frequently indicate that the commission is due "as, if, and when title passes." 19 That language makes
the commission contingent upon title passing.
. l*See, e.g., Graff v. Billet, 64 N.Y.2d 899, 477 N.E.2d 212 (1984). The strict construction of this language may work an injustice on the realtor. In Graff the broker brought
what was apparently an acceptable offer under the listing contract. The seller refused
to accept the offer, let the listing period expire,, and then accepted^ higher offer. The
court construed the listing agreement strictly against the broker. The listing agreement included the following language: "The aforesaid commission is due and payable
to the above named licensed broker as, if and when title passes (rider omitted), except for willful default on the part of the seller, in which case the commission shall
be payable upon demand." Id., 477 N.E.2d at 214. The court determined that a seller
could be in willful default only after a contract had been entered into. The result
0
this decision, as aptly expressed by the dissent, is to permit sellers to avoid payment for the broker's efforts by refusing to sign an offer and waiting until the listing
•Period expires.
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Other jurisdictions stretch quite far to reach the desired result. For
example, in Diehl and Associates, Inc. v. Houtchens20 the court explained that a difference exists between a listing agreement that "requires a broker to merely find a purchaser and a brokerage contract
which requires a broker to sell, make, or effect a sale."21 The listing
agreement the court wras examining began by indicating that the real
estate agent was employed to ' 'sell or exchange the property.'' The
court focused on that language to determine that the listing agreement required a sale before a commission was due. The court did
not note the following language in the clause concerning the commission:
In the event thai you, or any other brokers cooperating with
you, shall find a buyer ready and, willing to enter into a deal
for said price and terms, or such other terms and price as I may
accept, or that during your employment you place me in contact with a buyer to or through whom at any time within 90
days after the termination of said employment I may sell or con- _
vey said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your
services a commission equal in amount to
% of the above
stated selling price. 22
This language easily could be read to reflect the majority rule and
require a commission if, during the listing period, the real estate
agent finds a ready and willing buyer. The court, however, ignored
the language and indicated that the plain and clear language of the
agreement required a sale The court actually ignored the fair meaning of the language, and imposed the New Jersey rule upon the parties. The sale fell through because the contract for sale included some
substantial conditions that were not met. This failure was not the
seller's fault.23 Accordingly, the court legitimately could have treated
the issue as a breach of contract for failure to produce a willing buyer,
rather than stretch a fair reading of the language to find that the
listing agreement required a sale.
20

173 Mont. 372, 567 P.2d 930 (1977)
/d., 567 P. 2d at 935.
Id. (emphasis added)
23
The conditions involved the granting of an easement and the failure to settle a
boundary dispute. Id. at 933 Inclusion of conditions in the sales contract can protect
the seller from owing a commission if the seller later backs out of the sale For example, m ERA Real Estate Home Ranch Properties v. Big Horn Game Ranch, Inc., 692
P.2d 1218 (Mont. 1984), the corporate seller included a clause in the contract for sale
Hull icqulieu Jit; sale uu ue appiovtru Iry dll of the shareholders. No approval was ob
tained, and the court held that the real estate agent was not entitled to a commission
because a sale had not occurred and no evidence of wrongful conduct existed on the
part of the seller
21

22

270
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In Property Brokers, Inc. v. Loynhtg2^ a similar listing agreement
was construed with the same result. That agreement also included
a prefatory statement indicating that the broker was employed to
sell or exchange the property. That language was followed by a provision indicating that in the event the broker found "a buyer ready
and willing to enter into a deal" the seller would pay a commission.25
The broker found a prospective buyer within the period of the listing
agreement. The contract for purchase that the parties signed contained a provision making it contingent on sale of the purchaser's
home. The buyer was unable to sell his home within the primary
listing period (and the six-month extension period after its expiration during which ihe seller would be liable for commission if tne
sale was to a buyer placed in contact writh the seller by the broker).
After expiration of these periods, however, the buyer sold his home
and bought the seller's home. The court found that the listing agreement required a sale, and that no sale occurred during the effective
period under the listing agieement. This case is another example of
a sale that failed because of no fault of the seller.26
2. No Willing Buyer on Terms of the Listing

Agreement

a. In General—Offer Must Meet all Terms
A second and more common way courts permit sellers to avoid
liability for a commission under contracts that require payment of
a commission when brokers find ready, willing, and able buyers is
to determine that no buyer was willing to buy on the listing agreement terms. In other words, the courts require that the broker find
a buyer who is willing to meet all of the terms in the listing agreement before a commission is owed.
Rcnfro v. Mcacham27 is illustrative of how closely the terms of the
offer must match the terms of the listing agreement before the seller
may incur liability for a commission. In Renfro the listing agreement
called for the sale of 550 acres of open land for $687,500 or equivalent
price per acre, and sale of 1088 acres of woodland for $562,500 or
equivalent price per acre, or a total sale price of $1,250,000 for the
entire property. Terms of the sale identified in the listing agreement
called for one-half of the purchase price at closing and the balance
m six months if the entire property was sold.
-!201 Mont 309, 6R4 P2d 521 (1982)

yi
Afit-i beemg ine lengths courts will go to Imd Lhar a written agreement called
for a sale before a commission is earned, it is not surprising that the court in Big Horn
tound that an oral listing agreement required a sale before a c->r° mission wa<? eirned
27
50 N c A P P 4^1, 274 S E.2d 377 (1981)
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The broker brought an offer for $1,250,000 for 1638 acres or
quivalent price per acre based on a survey to be run at the buyer's
spense. The terms of the offer were to be half of the purchase price
t closing and half six months later. The seller rejected the offer and
llegedly refused to negotiate the terms. The broker sued for the comtission, arguing that he had produced a ready, willing, and able
uyer.
The court found for the seller, finding that the offer was not made
n the terms of the listing agreement. The court focused on the difjrence caused by including the language ' 'or equivalent price per
ere" for a purchase of the entire tract, while that language was inluded in the listing agreement only after the price statement for
ach individual track. 28 Accordingly, the sale of the entire tract could
»sult in less than the full $125,000 under terms of the offer if a
arvey discovered less than 1638 acres. This would not be possible
nder terms of the listing contract. Though this is true, the buyer
3uld have accomplished the same result, consistent with the terms
f the listing agreement, by offering the full asking price for each
•act separately, rather than offering the full asking price for the enre parcel. The court also noted a similarly inconsequential dif>rence in the financing terms that was caused by including the
quivalent price per acre language after the full acreage, rather than
fter the two tracts. This case would suggest that a seller can proide maximum flexibility by making the terms of the listing agreeLent as specific as possible. The chance of a broker finding a buyer
rho will offer identical terms is remote. If the listing agreement is
efficiently detailed, the seller may be at greater liberty later to
hange his mind about the wisdom of a sale and reject the offer as
>ng as the offer is not identical to the listing agreement on all
ibstantial terms. 2 9
The courts can make the broker's job next to impossible. In Haring v. Warren30 the listing agreement set out the purchase price
nd specified the terms of payment. The listing agreement clearly
squired a twenty-nine percent down payment and the balance amor-

2S
Id., 21A S.E.2d at 380. Interestingly, the offer contained additional terms that the
ourt did not discuss. For example, the offer provided that each party would pay their
>wn attorneys' fees, and that taxes would be prorated.
29
For other cases in which the seller has avoided owing a commission when rejecing an offer that contained terms different than those in the listing agreement, see
Wilson v. Upchurch, 425 N.E.2d 236 (Ind. App. 1981); William G. Vandever Co. v. Black,
»45 R2d 637 (Utah 1982); and Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977)
30
30 Wash. App. 848, 639 R2d 750 (1982).
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^zed over twenty years, with a balloon payment after ten years. No
iterest rate was listed on the line containing the financing terms,
elow this line was an indication of the current financing on the
roperty that included, in two places, the term seven percent.
The broker brought an offer for the full asking price, including a
twenty-nine percent down payment and a seven-percent interest rate
n the balance. The seller rejected the offer and the broker sued for
is commission. The issue was whether the offer matched the listing
greement. The court determined that the listing agreement was amiguous as to the financing term and accepted parol evidence as to
le terms. The seller alleged that the interest rate was to be negotible, while the broker alleged that they had agreed on seven persnt. The court believed the seller. Because the interest rate was condered negotiable, the broker was found not to have produced a
?ady? willing, and able buyer on terms acceptable to the seller. Aditionally, the court determined that the seller had no obligation to
egotiate unless the seller had refused to do so in bad faith.31
Harding indicates that the seller need only include one term that
left negotiable, and then refuse to negotiate that term, to avoid
ability. Some limitation on the seller exists in that his refusal to
egotiate cannot be in bad faith. Proving bad faith, however, puts
ie broker to a difficult test.
If the listing agreement does not include a negotiable term, the
same objective can be accomplished using the sales contract. In ERA
Real Estate Home & Ranch Properties v. Big Horn Game Ranch, Inc. ,32
for example, the parties had an oral listing agreement. When the
broker brought the seller a contract for sale, the seller had inserted
in the contract a provision requiring that the corporate shareholders
informally approve any sale. Although the shareholders approved of
the sale during a meeting, no formal ratification of the offer ever
occurred. Because this condition was part of the sales contract and
never was met the court determined that no commission was due.
_ If the seller intends to rely on a negotiable term or condition in
the listing agreement, that term or condition should be carried over
nito any contract for sale. Failure to include the term in the contract
~ 3lThe broker alleged that the seller refused to meet to discuss offers, never informed
the broker of the objection to the seven percent interest rate, changed his mind about
Ranting to sell that year's crop with the property, and had decided he wanted a taxtree exchange rather than a contract for sale. Id., 639 P.2d at 754
32
692P2d 1218 (Mont 1984)
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may, under the merger theory, mean that it no longer applies. In
Thy lor v. Gaudry33 the listing agreement included a provision that
made any sale contingent upon the seller approving the buyer's
business qualifications. The broker brought an offer, which, after a
counter offer by the seller, resulted in a signed agreement. The sale
never was completed, but the broker sued the seller for the commission, arguing that he had produced a ready and able buyer. The
seller apparently backed out of the deal believing the buyers did not
have sufficient financial ability. The seller also defended by arguing
that the broker had not produced a buyer agreeable to the seller
because he had not approved the buyer's business qualifications. The
court noted that this condition—approval of the business qualifications of a prospective buyer—had not been carried over from the
listing agreement to the sales contract. Accordingly, because the sales
contract constituted a new agreement and overcame theiisting agreement, that condition was not relevant to the inquiry. According to
the broker, the business qualifications of the buyer were discussed
with the seller at the time of the initial offer, and the seller accepted
the buyer's qualifications. Seemingly, then, brokers can benefit from
their own inept (or perhaps skillful and cunning) drafting of the sales
contract by failing to carry over a term from the listing agreement
to the sales contract.
While a seller generally can be protected from having to pay a commission for a sale that does not occur by including sufficient provisions or conditions in the listing agreement, bad faith always is a
limitation. If the court believes that the seller refused to accept an
offer in bad faith or took advantage of the broker's efforts without
paying, the court in most instances will find that the broker earned
a commission.34 Some cases, however, would indicate that the seller
can go pretty far without reaching this point. One illustration is Colorado City Development Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc.35
The broker for Jones-Healy was working under an oral, nonexclusive listing agreement to sell the property for a cash price of $220
per acre. The broker brought an offer for the full asking price, but
the offer included terms additional to those in the listing agreement
(inclusion of equipment and livestock with the sale and conducting
a survey). The seller's board initially approved the sale subject to
approval of an ad-hoc committee made up of some of the directors.
The committee failed to approve the sale, and the offer never was
accepted. The evidence indicated that the committee's failure to ap™46 Or. App. 235, 611 R2d 336 (1980).
:u
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.04(1).
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prove the offer was due to its belief that the property was worth
more than the $220 per acre, the price reflected in the listing agreement.
Jones-Healy sued for its commission, alleging bad faith rejection
by the seller. The trial court noted that the offer from the sellers contained substantial differences from the listing agreement, which entitled the seller to reject the offer without indicating to the broker
why the offer had been rejected.36 The trial court entered judgment
for the seller and the broker appealed.
On appeal, the court of appeals noted that the board of directors
had decided to reject the offer not because of any of the substantial
new terms, but because it felt the price was too low. The court refused
to let the sellers rely on the additional terms when the reason for
the rejection was their disagreement with the price reflected in the
listing agreement and offered by the buyer. Finding that the sellers
rejected the offer to hold out for more money, the court remanded
the cage for a directed verdict for the broker.37
The broker did not get the last laugh, however. The seller appealed
to the Colorado Supreme Court. 38 The court reversed, and indicated
that when the terms are substantially different, the seller can reject the offer for any reason, even if the seller merely had changed
his mind about selling. Thus, at least in Colorado, if the offer contains any substantial terms different from those in the listing agreement, the seller can reject the offer, regardless of the real reason
for the rejection.
* Jones-Healy Realty, Inc. v. Colorado City Dev. Co., 568 R2d 88 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977),
rev rf, 576 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1978).
37
The court of appeals stated:
The owner may decline to convey or complete the sale. He may so decline for
the reason that he may get more by holding and raising his price, or for any
other reason; but this does not and should not relieve him from his liability
to pay his broker for his services in procuring a person able, ready and willing
to purchase at the terms given, the same as if he had completed the sale.
Id. at 90 (citing Dickey v. Waggoner, 114 P.2d 1097 (Colo. 1941)).
^Colorado City Dev. Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc., 576 P.2d 160 (1978). The Col,. prado Supreme Court made the following distinction concerning minor and substantial variations:
An offer to purchase real estate often differs from the terms of the listing
agreement in some respect or adds terms regarding matters not addressed in
the listing. Where the variations are minor, the seller is obligated to identify
those on which it would rely if it chooses to reject the offer. Fairness requires
that the broker be afforded the opportunity to correct minor variations so that
the sale may be completed and a commission earned. However, wThen the variations are substantial, the seller is entitled to refuse the offer without specifying the reason for its rejection. The broker is charged with knowledge that the
substantial variation exists when he submits the offer.
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b the extent the variations are not substantial, the seller may have
uty to negotiate the terms but the seller still will gam flexibility
having a detailed listing agreement If the sale will include seller
ancmg, the acceptable financing terms should be specified, and
» sale should be made contingent upon the seller personally ap
>ving the creditworthiness of the buyer 79 When negotiating with
eal estate agent concerning who should bear the risk of default
the buyer prior to closing, the seller should be aware that the
>ker can, in the sales contract shift liability for a lost commission
the buyer in case of default by the buyer 80
^ related point is that the seller should be advised to make the
ce reflected m the listing contract high and the payment terms
imal As shown above, a seller may realize after signing the listing
eement that the property is worth more than agreed to m the
mg agreement Unfortunately, once the agreement is signed, if
broker brings an offer for that price, the seller may have to pay
commission even if the offer is rejected
'he attorney also should advise the client that if an offer is
pared by the broker, it should include all the conditions that ap
ir in the listing agreement Conditions not transferred to the sales
itract may be lost
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article has discussed some of the law concerning when a
broker can demand a commission from a seller of property The com
mission obviously is earned when the broker finds a buyer within
the period of the hstmg and the property is sold When the property
is not sold or when the seller rejects an offer the question of whether
the seller is liable to pay a commission is more difficult While some
variance exists between jurisdictions the trend is that the commis
sion is earned only when title passes unless failure of the transac
tion was because of the fault or bad faith of the seller While many
jurisdictions do not indicate that this is the rule frequently this is
the result achieved through various doctrines used by the courts to
avoid imposing liability on a seller for a real estate agent s commis
sion when the failure of the transaction was not the seller s fault
Though the law has treated sellers fairly, the numerous cases
litigating brokers' commissions are evidence that the law is not clear,
and that the agreements are not drafted adequately to avoid
misunderstanding and clearly allocate the risks Attorneys schooled
in this subject can benefit their clients by carefully reviewing and
drafting listing agreements

'inally, the attorney should consider expandmg the broker s duties
ting agreements generally are vague or silent about the broker's
cifIC responsibilities The seller would be wise to indicate expressly
he agreement the level of sales and advertising efforts the broker
equired to deliver If the seller subsequently becomes dissatisfied
h the real estate agent and early termination of the agreement
lecessary, the seller will have something concrete m the listing
eement upon which to rely

See Taylor v Weingart 693 P2d 1231 (Mont 1984)
When negotiating with the broker concerning who should bear the loss if the buyer
lults before closing there is authority in some jurisdictions that the buyer who
s a contract for sale and later defaults can be held liable to the broker for the
commission Clark v Wright 699 SW2d 174 (lenn Ct App 1985) A term im
ng liability for the commission on the buyer in the case of a default by the buyer
be placed m the contract for sale Salmon v Hodges 398 So 2d 548 (La Ct App
3) The seller should request such a term and use the a\ailabihtv of shifting the
to the buyer as a reason why the seller should not bear the risk

3
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tould be avoided. A lawsuit may cost the seller more than the comission. For attorneys who are fortunate enough to have a client seek
ieir advice prior to entering into a listing agreement, the following
sues should be considered when reviewing or drafting a listing
^reement.
The obvious starting point is to make certain that the time when
ie commission is earned is clearly set out. From the seller's perspeeve, the commission should be made contingent on title closing. This
ill remove any doubt and will contractually guarantee treatment
>nsistent with the modern trend established in New Jersey.75
The parties should anticipate and provide for any contingencies
lat might cause the deal to fall through and should allocate the risks
lemselves. If, as suggested above, the commission is made conngent on title passing, the risk is on the broker if the buyer is unable
> obtain financing or breaches the agreement before closing.
Another risk that should be anticipated is failure of title. If the
ansaction cannot be completed because a title defect exists, who
lould bear the loss? Thoughts may differ on this. Some may believe
ie seller should bear the risk, because he or she may be able to take
2tion to cure title or may be insured for loss from title defects,
smetimes, however, curing title requires cooperation by the buyer,
t; least in extending the time to close. At any rate, the parties should
nticipate this problem and specify how it should be handled. Listing
^ntracts often address this risk and, not surprisingly, they generalr
place the burden on the seller.76
Two other situations that could occur and should be anticipated
re foreclosure against the seller and subsequent default by the buyer
fter closing. First, if the broker is unable to find a buyer and the
roperty stays on the market for an extended period, the seller could
ecome financially strapped, resulting in a foreclosure sale. If the
roker has an exclusive right to sell, should a foreclosure sale be con.dered a sale or exchange under the listing agreement? That adds
isult to injury and should be avoided.

1991]

REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS

A more likely problem may result if the buyer defaults. If the
default occurs before closing, and the listing agreement calls for a
commission only upon closing of title, then no commission will be
owing. When, however, the seller is financing part of the purchase,
the seller may want to make some part of the commission payable
over time from receipts from the installment payments; in this way,
the broker shares the risk of future performance. 77
The period of the listing should be identified clearly, preferably
by indicating termination as of a specific day of the month rather
than after a given period. If the agreement will include an extension clause by which the seller agrees to pay a commission to the
broker during a period following expiration of the listing agreement
should a sale occur to one identified by the broker, the agreement
also should require that the broker, within a short period after expiration of the listing agreement, deliver to the seller a listing of all
parties to whom the property has been shown. The seller cannot
know who has seen the property with the broker, because the seller
may not even be present when the property is shown. Requiring the
broker to provide a list to the seller can avoid confusion and permit
ihe seller to exclude those parties from coverage under a listing agreement with a subsequent broker.
As a practical matter, if a client seeks assistance after terminating
a listing agreement that included an extension clause, but that did
not require the first broker to provide a list, the seller should be advised to request one from the first broker and to refuse to sign a contiact for sale until confirming with the first broker that the prospective purchaser was not identified by the first broker. If the purchaser
was identified by the first broker, the seller should refuse to accept
the offer until the two brokers concerned agree how to split the commission. Also, any extension clause should require payment of a commission only upon an actual sale, not upon signing of a contract for
sale.
In most instances the attorney will be assisting the client by making the terms of the listing agreement as specific and detailed as possible. The seller generally will not be bound to accept the offer unless
the offer matches the terms of the listing agreement. 78

75

See, e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 50 N.J. 528, 236 A.2d 843 (1967).
The following language is taken from a sample listing agreement produced by the
utchinson Board of Realtors in Kansas: "MARKETABLE TITLE: The REALTOR has
dunned SELLER of ihcii le^punbibiliij UJ piuvidc the BUYER? of the property vr{+h
vidence of marketable title and also to provide access for inspections, if any, wher
ailed for in a sales agreement and our obligation to disclose any known material
efects."
76

o*

77
Puttmg some of the risk of future default by the buyer on the broker makes good
business sense. The broker, if not subjected to the risk, has no interest in the buyer's
,U U
* *Z~ " ,, 'ifunu bc>und clusing If ~>cmc of the broker's commission is dependent
"n the buyer's future payment performance, the-broker may be more motivated to
^reen the buyer adequately based on financial ability.
,s
See supra notes 28-50 and accompanying text.
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In Jackson v. Free&1 the listing agreement granted the broker an
exclusive right to sell for 365 days from the date of the agreement
md thereafter until the broker received a fifteen-day written notice
,erminating the agreement. Additionally, the agreement included an
extension clause requiring a commission if, within one year from the
:ermination of the agreement, the property was sold to any person
Adth whom the broker had negotiations. The contract called for a
;en-percent commission. The broker found a potential buyer and submitted an offer to purchase. The offer was countered, and the coun:eroffer never was accepted. The property later was sold to the first
offeror under terms identical to the first offer. The sale, however,
occurred a little over two years after the listing contract was signed.
When the broker sued for a commission, the seller alleged that she
iad sent a letter terminating the agreement, and produced a copy
jf it. The broker denied ever receiving the letter. The court found
^hat it had been sent and that the agreement and extension period
had expired, resulting in a verdict for the seller.
For the extension clause to be effective, the broker will have to
>how that the eventual buyer was introduced to the seller during
;he period of the listing contract. 68 If the buyer is not identified un;il after the listing period has expired but during the extension period,
;he broker, in many jurisdictions, will not be successful in using the
:lause to recover a commission.69
2. Procuring Cause Doctrine
When two brokers claim entitlement to a commission from the proceeds of the same sale, the courts generally try to determine which
Droker was the procuring cause of the sale.70 In some jurisdictions,
nowever, this doctrine is used to permit a broker to recover a com67

442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
In Heckenlaible v. Fromherz, 577 R2d 523 (Or. 1978), the listing contract included
;he following language:
"In the event that you shall find a buyer ready and willing to enter into a deal
for said price and terms, or at such other price and terms as I may accept, or
that I am placed in contact with a buyer to or through whom at any time within
90 days after the termination of said employment I may sell or convey said property, I hereby agree to pay you in cash for your services a commission equal
in amount to seven % of the above stated selling price."
Id. at 523 (quoting Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1976)). The broker,
shortly after the listing agreement expired, brought a buyer to the seller and a sale
resulted. The court denied the broker a commission, stating that "[presenting a seller
with a buyer for the first time after the listing agreement has expired is no different
than presenting a seller with a buyer when no agreement exists." Id. at 524.
&
Hd.
70
Rohan, supra note 2, § 4.07.
68
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mission when the broker has placed the seller in contact with a buyer
during the listing agreement, but the contract for sale and actual
sale occur after the listing agreement has expired.
The procuring cause doctrine can provide a basis for recovery when
no extension clause is present in the listing agreement, or it may provide a basis for recovery independent of the extension clause.71 To
obtain relief under the procuring cause theory, the broker must show
that he did more than just aid the sale. 72 "Procuring cause refers
to the efforts of a broker in introducing, producing, finding, or interesting a purchaser, and means that negotiations which eventually lead to a sale must be the result of some active effort of the
broker."73 Thus, the mere absence of an extension clause will not
necessarily prevent the broker from obtaining a commission. Of
course, in many jurisdictions, oral listing agreements are permitted,
and courts can find that the parties who previously had a written
listing agreement either extended it or entered into a subsequent
oral listing agreement. 74

III. DRAFTING CONSIDERATIONS
While the law concerning when a commission is earned frequently is favorable to the seller, significant risks still exists that can and
7l
ln Jackson v. Free, 442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983), the listing contract contained an extension clause. The court found that the doctrine of procuring cause could
entitle the broker to relief when the extension clause was not effective:
1
'The purpose of the extension clause in a real estate listing contract is to insure the realtor's right to a fee when the property owner sells the property
subject to the listing after expiration of the primary term to a purchaser who
had been located or otherwise interested in the property by the realtor's effort. The realtor does not have to be the procuring cause in order to activate
the extension clause. He need not have been involved in active negotiation with
the purchaser at the time of the expiration of the primary term."
Id at 1348 (quoting Harkey v. Gahagan, 338 So. 2d 133 (La. Ct. App. 1976)). The court
continues by indicating that "a real estate broker is entitled to a commission if he
is the 'procuring cause' of the sale, even though the term of his listing agreement may
have expired." Id.
72
Id. at 1349.
73
/d.
74
For example, in Dickerson v. Hughes, 370 So. 2d 1301 (La. Ct. App. 1979), the seller
initially had listed his property with the broker, but the property did not sell. At the
expiration of the listing the seller validly terminated the agreement. A few months
later, the seller stopped by the broker's office and told him that if he knew of someone
interested m the house to bring them by. The broker brought an interested buyer to
^ee the house, and the seller was present during that showing. The seller then proceeded to negotiate a sale directly with the buyer, and, actually sold the home to the
buyer a month later. The broker sued for a commission and prevailed. The court found
'hat the seller's few words when he stopped by the broker's office were sufficient
> form an oral listing agreement.
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E. LIABILITY FOR COMMISSION AFTER
EXPIRATION OF THE LISTING CONTRACT
Perhaps the most dangerous area for sellers is the possibility of owg a commission to a broker based on a sale of the property after
e listing contract has expired. This can come as somewhat of a surise and can work a tremendous hardship. An attorney advising a
Her about selling real estate should caution sellers about this
mger. The problem most often arises in one of two contexts.
Extension

Clauses

Listing agreements often extend liability for a commission for a
ated period of time beyond expiration of the listing period should
e seller sell the property to a buyer identified by thei>roker.58 The
ording of these provisions varies considerably. For example, some
dicate that the sale must be due to the broker's efforts,59 while
hers require that the buyer be 'one with whom the broker had
igotiations,60 or one whose interest in the property was initiated
7
the broker or who was placed in contact with the seller by the
oker.61 The length of time for which this period of liability may
n varies, but generally is not less than three months, and may be
) to one year.
Some listing agreements include a stated initial period for the
ting, but include a clause that keeps the agreement in force until
e seller gives the broker written notice of termination of the agreeent. 62 Witii this automatic lenewal provision, the seller often
istakenly assumes that the agreement has expired.
Extension clauses serve th^ legitimate purpose of preventing a
Her from unfairly benefiting from the labors of the broker by
H

See, e.g., The Nebraskans, Inc. v. Homan, 206 Neb. 749, 294 N W.2d 879 (1980),
ckenlaible v. Fromherz, 28 Or. 199, 577 R2d 523 (1978).
9
See, e.g., The Nebraskans, Inc., 294 N.W.2d at 879.
"The following language is used in a real estate listing contract from the Hutchini Board of Realtors in Kansas:
PROTECTION PERIOD: The SELLER agrees to pay the aforesaid brokerage fee
should a sale be made directly by the SELLER within
days after this
exclusive right to sell terminates to parties with whom the REALTOR has
negotiated with or whose interest in the property was initiated by REALTOR
during the term hereof providing the REALTOR has notified the SELLER in
writing of such negotiation during the term of the exclusive right to sell, unless
the property is re-listed with another licensed person.
'See, e.<?., Heckenlaible, 577 P.2d at 523, Ferrara, 533 P.2d at 1351.
\Se<>, e.g., Jackson v. Free, 442 So. 2d 1346 (La. Ct. App. 1983).
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waiting a few days beyond the expiration of the listing agreement
to close a deal. For example, in Collins v. Ogburn Realty Co.63 the
seller gave an exclusive listing to the broker for 120 days. The contract called for a six-percent commission if the home was sold during the listing period, or if within ninety days following the expiration of the listing agreement it was contracted for by one to whom
the broker had shown the property during the listing agreement. The
broker brought a buyer to the seller while the listing agreement was
in force, and the seller and buyer entered into a contact for purchase.
The sales contract was made contingent on the buyer selling his
house, but gave the buyer immediate possession of the property pursuant to a lease provision. The buyer did not sell his house quickly,
and, as a result, the sale of the seller's home did not occur during
the listing period. The seller sent a letter to the broker instructing
him to refund the buyer's deposit because no sale had occurred during the listing period. The broker refused, arguing that he - had earned
his commission because the contract for sale of the property was
entered into within the 120-day period, even though the eventual
sale did jiot get finalized until after the listing period. The court found
that the broker was the procuring cause of the sale and, therefore,
had earned the commission.
While extension agreements can serve a legitimate purpose, they
also can be abused, and frequently are met with hostility by courts.
Courts generally will construe the agreement rigidly against the
broker who drafts the agreement. 64 For example, in McCartney v.
Malm,65 the broker drafted a listing agreement that included an attempt at an extension clause. The clause included the following language- "or if the property is afterwards sold within six (6) months
from the termination of this agency to a purchaser to whom it was
submitted by listing REALTOR."66 That language, however, was not
integrated accurately into the remainder of the commission clause.
Within the six-month period following expiration of the listing agreement the seller sold the property to a buyer identified by the broker
during the period of the listing agreement. Despite its statement that
such clauses were common practice in listing agreements, the court
determined that the extension agreement was ambiguous and refused
to enforce it. The court, however, found no bad faith on the part of
the sellers and indicated that any ambiguity had to be resolved
against the author of the instrument.
63
49 N.C. App. 316, 271 S.E.2d 512 (1980).
. 6 4 ^ eg., McCartney v. Maim, 627 R2d 1014 (Wyo. 1981). "Finally, any ambiguity
in tha ™^*™„t m u s t b e resolved against appellants (realtors) as authors of the instrun
^ m . " id. at 1020.
6
Vd.
a
'Id. at 1018.
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tive purchasers to ensure they are financially capable of buying the
property. The broker wastes the seller's time by showing the property
to those unable to purchase it. Further, today's lending practices are
more complex than before, with many different types of financing
being offered by a greater variety of institutions. Actually, because
of this complexity, some mortgage brokers specialize in finding loans
for buyers. 50

D. IDENTIFYING AND AVOIDING THE RISKS
Though the majority rule may seem inequitable, the practitioner
should be aware of the risks it poses to clients. The following cases
illustrate those risks and suggest how they can be avoided.
In Taylor v. Gaudry51 the seller of a business noted in the listing
contract that any sale was conditioned upon approval of the business
qualifications of the buyer. When an offer was received, the resulting
sales contract did not include the condition. The court determined
that the seller could not rely on the failure of that condition in
defense to owing a commission to the real estate agent because the
listing contract was overcome by the contract for sale. Thus, any condition that the seller wants to rely upon must be found in the listing
agreement and the sales contract.
A similar problem is demonstrated by Fleming Bealty and Insurance v. Evans.52 The seller entered into a listing agreement with
the broker. The listing agreement specified a price of $155,840, including $34,000 down, and $12,184 per year for ten years. Although
it indicated that the seller would carry the financing (less down payment), the listing ?»g*^ement did not provide that the sale was contingent on the seller approving Hie financial capability of the prospective buyer. The broker found a buyer who was willing to buy
the property on the terms of the listing contract. The seller refused
the offer, alleging that the buyer was not financially able to purchase.
When the matter was submitted to the jury, the jury examined the
financial assets of the prospective buyer, found him able, and awarded a commission to the broker. The court held that a ''prospective
purchaser is financially able if he has capability to make the down
payment and all deferred payments required under the proposed contract of sale." 53 The lesson is that whenever a seller intends to prob0

See, e.g., William G. Vandever Co. v. Black, 645 P.2d 637 (Utah 1982)
46 Or. App. 235, 611 R2d 336 (1980).
52
199 Neb. 440, 259 N.W.2d 604 (1977)
M
/d., 259 N.W.2d at 606.
51
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vide financing as part of a sale, the seller would be wise to include
in the listing agreement a provision making any sale contingent on
the seller's personal satisfaction with the buyer's financial status.
While such a provision probably would not protect the seller if the
rejection is in bad faith, it would give the seller more freedom to
reject a buyer based on the seller's personal evaluation of the buyer's
creditworthiness. As mentioned above, if the seller signs a contract
for sale, this provision should be carried over to the sales contract.
A related problem that should be anticipated and avoided concerns
the possibility of default by the purchaser after closing. In Taylor
u Weingart54 Weingart entered into a sales contract with a purchaser
brought to him by Taylor, the broker. The sales contract called for
a commission of five percent upon a sale. The financing terms provided for a down payment of $50,000, a $160,000 payment at closing, $210,000 by May 12, 1982, and the balance of the $1,750,000
purchase price to be paid in installments over a twenty-five-year
period. Closing took place, but the buyer was unable to make the
$2ip?000 payment by May 12. At the time of the default, the broker
had not been paid his full commission, and he sued for the balance
due. The seller tried to defend on a number of theories, none of which
was successful, and the court entered judgment for the broker.
This case illustrates that once closing has occurred, all risks of
future compliance are on the seller unless the contract provides
otherwise. Under the law of most jurisdictions most courts will hold
that the seller has accepted the buyer when the sales contract is
signed.55 The stated rationale for this rule is that the broker does
not ensure performance under the contract. 56 Whether or not this
seems equitable, the seller can alter this result either by placing conditions in the listing agreement or by altering the clause for payment
of commission to the broker.57 For instance, if the sales contract will
include seller financing, the seller may want to consider paying a
portion of the real estate agent's commission over time out of the
anticipated receipts under the contract and conditioning those future
commission payments on receipt of amounts due under the sales contract. This would provide some protection to the seller and would
shift some of the risk of future performance to the broker.

r,4

693 R2d 1231 (Mont. 1984)
"Rohan, supra note 2, § 5.02(1).
^Id (citing Bushnell Real Estate, Inc. v. Nielson, 672 R2d 746, 751 (Utah 1983))
^Eg.. Ferrara v. Firschmg, 533 R2d 1351 (Nev. 1975)
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Financially Able Buyer.
\ n issue that arises with some frequency is whether the seller owes
e broker a commission when the transaction fails to close because
e prospective buyer is financially unable to complete the purchase,
those states that have adopted the New Jersey position, of course,
ere would be no liability for a commission because title never
ssed.39 In other jurisdictions, the question is whether the broker
s performed under the listing agreement. The analysis in situa>ns in which the seller rejected an offer from a purchaser whom
e broker alleges was a ready and able buyer is different than the
alysis in situations in which the seller accepted the offer and
tered into a purchase contract with the buyer and then discovered
e buyer's financial inability.40
1) Rejecting the Offer. When the seller refuses to accept an offer
d the broker brings suit to recover a commission, courts generally
11 require the broker, as part of his case, to prove that the purchaser
,d financial ability.41 This makes sense because the listing agree*nt generally indicates that the broker earns the commission upon
esenting a ready, willing, and able buyer. A buyer who is not finanilly capable of buying the property should not be construed to be
> able purchaser. 42
While courts will use this to protect a purchaser who properly re:ts an offer from an unqualified buyer,43 the protection is far from
solute. For example, in Fleming Realty & Insurance, Inc. v. Evans44
e seller rejected an offer brought by the broker, claiming that the
tyer was not financially able to purchase the property. The issue
is sent to the jury, and the broker produced sufficient evidence
convince the jury that the buyer had the necessary means to fund
e deal.
McGill Corp. v. Werner45 is an example of a seller who unsuccessfulattempted to defend her rejection of an offer for full price based
L the buyer's financial inability. In McGill Corp. when the seller
jected the offer, she made a counter offer at the same price, but
™E.g., Cornett v. Nathan, 196 Neb. 277, 242 N.W.2d 855 (1976).
Rohan, su,pra note 2, § 5.02.
"Id. § 5.02(3).
t2
E.g., Goetz v. Anderson, 274 N.W.2d 175 (N.D. 1978).
™bee, e.g.} Kusciano Kealty bervs., Ltd. v. (inffler, 6^ N/Lzd 696, 465 N.E.2d 33
6 N.Y.S.2d 526 (1947).
"199 Neb. 440, 259 N.W.2d 604 (1977).
l5
631 P.2d 1178 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981).
10

r
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included additional terms. She asked to be permitted to store her
personal property on the land, asked for more earnest money, and
specified a real estate agent's commission of seven percent rather
than the ten percent indicated in the listing agreement and first offer. Her counter offer was not accepted, and the buyers bought
another home from the same real estate agent. The agent sued successfully for his ten-percent commission. The court rejected the
seller's defense that the purchasers were not financially able. The
buyers had received a tentative loan commitment at the time of the
rejection, and the court indicated that this was evidence that the
buyers "had the financial ability to complete the purchase within
the time permitted by the offer."46
(2) Default by Buyer After Contract Signed. When the buyer
defaults after signing a contract for sale, most jurisdictions will hold
that the broker need not prove that the purchaser was financially
able because the seller has accepted the purchaser by entering into
a contract. 47 The broker, therefore, earns the commission even though
the purchaser later defaults. Because of the harshness of this rule,
a growing number of jurisdictions hold that the broker represents
that the purchaser is financially able and that the seller can rely on
the broker's expertise. 48 This position is a necessary result of the
jurisdictions following the New Jersey rule formulated in Dobbs.49
The minority position arguably makes more sense in today's
market. The seller employs a real estate agent to do more that just
show the property. The seller expects the agent to screen prospecM
'Id at 1180. Some jurisdictions treat the seller who rejects a buyer on the basis
of financial ability much more favorably. For example, in Goetz the court explained
the broker's obligation as follows:
In summary, the proem mg of a prospective purchaser under an exclusive listing
agreement implies the production of a ready, willing, and financially able purchaser. The financially able condition refers to the requirement at the time of
closing the transaction of either having the funds to make the payment or be
in a position to arrange for the necessary financing to pay for the property to
be purchased, but does not refer to subsequent developments. It therefore
follows that for a real estate broker to be entitled to a commission pursuant
to an exclusive listing agreement he must produce a prospective ready, willing
and financially able purchaser of the property. It also follows that if the seller
rejects the purchaser, evidence must be introduced to establish that the seller's
refusal to consummate the sale was arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or
wrongful and was not for good cause.
Goetz, 274 N.W.2d at 182-83. As can be imagined, it would be difficult for a broker
to prove that the seller wrongfully rejected the buyer under the standards in North
Dakota. Again, what the court examines is whether the seller acted in bad faith.
-ui, oapta ituLc 2, £ "> 02(1;
'Vd. § 5.02(2).
4<
*See text accompanying notes 15-16.
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INTRODUCTIOXN

The past decade has witnessed a real estate boom throughout
Massachusetts. 1 With the boom, real estate brokerage firms have become more

* I would like to thank my fellow members of the Boston University Law Review for their
work on this Note, especially Shireen Arani for her editing, Kevin Sullivan for his valuable
discussions and insightful comments, and Howard Lipton for his patience. I would also like
to thank my fiancee Lindsay for her continued love and support, not only during the course
of my work on this Note, but also throughout my law school career.
1
Thomas Grillo, Housing Prices Soared in Most of the Bay State, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
22, 2001, at HI ("The longest-running real estate boom in Massachusetts has pushed the
median price for single-family homes up by 36.7 percent from 1990 to 2000."); see also
Lynnley Browning, Firms Bearing Larger Share of Tax Burden, Report Says; Industry
Study Blames Property Rating System, BOSTON GLOBE , Nov. 19, 1998, at C3; Kimberly
Blanton, Market Economy Benefits of Bull Market Had Seeped Deep Into Economic Fabric
of State. A Retreat Could Cut Just as Deep, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 25, 1998, at Gl (noting
that home prices in Boston and nearby suburbs have "skyrocketed").
195
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prevalent and more profitable than ever before.2 As a result of the increase in
the number of real estate transactions and the coinciding increase in the
number of brokers, it follows that real estate brokerage contracts have become
more widespread as well.
Due to the uncertain nature of the rea] estate market, disputes arising out of
real estate brokerage contracts have always been very common. As Corbin
notes, during the past century real estate brokerage contracts have given rise to
seemingly abundant litigation.3 One of the most frequently litigated issues
involves a broker's right to a commission when the broker presents a buyer to
the seller, 4 the two parties enter into a purchase and sale agreement, but the
buyer backs out before closing and the deal falls through.5 The ensuing
dispute frequently centers on ambiguous contractual language concerning
whether the broker is legally entitled to a commission.
In particular,
contractual clauses dealing with a broker's entitlement to a commission are
often susceptible to interpretation as either a condition precedent to payment or
as a schedule setting the time when payment of the commission is due.6 In

2

See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEFT, OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE

UNITED STATES 430 tbl.684. 507 tbi.787, 507 tbl.788 (120th ed. 2000) (illustrating the
increase of establishments, employees, revenues, and earnings in the real estate brokerage
industry during the 1990s); see also BUSINESS STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 260 tbl.201 (Linz Audain & Cornelia J. Strawser eds., 6th ed. 2000) (illustrating the real estate
industry's increased payroll during the 1990s).
3

ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 50, at 78-81 (1952); see also-Henderson

& Beal, Inc. v. Glen, J10 N.E.2d 373, 375 (Mass. 1953) ("The obligation of an owner, or
one who engages a real estate broker, to pay a commission to the broker has been the subject
of frequent litigation in our courts."); Gaynor v. Laverdure, 291 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Mass.
1973) (quoting Henderson & Beal for the same proposition). Corbin attributes the
"immense amount of litigation" both to the character of the real estate business itself, with
buyers and sellers frequently feeling that the broker's commission is disproportionate to the
service that the broker provides, and to the use of vague terms in the agreement between the
principal and the broker, with "no clear provision as to matters that become the subject of
dispute." CORBIN, supra, at 78.
4
This Note uses the terms "property owner" and "seller" interchangeably to refer to a
property owner who engages a broker to sell his property.
5
This Note focuses on cases involving buyer default. While there is a rich body of law
dealing with entitlement to a brokerage commission in the case of seller default, compare
Bennett v. McCabe, 808 F.2d 178, 180 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that "Massachusetts law
does not restrict a broker's entitlement to receive a commission on a failed transaction only
to those cases where a seller's default involves affirmative conduct rising to the level of a
wrongful act or interference") with Hillis v. Lake, 658 N.E.2d 687, 691 (Mass. 1995) ("The
Bennett decision does not state Massachusetts law correctly. . . . In circumstances like those
present in this case and in the Bennett case, the broker is not entitled to a commission unless
it appears that the closing is prevented by wrongful conduct on the seller's part."), that issue
is beyond the scope of this Note.
0
Common contractual language to this effect calls for payment of the commission "on
said sale." See e.g.. Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 729 (Mass. 1975).
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spite of the profusion of litigation, courts have not yet settled on a uniform
interpretation of these clauses.7
Uncertainty in the interpretation of ambiguous contractual language as a
condition precedent or as a schedule of payments is by no means isolated to
real estate brokerage contracts. To the contrary, the issue arises throughout
contract law.8 In interpreting these ambiguous clauses, courts generally apply
familiar methods of contractual interpretation,9 with two provisos: (1) courts

The question that arises is whether a completed sale, with the passing of title, is required
before the broker becomes entitled to a commission, or whether the parties used the
language to set a convenient time when the commission should be paid. If a court adopts
the former interpretation, then a failed sale will prevent the owner from owing the broker a
commission, as a condition precedent to the commission (the closing of the sale) will have
failed. If, on the other hand, the court adopts the latter interpretation, the owner will owe
the broker a commission despite the failed sale, as the failure of the parties' schedule of
payments will have no effect on the broker's legal entitlement to a commission.
7
Compare Alvord v. Cook, 54 N.E. 499, 500 (Mass. 1899) (construing contractual
language providing for payment of a brokerage fee when "the agreement between [the
seller] and [the buyer] is carried into effect" to set a convenient time when payment of the
commission should be made) and Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 817 (Va. 1991)
(construing an agreement providing for the payment of a brokerage fee "if anyone produces
a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy the property" not to make settlement of the sale a
condition precedent to payment of the brokerage commission) with Tristam's Landing, Inc.
v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d at 730 (construing contractual language providing for the payment of a
brokerage commission "on said sale" to make consummation of the sale a condition
precedent for the broker to earn his commission) and Currier v. Kosinski, 506 N.E.2d 895
(Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (construing contractual language providing for the payment of a
brokerage fee "if the broker produced a buyer ready, willing and able to buy [the property]"
as insufficient to require payment of a brokerage fee absent a completed sale (internal
quotation-marks omitted)).
3
Most arrangements giving rise to this controversy involve claims for payment for
services rendered. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTHON CONTRACTS § 8.4. at 535 (3d

ed. 1999). One of the most common situations involves "pay when paid" clauses in
agreements between general contractors and subcontractors. See A.J. Wolfe Co. v.
Baltimore Contractors, Inc., 244 N.E,2d 717 (Mass 1969); Jeremiah Sullivan & Sons, Inc. v.
Kay-Locke, Inc., 459 N.E.2d 837 (Mass. App. Ct. 1984); Bayer & Mingolla Indus., Inc. v.
A.J. Orlando Contracting Co., 370 N.E.2d 1391 (Mass. App. Ct. 1978). In the typical case,
the contract provides that the general contractor will pay the subcontractor within a certain
amount of-time after the property owner pays the general contractor. See e.g., A.J. Wolfe.
244.N.E.2d at 720 (interpreting contract calling for payment "within 10 days after" the
general contractor received payment from the owner). When the owner fails or is unable to
pay the general contractor, the general contractor often refuses to pay the subcontractor, and
the subcontractor brings suit to recover money owed. See id. at 719-20. In the subsequent
litigation, the general contractor argues thai the "pay when paid" clause establishes a
condition precedent to payment, while the subcontractor argues that the clause merely sets a
time for payment. See id. at 720. Massachusetts courts generally interpret these clauses to
set a time for payment. See id.: Sullivan. 459 N.E.2d at 838; Bayer. 370 N.E.2d at 1382.
q
Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co. v. Town of Dan vers, 577 N.E.2d 283. 288 (Mass.
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prefer an interpretation that imposes a duty on one of the parties to ensure that
an event occurs, rather than an interpretation that makes the other party's duty
conditional on the happening of an event;10 and (2) courts prefer an
interpretation that will lessen the obligee's risk of forfeiture if the event does
not occur.11 Nonetheless, in real estate brokerage contracts, ambiguous
language generally renders familiar methods of interpretation ineffective, and
courts' provisos do not provide a ready answer.12 As a result, without the aid
of these tools, policy considerations often become determinative.
Courts have looked to several opposing policies when interpreting
ambiguous contractual language regarding a broker's right to a commission.
On the broker's side of the balance, the primary argument builds from the
premise that the broker's duty is to bring the buyer and seller together in a
legally enforceable agreement, and, at that point, the broker's work is at an
end.13 Under this view, once the parties have entered into a purchase and sale
1991) ("When construing a contract, a court looks to the parties" intent to determine whether
they have created a condition precedent. To ascertain intent, a court considers the words
used by the parties, the agreement taken as a whole, and surrounding facts and
circumstances." (internal citations omitted)); FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 530.
10
FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 532. Professor Farnsworth provides the example of a
contract for the sale of goods that calls for "[sjelection by the buyer to be made before
September 1,"' but in which the buyer does not select the goods until September 10. Id. The
question arises whether the seller's duty to perform is discharged because the buyer failed to
make selection in accordance with the contract. Id. Rather than interpreting the clause as a
condition, which results in a discharge of the seller's duty to perform if the buyer does not
make proper selection, most courts interpret the clause as imposing a duty on the buyer to
make a proper selection, leaving the buyer liable for damages if he fails to do so, but not
allowing the seller to escape his duty to perform under the contract. Id.
11

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227(1) (1981).

In resolving doubts as to whether an event is made a condition of an obligor's duty, and
as to the nature of such an event, an interpretation is preferred that will reduce the
obligee's risk of forfeiture, unless the event is within the obligee's control or the
circumstances indicate that he has assumed the risk.

2002]

12

Because of the nature of real estate brokerage contracts, courts' provisos generally
lend no aid. First, because real estate brokerage contracts involve a third party—the buyer,
who is most often at the root of the default—in a dispute between the owner and the broker,
it is not a sufficient answer simply to say that the court can construe the contract in a way
that closing of the sale rests in the control of one of the parties to the contract. Second, the
only risk of forfeiture in the contract between the owner and the broker consists of a waste
of the broker's expended efforts in arranging a sale. Nevertheless, a large portion of a
broker's business involves expending energies in projects where the outcome is doubtful.
FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 537. Therefore, a construction to avoid forfeiture provides
no aid. as the broker assumes the risk of this forfeiture in the course of his business.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 227 illus. 4 (1981) (explaining that a broker's
efforts should not be viewed as forfeiture because the broker assumes the risk that the sale
will fall through).
13

One of the earliest expressions of this rationale appears in Fitzpatrick v Gilson. 57
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agreement, the broker has no further control of the matter.14 Thus, ii would not
be reasonable to interpret ambiguous language to condition the broker's right
to a commission on the activities of people over whom the broker has no
control.15 Some courts have therefore concluded that a broker becomes legally
entitled to a commission at the time the buyer and seller enter into an
enforceable agreement.16
The arguments on the seller's side of the balance are founded on some
courts' view of the relative skill and understanding of the broker and the
property owner in the typical real estate transaction.17 The imbalance between
the sophisticated broker and the naive property owner has prompted some
courts to conclude that the default rule should favor the property owner and the
broker should bear the burden of expressly contracting around that default rule
if he so desires.18 Moreover, given the nature of a broker's business, the
broker is better suited to shoulder the risk that the prospective buyer will fail to
complete the transaction.19 Also, rather than viewing the broker's duty as
producing a purchaser who will enter into an agreement, these courts have
taken the different perspective that the broker's duty is to produce a purchaser
N.E. 1000 (Mass. 1900). The court in Fitzpatrick reasoned as follows:
When a broker has found a customer for that which his principal has employed him to
find a customer, the broker has performed his duty, and has earned his commission; or.
as the proposition is usually stated, if the person produced by the broker is able, ready,
and willing to buy, sell, or lend, as the case may be, the broker's commission is earned.
When the broker has produced a customer, his duty is at an end. So far as his rights or
his duty are concerned, it is immaterial whether a contract is or is not made, or, if
made, whether it is or is not performed. The broker's right to a commission is no more
dependent upon or affected by the fact that a contract is or is not drawn up and
executed than it is by the fact that the contract, if drawn up. is or is not carried into
effect. Making or not making a contract with the customer produced, enforcing or not
enforcing a contract, if made, arc matters for the broker's principal to do or not to do.
as his ability and inclination determine. They are matters with which the broker is not
concerned, and on which his right to a commission is not dependent.
Id. at 1000-01 (citations omitted).
14

Id.
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D. BARLOW BURKE, J R . , LAW OF REAL ESTATE BROKERS § 3.5, at 3:69-3:70 (2d ed.

1992 & S u p p . 2001).
15
Id. at 3:70 ("There is no reason to make the broker's entitlement to a commission
dependent upon the activities or persons—abstractors of title, attorneys, and, title insurers—
over whom the broker has no control.").
16
See e.g., Canton v. Thomas, 162 N.E. 769 (Mass. 1928); Sayegusa v. Rogers. 846 P.2d
1005 (Mont. 1993); Coughlin v. Neefos. 549 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Div. 1990).
17
See e.g., Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wrait. 327 N.E.2d 727. 731 (Mass. 1975) ("[M]any
sellers, unlike brokers, are involved in real estate transactions infrequently, perhaps only
once in a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights.'').
18
Id. at 731-32.
19
See e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson. 236 A.2d 843. 855 (N.J. 1967) (arguing
that the risk of the buyer's inability to go through with the transaction at closing "must b e
treated as a normal incident of the brokerage business"); Tristam's Landing. 327 N.E.2d at
730-31.
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who is financially capable of completing the transaction. As a result, the
broker should bear the duty of investigating the prospective purchaser's
finances to confirm that the purchaser is in fact capable of completing the
deal.20 Finally, these courts have looked to the expectations of a property
owner in a real estate transaction. The customary expectation of the owner is
to pay the broker out of the proceeds of the sale,21 and it would be inconsistent
with this expectation to hold an owner liable for a commission when the sale
falls through and there are no proceeds to draw from.22
Massachusetts courts have faced extensive litigation in this area and have
taken a changing approach to ambiguous language in real estate brokerage
contracts. Over the last century, Massachusetts courts have gone from
interpreting ambiguous language in favor of real estate brokers to interpreting
it in favor of property owners.23 At the same time, the courts in a majority of
states continue to interpret ambiguous language in favor of real estate
brokers.24

20
Ellsworth Dohbs, 236 A.2d at 853. The court noted:
Since the broker's duty to the owner is to produce a prospective purchaser who is
financially able to pay the purchase price and take title, a right in the owner to assume
such capacity when the broker presents his purchase ought to be recognized. It follows
that the obligation to inquire into the prospect's financial status and to establish his
adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the purchase must be regarded logically
and sensibly as resting with the broker.

Id. The placement of the burden of investigation is a function of a court's interpretation of
ambiguous language. If a court interprets ambiguous language regarding the broker's
entitlement to a commission as a condition precedent, then the burden of investigation will
rest with the broker, as a buyer's inability to close the transaction will result in the loss of
the broker's commission. If, on the other hand, the ambiguous language is treated as a
schedule for payments, then the duty of investigation will fall on the property owner, as
once the owner has accepted the buyer by entering into a purchase and sale agreement, the
owner will be liable for a commission, even if the buyer is subsequently financially unable
to go through with the transaction. In the latter scenario, the owner must therefore satisfy
himself as to the financial capability of the buyer before entering into the purchase and sale
agreement.
21
Id. at 854 ("The common understanding of men is, however, that the agent's
commission is payable out of the purchase price." (quoting Dennis Reed, Ld. v. Goody,
1950 K.B. 277, 284-85 (Eng. C.A.))).
22
Id. 854-55. hi addition, interpreting a brokerage contract to provide for a commission
on a failed sale can lead to the odd result of a property owner paying multiple commissions
on the sale of a single property.
23
See Gaynor v. Laverdure. 291 N.E.2d 617, 620-23 (Mass. 1973; (surveying
Massachusetts courts' treatment of the issue): Trhtcun's Landing, 327 N.E.2d at 731
(adopting a rule more favorable to property owners).
24
See BURKE, supra note 14.
estate brokerage commissions).
adopted the minority rule, while
it as the basis for a decision. Id.

§§ 3, 4 (discussing the majority and minority rules on real
Professor Burke notes that, at present, six states have
eight others have cited it approvingly but not yet relied on
§ 3.
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This Note explores the law of real estate brokerage commissions through the
disparate positions that courts have developed to deal with ambiguous
language in real estate brokerage contracts.25 With a focus on Massachusetts
case law,26 the Note sets forth the majority and minority rules27 and ultimately
argues in favor of the minority rule. The Note begins in Part I by analyzing the
decisions of Massachusetts courts over the past century, culminating with the
decision in Trutam's Landing, in which the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court (**SJC") formally adopted the minority rule. From this analysis. Part I
identifies and examines the factors that motivated the Massachusetts courts*
initial interpretation in favor of brokers, as well as the factors that were
instrumental in the SJC's adoption of the minority rule. Part II takes a closer
look at the justifications that courts have given for the majority rule in the
years since Massachusetts courts abandoned it. After Parts I and II have
examined the majority and minority positions and their underlying
justifications, Part III argues that the minority rule is superior: first, by drawing
on the reasons set forth by courts in their decisions, and second, by raising
efficiency considerations that, to this point, courts have not explicitly taken
into account in their opinions.
I.

MASSACHUSETTS CASES

For the first seventy-five years of the twentieth century, when Massachusetts
courts faced ambiguous language in real estate brokerage contracts regarding a
broker's entitlement to a commission, they interpreted the language in favor of
brokers.28 This approach was developed in a series of cases beginning in 1899.
25

The Note focuses on the specific ambiguity that arises when a clause is susceptible to
interpretation as either a condition precedent to payment or a schedule for payments. While
this scenario is probably the most common, the default rules applied by courts in resolving
these disputes have application beyond this situation. Indeed, as many of the discussed
cases reveal, courts will apply the default rules in any dispute involving ambiguity
surrounding a broker's right to a commission. Consequently, the reasoning employed in this
Note has application beyond the condition precedent/schedule for payments dichotomy.
Furthermore, this Note deals primarily with transactions involving a broker and an
inexperienced residential property owner rather than a commercial entity. While it is
beyond the scope of this Note, it is worth noting that courts have applied the rules developed
in the residential context to transactions involving a broker and a sophisticated commercial
entity. See infra note 105.
26
Massachusetts case law provides an excellent vehicle tor exploring this area of the
law. Not only have Massachusetts courts have faced exteusi\e litigation in this area, but the
decisions have run the gamut both in terms of their outcomes and the considerations that
have driven courts 1 decisions.
27
The majority rule, also called the "ready, willing and able*1 rule, interprets ambiguous
language in favor of real estate brokers, while the minority rule, also called the Ellsworth
rule, interprets ambiguous language in ta\or of property owners.
2K
See e.g., Alvord v. Cook. 54 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1899) (interpreting the language "when
the c o n t r a c t . . . is carried into effect" as a schedule for payment of Hie brokerage fee;;
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The Early Cases
1.

Alvord v. Cook

In Alvord v. Cook, 29 the property owners, the Cooks, entered into an
agreement with two real estate brokers regarding the sale of real estate. Under
the agreement, the brokers were to obtain a sale or exchange of the Cook's
property. Some time after the agreement was entered into, the brokers
succeeded in procuring an individual named Jewell to exchange his property
for the property of the Cooks. In return, the Cooks agreed to pay the brokers a
commission consisting of the transfer of a portion of the land to be conveyed
by Jewell plus $200. The contract between Jewell and the Cooks contained
language providing for the payment of the commission to the brokers when the
' contract with Jewell "is carried into effect."30 The exchange with Jewell
ultimately fell through, and the brokers brought an action to recover their
commission.3 ]
The SJC acknowledged that the clause was open to two potential
interpretations,
A [fjirst, as being a clause for the protection of the defendants, and
| I providing that they should pay nothing unless Jewell carried out his
/ I contract or the defendants saw fit to make him do so; and, second, as
JI being a clause for the protection of the plaintiffs, and limiting the time
( beyond which they would not have to wait for their commission.32
The court opted for the latter interpretation, concluding that the clause set a
time for payment, thus entitling the brokers to a commission despite the failed

Rosenthal v. Schwartz, 101 N.E. 1070 (Mass. 1913) (finding that contractual language that
called for the payment of the brokerage fee "when title passed" did not make the brokerage
fee conditional upon the transfer of the title, but merely set a dead-line for payment); Canton
v. Thomas, 162 N.E. 769 (Mass. 1928) (interpreting language that called for the brokerage
fee to be paid "when papers are passed" to set a time for payment of the fee, noting that the
payment was not conditioned on the papers actually being passed); Maher v. Haycock, 18
N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1938) (stating that language making the brokerage fee payable when the
property was "sold" required only that the broker produce "a purchaser ready, willing, and
able to buy" and that the language should not "be so strictly construed as to require that title
should actually pass before the plaintiff should be entitled to a commission"); Henderson &
Beal. Inc. v. Glen. 110 N.E.2d 373 (Mass. 1953) ("a broker in the absence of special
circumstances is entitled to a commission if he produces a customer ready, willing, and able
to buy upon the terms and for the price given the broker by the owner"); Gaxnor, 291
N.E.2d 617 (holding that once a broker produces an acceptable customer, "making or not
making a contract
aie matters with which the broker is not concerned, and on which
commission is not dependent'')
29
54 N.E. 499 (Mass. 1899).
30
Id. at 500
31
Id. at 499
32
Id
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deal.33 In reaching this outcome, the court fust defined the duty of Alvord
under the contract as "obtaining a satisfactory contract for a purchase or
exchange," rather than as obtaining a completed sale of the property.34 From
the assumption that the broker's duty was merely to find a buyer who would
enter into a contract, the remainder of the court* s analysis flowed easily:
The plaintiffs had done all they were employed to do. They had obtained
for the defendants a contract with Jewell which the defendants could
compel him to carry out. and all parties expected that it would be carried
out. The plaintiffs had no further power in the matter; the rest was to be
done by the defendants. But they had the right to assume that the
defendants would use all reasonable efforts to do the rest, and to avail
themselves of the agreement with Jewell.35
In keeping with the SJC's interpretation, the risk that the purchaser would
default between the time of the agreement to buy and the time of closing fell
squarely on the property owner. It was not long before the SJC began to
express misgivings about this result.
2. Canton v. Thomas
In Canton v. Thomas,36 the broker. Canton, entered into a written agreement
33

Id
' 4 Id The court's opinion does not lend any insight into why it started from the baseline
assumption that the broker's duty was merely to bring the two parties together; it does not
indicate whether this assumption came from the court's reading of the language in the
contract, whether it was the common understanding of the time, or whether it originated
from some other source.
:5
Id. One factor in the case that appeais to ha\e been of critical importance to the court
was the Cooks' failure to enforce their contract with Jewell. Fiom the facts that the couit
piovides, it appears that after entering into the contract. Jewell continually postponed
closing. Id. After several failed attempts to encourage Jewell to close, the Cooks eventually
ceased their efforts to enforce the contract against Jewell and declined to hold themselves
bound. The court viewed the Cooks' efforts as insufficient, and its opinion is littered with
references to the Cooks" failure to enforce their contract against Jewell. A few of the many
examples of the court's displeasure with the Cooks include: the court's reference to its
disinclination to leave Alvord's payment to the "whim or caprice of either of the principals":
the court's note that the Cooks have "by their own voluntary conduct" become unable to
carry out their contract with the brokers; the court's reference to the contract between the
Cooks and Jewell as "canceled by mutual agreement"; and the court's finding that the Cooks
had "neglected to use reasonable means" to hold Jewell to the contract. Id. While the facts
are insufficient to determine whether and at what cost the Cooks would have been able to
force Jewell to go through with the deal, the court was extremely harsh on the Cooks lor not
doing moie to enforce the deal against Tevvell Id While this factoi may go a long way in
explaining the outcome in the case, the opinion established a rule that would ha\e bioad
application in subsequent years See e ? , Canton v Thomas. 162 N E 769. 769 (Mass
1928) (finding that the facts be lore the court were "governed by Alvord v Cook")
* 162 N E 769 (Mass 1928)
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with the property owner, Thomas, later on the same day that Thomas entered
into an agreement with a buyer. The agreement between Canton and Thomas
provided that "in j^^^\dn^U^ft-^--4Cm).ton]vwcurm^
a purchaser for the
property . . . [Thomas] agree[s] to pay [Cantorjthe surrTof $1,632 when papers
are passed." 37 When the prospective buyer breached, Thomas refused to pay
the brokerage commission, and Canton brought an action for recovery. 38
In its analysis, the SJC turned immediately to Alvord and found its rule
controlling 39 and dispositive of the case. 40 Nevertheless, the court appeared to
be growing uncomfortable with the Alvord rule. The SJC noted that the
slightly different language "if and when papers are passed" would have been
sufficient to create a condition precedent. 41 Moreover, the court identified
several other cases where "ameliorating circumstances" had required a
different result. 42 Finally, the SJC noted that its interpretation of the contract

37
Id. at 769. Though the court did not overtly consider it m its opinion, there is an
argument that the contractual language ''in consideration of. . . procuring a purchaser"
established the broker's duty as providing a purchaser, independent of whether the
purchaser ever carried out the transaction. See Coughlin v. Neefus, 549 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App.
Div. 1990) (holding that contractual language providing for the payment of a commission
when "a transfer, sale or exchange of said property is made or effected or agreed upon with
anyone" unambiguously entitled the broker to her commission for producing a prospective
purchaser, despite the failed sale (emphasis added)). While this may have played a role m
the decision, the court overtly rested its decision on other grounds.
38
Canton, 162 N.E. at 769. While it is not clear from the court's opinion, the most likely
reason that the parties signed an agreement after Thomas had already entered into an
agreement with a prospective purchase is that Canton and Thomas had previously entered
into an oral agreement that they were memorializing in a writing. Nonetheless, due to the
operation of the Parol Evidence Rule, the court's interpretation may create problems of past
consideration. See infra note 46.
39
Id. (noting that there is no workable difference between a contract to pay a broker
when an agreement "is carried into effect" and "when papers are passed")
40
Id. ("[W]here cases arise not fairly distinguishable in their facts from Alvord v.
Cook . . . the rule there established must be followed.").
41
Id. (emphasis added) ("A condition of the payment of the commission would be
expressed if the words 'if and when papers are passed' had been used in the contract here in
issue in place of the words 'when papers are passed.'").
42
Id. Among the cases that the court cites for this proposition are Pagum v. White, 156
N.E. 711 (Mass. 1927) (interpreting an agreement, that provided the broker with a
commission consisting of the amount that the broker obtained on the sale of the property in
excess of $10,500, to foreclose a commission when the property sold for exactly $10,500);
Brown v. Jacobs. 150 N.E. 206 (Mass. 1926) (upholding lower court's finding that the
parties had orally agreed that the broker would receive no commission if the deal did not go
through); Carpenter v. Blake, 146 N.E. 224 (Mass. 1925) (upholding lower court's finding
that the contract only entitled the broker to a commission if he received more than $5000 for
the property): Clark v. Hovey, 105 N.E. 222 (Mass. 1914) (finding that, because the contract
provided for payment of the commission from the proceeds of the sale that came after the
first $5000 had been paid, payment of $5000 was a condition precedent to the broker
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"may be not that which an inexperienced owner might think the contract to
mean." 43
The S J C s misgivings in Canton mark the beginning of its recognition of a
policy supporting a contrary interpretation. In particular, the court's statement
regarding the meaning that an inexperience property owner would give to the
contract reflects a recognition of the unfairness in holding an inexperienced
property owner liable for a brokerage commission when the sale of the
property never transpires. There are two bases for questioning a rule that
effectuates such a result. The first builds on the parties' intent in entering the
contract. Absent clear and unambiguous language to the contrary, in the
ordinary case a property owner will not anticipate being liable for a brokerage
commission on a failed sale. 44 As a result, it is unreasonable for a court to hold
that through ambiguous langr^w* the, parties' intent at the, time, of contracting
was to achieve exactly that result.
The second basis is grounded in public policy. The broker is a repeat player
in real estate transactions and thus presumably is more conscious of the
interpretation that courts will give to ambiguous language in real estate
brokerage contracts. As a result, it is more equitable for a court to interpret
ambiguous language in favor of property owners—or, in the alternative, to
create a default rule that favors property owners and to put the burden on
brokers to contract around the rule through clear and unambiguous language.
An interpretation of ambiguous language in favor of property owners would
force brokers to include clear and unambiguous language providing for
entitlement to a commission in the absence of a completed sale, if that were the
parties' desired result. This would ensure that both the broker and the property
owner are conscious of the agreement that they are entering.
On the other hand, an interpretation of ambiguous language in favor of
brokers may create a trap for the unwary property owner.
Such an
interpretation would allow brokers to mislead property owners into a contract
where the property owners will unexpectedly be liable for a brokerage
commission in the absence of a completed sale. The broker, knowing that
courts will interpret the ambiguity in his favor and desiring to maximize his
profits in the transaction, may actually preter tne use ot ambiguous larrguage.45
earning a commission); Munroe v. Taylor, 78 N.E. 106 (Mass. 1906) (holding that an
agreement fixing the amount of the broker's commission to the amount of the sale price
made completion of the sale a condition precedent to a brokerage commission)
43
Canton, 162 N.E. at 769.
44
See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1967).
45
The risk of buyer default is a risk that the agreement between the property owner and
the seller will take into account. Theoretically, if the owner is bearing that risk, than the
broker will be paid less, and, conversely, if the broker is bearing that risk, the broker will be
paid more. The use of ambiguous language allows the broker to have the best of both
worlds, for if the courts will construe ambiguous language in favor of brokers—an
interpretation that property owners do not anticipate but brokers do—then the broker can
contract for a rate that reflects the broker bearing the risk, while, in reality, the owner will
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As the court started to appreciate this reality, it began to question the Alvord
rule. Though the SJC acknowledged the problem, at this point, it did not view
the problem as sufficiently serious to overcome precedent and thus construed
the contract at issue in favor of the broker. 46
3.

Maker v. Haycock

In Maker v. Haycock, 47 the broker went to the property owner's home,
identified himself as a real estate broker, and told the property owner that he
had a customer who was willing to buy the home. The two parties then entered
into an oral contract calling for the property owner to pay the plaintiff broker a
commission "if the house were sold." 48 The broker produced a purchaser, who
entered into an agreement to purchase the property and completed the
transaction. Nevertheless, the property owner subsequently tried to invalidate
his contract with the broker because the sale of the property took place on a
Sunday. 49 The broker then brought suit to recover his commission. 50
The court held that the contract did not require a completed sale for the
broker to earn his commission. 51 It reasoned that "[t]he word 'sold' in this
connection should not, in the absence of anything to indicate the contrary, be
so strictly construed as to require that titleshould actually pass before the

bear it.
46
There are additional grounds to challenge the court's outcome m this case. The
contract between the seller and buyer was entered into before the agreement between the
seller and the broker. Thus, under the court's interpretation, the broker had already
provided the consideration at the time that the seller and broker entered into their contract.
Consequently, Thomas' promise to pay cannot have been made in exchange for Canton
procuring a purchaser who would enter into an agreement to buy, and the doctrine of past
consideration would render the agreement unenforceable. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 8,
at 54-55. On the other hand, if the court had interpreted the contract to require a purchaser
who completed the transaction, Canton's performance would still be forthcoming, and
problems of past consideration would be avoided.
47
18 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1938).
48
Id.
49
The property owner based his argument on chapter 136, section 5 of Massachusetts
General Laws, which prohibits "any manner of labor, business or work, except works of
necessity and charity" on Sunday. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 136, § 5 (2001). The property
owner argued that because the transaction closed on a Sunday and his agreement with the
broker required payment of a brokerage commission when the deal closed (under his
reading), the agreement with the broker was invalid because it transpired on a Sunday.
Nevertheless, under the court's interpretation, because the broker earned his commission
upon procuring a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy, rather than at the time of
closing, the broker had become entitled to his commission earlier in the week, and thus
chapter 136, section 5 was of no consequence. Maker, 18 N.E.2d at 349.
50
Maker, 18 N.E.2d at 348.
51
Id. at 349.
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plaintiff should become entitled to a commission. ,,52 Instead, it was enough if
the broker produced a purchaser "ready wjlljfia nnH nh1r»" tn buy on the
seller's terms. 53
The^court's articulation of the ready, willing, and able rule became the
baseline rule for entitlement to a brokerage commission in Massachusetts. 5 4
Henceforth, absent special circumstances or an agreement otherwise, a broker
would be entitled to a commission when he produced a purchaser who was
ready, willing, and able to buy on the seller's terms. 55 This rule has several
consequences adverse to property owners. First, the ready, willing, and able
rule puts the risk of buyer default on the property owner during the executory
period, the time between the initial agreement between the buyer and seller and
closing of the deal. 56 This seems counterintuitive, as the nature of the broker's
business involves expending energies in projects where the outcome is
52

Id.
" Id.
54
A number of cases subscribes to this rule. In Talanian v. Phippen. 256 N.E.2d 445,
446 (Mass. 1970), the court held that the evidence supported a finding that the broker
produced a customer ready, able and willing to purchase the property on the
defendant's terms, at which time the [broker's] obligation as a broker ceased and he
was entitled to his commission regardless of whether the contract between the
defendant and the purchaser was thereafter made, or, if made, whether it was carried
into effect.
Id. In Spence v. Lawrence, 149 N.E.2d 379, 381 (Mass. 1958), the SJC found that
[w]here the broker's right to a commission is not by the terms of his undertaking made
dependent upon the completion of a sale, the fact t h a t . . . the sale is not completed is
immaterial and it is sufficient if the broker has procured a customer ready, able, and
willing to purchase the premises at the price and on the terms stipulated by the seller.
Id. Additional cases include MacDonald v. Mihalopoulas. 149 N.E.2d 138, 140 (Mass.
1958) ("If the customer procured by the broker is ready, able, and willing to purchase the
property on the terms fixed by the seller, the broker's duty is at an end and he has earned his
commission."); McKallagat v. La Cognata, 140 N.E.2d 185, 187 (Mass. 1957) ("When the
[broker] has [produced a customer ready, able, and willing to buy on the seller's terms] he is
not required to show that a sale resulted or even that a written agreement of sale was ever
entered into by the parties."); Drake v. Sweet, 92 N.E.2d 346, 347-48 (Mass. 1950) ("It is
familiar law that to recover a commission a broker ordinarily is required to prove only that
he produced a customer who was ready, able, and willing to purchase on the seller's
terms."); Chapin v. Ruby, 74 N.E.2d 12, 13 (Mass.1947) ("If the finding of the judge that
the customers produced were ready, able and willing to accept the defendant's
proposition . . . the [broker] should prevail.").
55
For a description of the substance that courts have given to the terms "ready."
"willing," and "able" in years following the Maker decision, see infra note 64.
36
Under the ready, willing, and able regime, once the broker has produced a prospective
buyer on the seller's terms, the broker has earned a commission. As a result, during the
period between agreement and closing, the so-called executory period, if the buyer breaches,
the broker is still entitled to a commission, but the seller will not yet have sold the property.
See e.g., Gaynor v. Laverdure. 291 N.E.2d 617, 621 (Mass. 1973). The effect of this system
is to place the risk of buyer breach on the seller during the executory period.
5
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uncertain. 57 As a result, brokers are familiar with handling this sort of risk, and
if courts put the additional risk of buyer default on brokers, then brokers can
account for the increase by raising their compensation on completed sales. On
the other hand, property owners are largely incapable of dealing with this risk.
Property owners may not even be aware that the risk exists, and if they are
aware of it, they would only have two ways to try to account for it, both
ineffective. They could increase the asking price for their property, which
would pass the cost on to buyers and artificially inflate real estate prices, which
in turn would distort the market's pricing of property. In the alternative,
property owners could demand lower brokerage commissions. In addition to
the collective action problem that a diverse group of property owners would
face in effectuating this second option, even if successful, this set-up would
lead property owners and brokers to alter their agreements to provide that the
broker would bear the risk of buyer default during the executory period in
exchange for an increased commission. This leads to exactly the situation that
an initial interpretation in favor of owners brings about, except that such an
interpretation in favor of owners in the first instance avoids the transaction
costs that this alternate scenario incurs.
Second, the ready, willing, and able rule puts the duty of investigating the
financial capability of the buyer on the seller rather than on the broker. 58 This
is objectionable as well. Certainly, of the two parties, the broker is in a better
position to investigate the resources of the buyer. In almost every case, the
typical seller will not have sufficient access to financial information about the
buyer to conduct an adequate investigation. 59 On the other hand, the broker
makes his living in the real estate business and as a result is likely to have
superior access to financial information. 60 If the duty of investigation was put
57

FARNSWORTH, supra note 8, at 537.
See supra note 20 (explaining that the burden of investigation is a function of the way
in which a court interprets ambiguous language regarding entitlement to a brokerage
commission).
58

59

ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW § 153, at 218 (1987

& Supp.

2001) ("[I]t is unrealistic to believe that most sellers, no matter how vigilant and
resourceful, would be able to protect themselves by investigating the buyer's financial
ability.").
60
Id. (noting that the broker "can make a spot qualification of the prospective buyer with
possible lenders")- In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court of Iowa expressed its
view on the duty of investigation:
[The brokers] found a buyer unknown to the [seller], and the latter was necessarily
interested in the financial responsibility of the purchaser with whom he was about to
deal through an agent. Under such conditions the principal is not bound to investigate
the truth of the facts stated as an inducement for his signature to a contract, nor does it
lie in the mouth of the agent to say that his statements should not have been believed
by his principal.
Thompson v. Finch, 195 N.W. 744, 744-45 (Iowa 1923) (deciding a case where the property
owner defended against the broker's suit to recover commission by claiming fraudulent
misrepresentation on the part of the broker).
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upon brokers in the ordinary course, brokers would develop an expertise and
efficiency in conducting these investigations that property owners would likely
never be capable of developing.
Finally, the ready, willing, and able rule leaves open the possibility of fraud
or a conspiracy between the broker and a prospective purchaser. It is not hard
to imagine a situation where the broker knowingly produces a purchaser who
has no intention of going through with the deal, but, by presenting the
purchaser as a ready, willing, and able, the broker becomes entitled to a
commission despite the ultimate failure of the sale through buyer default. 61
Courts have used several doctrines to deal with this problem, including breach
of fiduciary duty 62 and the general tort of misrepresentation. 63 Additionally,
courts have attempted to guard against misrepresentation and conspiracy
through the substance that they have given to the terms "ready," "willing," and
"able." 6 4 Consequently, while the ready, willing, and able rule does account

61
See e.g., White \. Boucher. 322 N.W.2d 560 (Minn. 1982) (finding that broker's
failure to disclose pertinent adverse information regarding prospective buyer" s inability to
go through with transaction constituted breach of broker's fiduciary duty to seller).
62
Id.
63
BURKE, supra note 14, at 8:9-8:16. Professor Burke sets forth the nine element of the
tort of misrepresentation:
(1) a representation
(2) which is false and
(3) material to the plaintiffs transaction, and
(4) which the broker knows to be false or does not know to be true, but which the
broker makes
(5) with the intent that the plaintiff act on it
(6) while ignorant of its falsity and
(7) relying on its truth;
(8) the plaintiff must have been entitled to his or her reliance (it must have been
reasonable), and
(9) his or her reliance caused him injury.
Id. at 8:9.
54
The terms "ready" and "willing" have been interpreted together to require that the
buyer be ready and willing to purchase on terms agreeable to the owner, including not only
the purchase price, but also the amount of the down payment, E.A. Strout Western Realty
Agency, Inc. v. Peterson, 585 P.2d 456 (Utah 1978), the possession date, Weittmg v.
McFeeters, 304 N.W.2d 525 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), and items to be included in the sale,
Colorado City Dev. Co. v. Jones-Healy Realty, Inc., 576 P.2d 160 (Colo. 1978). See
GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 196. "Able" has been interpreted to require that the buyer have
the legal capacity and the financial ability to complete the transaction. Goetz v. Anderson,
274 N.W.2d 175, 179 (N.D. 1978). Traditionally, the operative time for satisfying these
terms has been the time at which the buyer and seller reach an initial agreement. See e.g.,
Storm Associates, Inc. v. Baumgold, 440 A.2d 306, 308 (Conn. 1982). Thus, the critical
time is the time at which the seller "accepts" the buyer and the two parties reach an
agreement for sale. Generally, a seller "accepts" a buyer when the two enter into an
agreement, either oral or written, regarding sale of the property. See William Pitt, Inc. v.
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for this sort of deceit, it does so only by incurring litigation and other
enforcement costs that a rule that dealt with misrepresentation and conspiracy
in the first instance would avoid.
B.

The Late Twentieth

Century

In keeping with the decisions of the SJC, nearly every jurisdiction that
considered the issue during the early part of the twentieth century accepted and
applied the ready, willing, and able rule. 65 In the 1960s, the New Jersey
Supreme Court was the first to abandon the rule. This prompted the SJC to
reconsider its position on real estate brokerage contracts—a reconsideration
that ultimately led to the adoption of a new rule in Massachusetts.
1.

Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson

The New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to break from the ready,
willing, and able rule. In Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson,66 the New Jersey
court added two prongs to the ready, willing, and able rule, holding that a
broker was not entitled to a commission until "( a ) he produces a purchaser
ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) the

Taylor, 438 A.2d 1206 (Conn. 1982) (oral agreement sufficient); Walsh v. Turlick, 316
A.2d 759 (Conn. 1972). Consequently, in a majority of jurisdictions adhering to the ready,
willing, and able rule, the prospective purchaser must be willing to purchase on the seller's
terms and must be legally and financially able to do so at the time the prospective purchaser
and seller enter into an initial agreement. See GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 208. If, however,
the prospective purchaser subsequently becomes either unwilling or unable to purchase on
the seller terms, the purchaser will still be deemed ready, willing, and able.
65
In its consideration of the issue, the Restatement (Second) of Agency provides as
follows:
If the broker produces a customer who, without misrepresentation as to his assets or his
intent to purchase, makes a binding contract with the principal, the broker's right to his
commission is not defeated by a subsequent default on the customer's part, unless the
principal's promise to the broker is expressed to be conditional upon actual
performance by the customer, or unless the broker has failed to reveal to the principal
facts known to him which would indicate the likelihood of such default, or unless he is
guilty of some similar breach of duty to the principal.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 445 cmt. d (1957). The states expressing support for
the minority rule from an early date include Maryland, see Riggs v. Turnbull, 66 A. 13 (Md.
1907) (finding that the legal import of a contract to produce a purchaser binds the broker to
present a buyer who ultimately buys the property, mere execution of a contract to purchase
was insufficient), and Rhode Island, see Butler v. Baker, 23 A. 1019 (R.I. 1892) (rejecting
broker's position that he became entitled to a commission when the buyer and seller entered
into a contract for sale of the property).
66
236 A.2d 848 (NJ. 1967). The Ellsworth Dobbs decision has been extremely
influential in other jurisdictions, especially Massachusetts. See e.g., Tristam's Landing, Inc.
v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 730-31 (Mass. 1975) (relying heavily on Ellsworth Dobbs in
reaching its decision).
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purchaser completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the
provisions of the contract." 67 The Ellsworth rule drastically alters the way that
courts approach real estate brokerage contracts. Under the rule, the purchaser
must close the transaction before a broker becomes entitled to a commission.
This ameliorates many of the aspects of the ready, willing, and able rule that
were so troubling. 68 First, the broker bears the risk of buyer default during the
executory period. 69 In addition, the duty of investigation into the buyer's
finances falls upon the broker. 70 Finally, the Ellsworth rule eliminates the risk

67
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 855. The Ellsworth Dobbs court's view of the facts in
the case before it provides an interesting contrast to the Alvord court's view of the facts in
that case. See supra note 35 (discussing the Alvord court's view that the property owners in
that case had taken insufficient measures to enforce their contract against the defaulting
purchaser). In Ellsworth Dobbs, the owners entered into a purchase and sale agreement with
a prospective buyer. Subsequently, the buyer continually failed to generate financing for his
development plans for the property and thus continually postponed the closing. The buyer
made two small payments, but after several extensions from the seller, and a suit by the
buyer against the seller for specific performance, the sellers ultimately released the buyer
from the contract. Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 847-49. Unlike the SJC in Alvord, in
Ellsworth Dobbs, the New Jersey Supreme Court believed that the sellers had made a
reasonable attempt to enforce their agreement against the buyer, despite the ultimate release.
Id. at 847-48. The court explained its view of the seller's position as follows:
The property which they were anxious to sell had been tied up for more than a year by
the [] contract [with the prospective purchaser]. They had been subjected to litigation
and other expenses. They were advised by their attorneys that further litigation with
[the prospective purchaser] might well tie up their land for an indefinite period of time.
So they concluded they had no choice but to "rescind the contract," since they were
interested in selling the land.
Id. at 849.
68
See supra text accompanying notes 43-46, 55-64 (discussing several of the
objectionable aspects of the ready, willing, and able rule).
69
The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
In reason and in justice it must be said that the duty to produce a purchaser able in the
financial sense to complete the purchase at the time fixed is an incident of the broker's
business. . . . The risk of [financial] inability at [the time of closing] must be treated as
a normal incident of the brokerage business.
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 853, 855.
The Ellsworth rule achieves this result by depriving the broker of a commission unless the
buyer completes the transaction. This puts the risk that the buyer will default at any time
prior to closing on the broker. Cf. supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text (explaining
that the ready, willing, and able rule puts the risk of buyer default on the seller).
70
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 853 ("[T]he obligation to inquire into the prospect's
financial status and to establish his adequacy to fulfill the monetary conditions of the
purchase must be regarded logically and sensibly as resting with the broker."). Under the
Ellsworth rule, the buyer must close the deal for the broker to earn a commission. This puts
the duty of investigation on the broker, as under the rule it is crucial for the broker to
produce a buyer who is capable of completing the transaction. Cf. supra notes 58-60 and
accompanying text (explaining that the ready, willing, and able rule puts duty of
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of broker misrepresentation or conspiracy between the broker and the
prospective purchaser in the first instance. 71 The New Jersey Supreme Court
I demonstrated the strength of its conviction in adopting this rule by making any
attempt to contract around it void per se as inconsistent with public policy in
I any case where the parties stood on unequal footing.72
In Ellsworth Dobbs, the New Jersey Supreme Court was prompted by the
need to take "[a] new and more realistic approach" to real estate brokerage
contracts. 73 This need was compelled both by the court's view of the
expectations of the parties in entering into a brokerage contract and by public
policy considerations. Under its view of the expectation of the parties, the
court noted that a property owner normally hires a broker with the expectation
that he will not be liable for a commission unless there is a completed sale of
the property. 74 Indeed, the property owner expects to pay the commission
from the proceeds of the sale. 75 Thus, it would not be consistent with these
expectations for the court to interpret a brokerage contract to provide for a
commission in the absence of a completed sale. Additionally, the owner is
entitled to the reasonable expectation that when the broker produces a
purchaser who executes a contract on mutually agreeable terms, the buyer will

investigation on the seller).
71
Cf. supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
72
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 857-58. The court explained:
[I]n our judgment public policy requires the courts to read into every brokerage
agreement or contract of sale a requirement that barring default by the seller,
commissions shall not be deemed earned against him unless the contract of sale is
performed. By the same token, whenever the substantial inequality of bargaining
power, position or advantage to which we have adverted appears, a provision to the
contrary in the agreement prepared or presented or negotiated or procured by the
broker shall be deemed inconsistent with public policy and unenforceable.
Id. The SJC, in its adoption of the Ellsworth rule, took a slightly different approach to the
enforceability of a broker's attempt to contract around the default rule. See infra note 104
(explaining that the SJC announced its intention to scrutinize attempts to contract around the
Ellsworth rule closely, but that such attempts would not be v o i d e r se).
73
Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 852.
74
Id. at 853, 855 ("'What must be regarded as the fundamental intendment of the parties,
owner and broker, i.e., that the owner will sell and the buyer will pay, and the broker will
thus earn a commission out of the proceeds, cannot be ignored in this connection.")75
Id. at 852. The court quoted at length from Lord Denning:
When a house owner puts his house into the hands of an estate agent, the ordinary
understanding is that the agent is only to receive a commission if he succeeds in
effecting a sale; but if not, he is entitled to nothing. That has been well understood for
the last 100 years or more. . . . The agent in practice takes what is a business risk: he
takes on himself the expense of preparing particulars and advertising the property in
return for the substantial remuneration . . . which he will receive if he succeeds in
finding a purchaser. . . . The house-owner wants to find a man who will actually buy
his house and pay for it. He does not want a man who will only make an offer or sign a
contract.
Id. at 853-54 (quoting Dennis Reed, Ld. v. Goody, 1950 K.B. 277, 284-85 (Eng. C.A.)).

2002]

ARGUING

FOR THE MINORITY

RULE

213

perform. 76 Providing the broker with a commission in a case of buyer default
is inconsistent with this expectation as well.
Building on these realities of the owner-broker relationship, the court turned
to public policy. The court expressed its misgivings about several aspects of
the ready, willing, and able rule. 77 In particular, the court noted that the ready,
willing, and able rule forced the owner to bear the risk of buyer default and to
investigate the prospective purchaser's resources, preventing the owner from
relying at all on the broker's good faith production of the purchaser. 78 This
arrangement "puts the burden on the wrong shoulders." Instead, in a more
equitable arrangement, the broker should bear both the duty of reasonable
investigation and the risk of buyer default. 79
In the years following the decision, the Ellsworth Dobbs opinion would
have wide-reaching effects.80
2.

Gaynor v. Laverdure

It was not long after the Ellsworth Dobbs decision that the issue again
confronted Massachusetts courts. In Gaynor v. Laverdure}1
the property
owner and the broker entered into an oral agreement providing for the payment
of a 10% brokerage commission "on whatever price [the broker] could get a
ready, willing and able buyer to agree to pay for [the seller's land]." 8 2 The
broker produced a prospective purchaser who entered into an agreement to buy
but subsequently defaulted. 83
The court acknowledged that the law concerning real estate brokerage
commissions as it stood in Massachusetts appeared "unduly favorable to
-brokers, particularly by permitting brokers to recover commissions for
procuring customers . . . who at the time fixed for sale may not be ready,
willing or able to complete the purchase." 84 In addition, the court recognized

76

Id. at 852-53.
Id. at 853 (noting that the ready, willing, and able rule was "deficient as an instrument
of justice").
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
A few of the decisions expressing support for the Ellsworth rule in the years following
the decision include Winkelman v. Allen, 519 P.2d 1377, 1389-90 (Kan. 1974) ("We are
persuaded by the cogent reasoning in Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson . . . and adopt the
rules stated [therein]/'); Brown v. Grimm, 481 P.2d 63, 65-66 (Or. 197D: Setser v.
Commonwealth, Inc., 470 P.2d 142, 145-47 (Or. 1970); Staab v. Messier, 264 A.2d 790,
792 (Vt. 1970) (quoting "with approval" from the Ellsworth decision); and Rogers v.
HendrixT^P.2d 653, 656 (Idaho 1968).
81
291 N.E.2d 617 (Mass. \9iy).
'
82
Id. at 619.
83
Id. The court specifically noted that the record did not reflect an attempt by the
property owner to obtain specific performance against the prospective purchaser. Id.
84
Id. at 622.
77
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the trend, led by Ellsworth Dobbs, towards a rule more favorable to property
owners 85 Nonetheless, the SJC refused to relinquish its existing rule The
court justified continued adherence to the ready, willing, and able rule based in
part on its perception of mitigating factors softening the harshness of the rule
and in part on the facts in the case before it While the ready, willing, and able
rule could leave the owner liable for a brokerage commission without proceeds
to draw from, the court reasoned that this was mitigated by the owner's ability
to pursue an action for breach of contract or a suit m equity for specific
performance against the defaulting purchaser 8 6 Moreover, the owner was free
to contract around this result by including clear and unambiguous language in
the brokerage contract to the effect that the broker would not be entitled to a
commission absent a completed sale 87
In addition to these mitigating factors, the court was persuaded by the facts
m the case before it
The court pointed to Ellsworth's reliance on the
"substantial inequality of bargaining power, position, or advantage" between
the broker and the property owner m that case 88 Nevertheless, m Gaynor,
both the broker and the property owner were licensed real estate brokers, and
the property owner was actually more expenenced in real estate transactions 89
Moreover, the property owner had signed the purchase and sale agreement
only after consulting with his attorney 90 Thus, even if the Ellswoi th rule was
the superior rule, the facts before the SJC did not provide the appropriate
vehicle for adopting it 9 1
While the court may or may not have made too much of the importance of
an inequality of bargaining power, position, or advantage to the decision m

85
The SJC stated
We are aware of the fact that in several States in which the general rule of the liability
of an owner of real estate to a broker procuring a purchaser ready able and willing to
purchase the real estate was substantially the same as that of Massachusetts, the law
has been changed bv recent decisions
Id at 623
86
Id at 622
87
Id The court made clear that the burden on the owner to contract around the ready,
willing, and able rule would be an onerous one In its articulation of the burden, the court
noted that conditioning payment of the commission on payment of the purchase price was
"legally possible," but "clear and unambiguous language to that effect is necessary to
accomplish that result ' Id
88
Id at 624 (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, 236 A 2d 843 857 (N J 1967))
89
Id (noting that the facts before court did not present a "case involving a broker and a
person selling his residence once in his lifetime" and thus it did not in\olve a "substantial
inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the broker and the other
party involved' (internal quotation marks & citation omitted))
90
Id
91
But see mpia note 105 (discussing Massachusetts courts' eventual abandonment of a
finding of inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the propetty
owner and the seller as a prerequisite to application of the Ellsworth rule)
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Ellsworth Dobbs,92 the SJC's belief that two mitigating factors—the property
owner's ability to bring suit against the defaulting buver for indemnification
and to contract around the default rule—-justified continued adherence to the
ready, willing, and able rule seems misguided First, a property owner's action
against a defaulting buyer will produce results m only the rarest of cases The
typical reason for buyer breach is insufficient funding to complete the
transaction, and therefore a suit against a defaulting buyer is likely to yield
only a very small award or no award at all 9 ^ Second, it seems nonsensical to
put the burden of contracting around the default rule on the party who is less
experienced m transactions of the sort at issue 94 Rather, a more equitable rule
would draw the default rule m favor of property owners and put the burden on
brokers to contract around it
A few years after Gaynoi, the SJC was faced with a moie appropriate
vehicle for reconsideration of the ready, willing, and able rule
3

Ti istam 's Landing

Inc v Wait

Tnstam s Landing, Inc v Wait9* involved a property owner who was
inexperienced m real estate transactions The owner agieed to allow a bioker
to show her property to prospective buyers Accordingly, the broker produced
90
See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson 236 A 2d 843, 857 (N J 1967) The New Jersey
Supreme Court held that the Ellswoi th would be applicable m every case it was m cases
where there was a 'substantial inequality of bargaining power position or advantage"
between the property owner and the broker that the court would strike down attempts to
contract around the rule Id Nonetheless, this portion of the court s holding does nothing
to disrupt application of the rule in cases not involving this inequality
93
GAUDIO, mpia note 59, at 217-18 ("Even though the damages ma> be less than trie
funds necessary to complete the purchase, there is no reason to believe that the purchaser
will be any more able to obtain the funds necessary to pay the judgment than to complete
the purchase ') Professor Gaudio points to two additional reasons why recovery against the
defaulting purchaser is likely to be ' more theory than reality Id at 217 First the owner
will have to bear the transaction costs of any suit against a defaulting purchase, and, absent a
special agreement, these costs cannot be recovered in an action for breach of contract Id
(noting that the relevant transaction costs include attorneys fees courts costs, and loss of
interest on the recovery in the time between payment to the bioker and reco\ery from the
buyer) In addition m many situations forcing the seller to pay a broker fee in the absence
of sale proceeds to draw from will "necessitate the depletion of life savings or the sale of
other assets to raise, if at all possible, the funds necessary to pay the broker " Id
94
See sup? a notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing why it is more equitable for
courts to establish the default rule in favor of property owners and to put the burden of
contracting around that rule on brokers) see also GAUDIO, sup? a note 59, at 218 (noting
that, because "many sellers are involved m real estate transactions infrequently perhaps
only one m a lifetime, and are thus unfamiliar with their legal rights' it may be more
appropriate for courts to equalize the position of the parties by drawing the default rule m
favor of the seller and making the broker contract around it (quoting Tnstam's Landing, Inc
\ Wait, 327 N E 2d 727 731 (Mass 1975)))
95
327 N E 2d 727 (Mass 1975)
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a buyer who signed a purchase and sale agreement. The purchase and sale
agreement contained a provision that provided: "It is understood that a broker's
commission of five (5) percent on the said sale is to be paid to . . . [the broker]
by the said seller. ,,% After the seller granted the buyer a fifteen-day extension,
the buyer failed to show at closing and subsequently refused to go through with
the deal. 97 The broker then brought suit to recover the commission. 98
The SJC based its decision in the case before it on the ready, willing, and
able rule. The court construed the language "on said sale" to make the
completion of the sale a condition precedent to the broker's right to a
commission. 99 The court did not stop there, however. Instead it went on to
"join the growing minority of States who have adopted the rule of Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson." 100 The court quoted at length from the Ellsworth
Dobbs opinion and expressly adopted Ellsworth's three implied conditions
precedent to a broker's entitlement to a commission. 101 The court reasoned
that the Ellsworth rule provided the necessary protection for sellers and "places
the burden with the broker, where it belongs." 102 In Massachusetts, brokers
remained free to alter these implied conditions through clear and unambiguous
language in their agreements. 103 Nonetheless, the court made clear that, in the
future, it would closely scrutinize attempts to contract around these conditions
precedent to ensure that they were not void as unconscionable. 104
96

Id. at 729.
Id. at 728. The court noted that the seller had not taken formal action against the
prospective purchaser to recover damages, but that the seller had retained the down
payment. Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 730 C'[W]e construe the language 'on said sale' as providing for a special
agreement or as creating special circumstances wherein consummation of the sale became a
condition precedent for the broker to earn his commission." (internal quotation marks &
citations omitted)).
100
Id.
101
Id. at 731. The court adopted the three implied conditions precedent of Ellsworth
Dobbs in the following passage:
Thus we adopt the following rules: "When a broker is engaged by an owner of property
to find a purchaser for it, the broker earns his commission when (a) he produces a
purchaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms fixed by the owner, (b) the
purchaser enters into a binding contract with the owner to do so, and (c) the purchaser
completes the transaction by closing the title in accordance with the provisions of the
contract. If the contract is not consummated because of the lack of financial ability of
the buyer to perform or because of any other default of his. . . there is no right to
commission against the seller."
Id. (quoting Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (NJ. 1967)).
102
Id.
103
Id. at 731 ("We recognize that this rule could be easily circumvented by language to
the contrary in the purchase and sale agreements or in agreements between sellers and
brokers.").
97

104

Id. at 731. In this respect, the SJC broke from the New Jersey Supreme Court's
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With the Tristam's Landing decision, Massachusetts joined the minority of
states that interpreted real estate brokerage contracts in favor of property
owners.
In the years following the case, the Massachusetts courts
demonstrated how far they were willing to stretch the Ellsworth rule. 105
Nevertheless, a majority of states continue to adhere to the ready, willing, and
able rule. 106
IT.

M O D E R N JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE M A J O R I T Y R U L E

Though in recent years many states have subscribed to the reasoning of
Ellsworth Dobbs and adopted its rule, a majority of states still follow the ready,
willing, able rule. While the old Massachusetts cases provide some of the
justifications for the majority rule, courts and commentators have put forth
several other arguments in favor of the rule in the years since Tristam's
Landing. This section takes a comprehensive look at the arguments in favor of
the ready, willing, and able rule.
The primary justification for the ready, willing, and able rule is that once the
buyer and the seller have entered into a purchase and sale agreement, the
position in Ellsworth Dobbs. In Ellsworth Dobbs, the court held that the three conditions
for entitlement to a real estate brokerage commission were mandatory in cases involving
inequality of bargaining power, position or advantage between the parties. Ellsworth
Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 857 (N.J. 1967). That is, any attempt to contract
around them was per se void as inconsistent with public policy. See supra note 72. On the
contrary, in Massachusetts, these agreements were not per se unlawful; rather, the SJC
expressed its intention to scrutinize them closely. Tristam's Landing, 327 N.E.2d at 731-32.
105
In particular, Massachusetts courts have made it extremely difficult for brokers to
contract around the Ellsworth rule. In Currier v. Kosinski, 506 N.E.2d 895 (Mass. App. Ct.
1987), the contract between the seller and the broker provided that the broker would earn a
commission if he produced a buyer "ready, willing and able to buy said property in
accordance with the price, terms and conditions of the Agreement or such other price, terms,
and conditions as shall be acceptable to the Seller." The Massachusetts Appeals Court held
that this language was not sufficient to override the implied conditions of Tristam's
Landing. While the language reflected the first condition of Tristam's Landing, it did not
explicitly negate the other two conditions. Id. at 896-97. Thus, it did not put the seller "on
notice that he may incur liability for a broker's commission even though he does not enter
into a purchase and sale agreement or, if he does, even though the buyer defaults." Id. at
897. Further, "a provision in a brokerage agreement varying the rule should be made to
appear with enough specificity to alert the seller to the situations in which he can be liable
for a brokerage commission even if a sale is not consummated." Id. at 896. The SJC has
also applied the rule to transactions involving two parties well versed in real estate
transactions. In Capezzuto v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co., 476 N.E.2d 188
(Mass. 1985), the court applied the rule of Tristam's Landing to a transaction where the
property owner was a large commercial entity, experienced in real estate transactions.
While the court in Gaynor found a transaction involving two commercial parties an
inappropriate context for application of the same rule, by the time of Capezzuto, it did not
give the court a moment's pause.
106
BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:3-3:17.
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broker's duty under the agreement is complete. One of the most detailed
discussions of this rationale appeared in Gay nor, where the court noted:
When the broker has produced a customer, his duty is at an end; so far as
his rights or his duty are concerned, it is immaterial whether a contract is,
or is not, made, or, if made, whether it is or is not performed. The
broker's right to a commission is no more dependent upon, or affected by,
the fact that a contract is, or is not, drawn up and executed, than it is by
the fact that the contract, if drawn up, is or is not, carried into effect.
Making or not making a contract with the customer produced, enforcing
or not enforcing a contract, if made, are matters for the broker's principle
to do or not to do, as his ability and inclination determine; they are
matters with which the broker is not concerned, and on which his right to
a commission is not dependent. 107
Accordingly, some have argued that there is no justification for making a
broker's entitlement to a commission depend upon the activities of others—
including abstractors of title, attorneys, and title insurers—over whom the
broker has no control. 108
Some have taken issue with the Ellsworth rule's placement of the burden of
buyer default on the broker, arguing instead that the seller is in a better position
to know the state of the title and therefore better situated to bear the risk that
the title will prove unmarketable. 109 There are two grounds to question this
reasoning. First, if there is a defect in the title that prevents the seller from
conveying the property to the buyer, then that would constitute a case for seller
breach rather than one for buyer breach. In such a case, the Ellsworth rule and
the arguments in support of it would not apply. 110 Nevertheless, the reasoning
behind holding the seller liable for a commission in a case of seller breach does
not provide any support, and indeed has no application, in a case for buyer
breach. Second, it is common for the buyer to arrange financing during the
107
Gaynor v. La verdure, 291 N.E.2d 617, 620 (Mass. 1973) (quoting Fitzpatrick v.
Gilson, 57 N.E.1000, 1000-01 (Mass. 1900) (quotation errors in original)).
108
BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70.
109
Id. There are several cases that adhere to this reasoning, each of which involves a
broker's successful claim for a commission where the broker produced a purchaser who was
ready, willing, and able to buy, but the property owner was ultimately unable to convey the
property because a family member refused to convey his or her joint interest in the property.
See Woodworth v. Vranizan, 539 P.2d 1005 (Or. 1975); Perkins v. Willacy, 431 P.2d 141,
144 (Alaska 1967); Roy v. Huard, 174 A.2d 41 (Me. 1961); Portis v. Thrash, 229 S.W,2d
127 (Ark. 1950); Reynolds v. Ashabranner, 207 S.W.2d 304 (Ark. 1948); Chastain v.
Carrol, 307 So. 2d 491 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); McAlinden v. Nelson, 262 P.2d 627, 62729 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1953).
110
See Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 855 (N.J. 1967) ("On the other
hand, if the failure of completion of the contract results from the wrongful act or
interference of the seller, the broker's claim is valid and must be paid."); Tristam's Landing,
Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 731 (Mass. 1975) (same); see also supra note 5 (explaining
that the topic of seller default is outside the scope of this Note).

2002]

ARGUING

FOR THE MINORITY RULE

219

executory period. 111 A failure of financing during this time is one of the most
common causes of buyer default. In such a situation, the broker is at least as
well suited as the seller to be aware of the possibility that the deal will fail, and
therefore at least as well suited to bear the risk of default.112
The proponents of the ready, willing, and able rule also argue that in the
event of buyer default, the seller can bring a legal claim against the breaching
buyer for damages, while the broker, not being a party to the contract,
cannot. 113 As a result of this cause of action, they argue that the broker is in a
better position to absorb the buyer's breach. 114 Moreover, they argue, if the
seller decides not to sue, he can recover the commission by increasing the
asking price when re-listing the property. 115 This argument fails as the seller's
right against the breaching buyer is likely an empty one. 116 In reality, a seller's
claim is likely to entail high transaction costs and is unlikely to yield a
worthwhile recovery. 117 Further, the argument that a seller who is liable for a
brokerage commission on a failed sale can simply re-list the property to take

111

BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70.
See also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text (explaining why the broker is
better situated to investigate the prospective purchaser's finances).
113
BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:70-3:71. But see Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A. 2d at 859-61
(allowing the broker to proceed with a claim against the breaching buyer). In Ellsworth
Dobbs, the court held that the buyer's liability to the broker was a jury question that
depended on the nature of the relationship between the broker and buyer. Id. at 861. More
specifically, it hinged on whether the buyer made an implied promise to the broker at the
time of signing the contract. The New Jersey Supreme Court later explained the theory:
[W]hen a buyer solicits a broker's services in finding a suitable property, the buyer
impliedly contracts with the broker that, if the latter produces a property which the
buyer agrees to purchase, he will complete the transaction through the broker so that
the latter will receive his commission from the seller, and that, if the buyer does not do
so, he will be liable for the commission.
McCann v. Biss, 322 A.2d 161, 167 (N.J. 1967). Subsequent commentary has been
skeptical of this theory. BURKE, supra note 14, at 4:48.
114
BURKE, supra note 14, at 3:71.
115
Id.
116
See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the problems, in practice, with a
seller's claim against a buyer); GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 217-18 (detailing the difficulties
that a seller will likely experience in an action against a breaching buyer).
117
GAUDIO, supra note 59, at 217-18. There is a counter argument to this point that the
seller often is in possession of the buyer's down payment and thus can draw from those
funds in paying the broker. While a down payment will likely be insufficient to cover the
broker's fee, certainly in most cases the down payment will not cover the seller's expended
costs in attempting to go through with the transaction to the point of buyer breach in
addition to the brokerage fee. Courts have not overtly considered down payments, and it
does not appear to have played a role in their decisions. See e.g., Ellsworth Dobbs. 236
A.2d at 850 (noting that the Johnsons had received small payments under the contract);
Tristam's Landing, Inc. v. Wait, 327 N.E.2d 727, 728 (Mass. 1975) (noting that the sellers
had retained the breaching buyer's down payment).
112
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account of the paid commission is overstated It is hard to imagine that a
rational, profit-maximizing seller and broker would not list the property for the
highest possible price m the first instance This would eliminate the realistic
prospect of sale if the seller attempted to raise the pi ice furthei In addition,
adding lost brokerage commissions to the sale price of property would add an
artificial increase to the price of property, thereby interfering with the market's
ability to price accurately
There is also the argument that under the majority rule, though legally
entitled to a commission at the time of the purchase and sale, the broker retains
an incentive to remain involved m the transaction m In particular, the broker
has an incentive to remam involved m arranging financing or attending to the
details of closing 1I9 Under this argument, the incentive of the broker will \ary
among jurisdictions, depending on which version of the ready, willing, and
able rule that the jurisdiction has adopted 120 Contrary to this argument, it is
the Ellsworth rule that provides an incentive for brokers to remain involved in
the transaction, while the ready, willing, and able rule creates an incentive for
the broker to move on to the next deal as soon as the buyer accepts the seller
121
As a result, any argument based on broker incentives can only be an
argument in favor of the Ellsworth rule
A final argument for the ready, willing, and able rule is that the seller is
better able to absorb the loss incurred when a buyer breaches 122 As a factual
matter, this proposition is questionable 123 Moreover, even if true, a broker, by
the nature of his business, assumes exactly this sort of risk 124 Thus, this risk
should be treated as an incident of the brokerage business, and a property
owner's ability to absorb the loss is therefore of no consequence 125
118

BURKE, supra note 14, at 3 69
Id Potential reasons for a broker to remain involved m the transaction beyond the
signing of the purchase and sale agreement include the prevention of potential litigation
costs, see supia text accompanying notes 132 33, and the attempt to gam an ad\antage over
competitors by prouding superior services
120
See supra note 64 (discussing the meaning gi\en to "ready willing, and able'
formulation)
121
See infia Part IH (discussing the incentives created by the Ellswoith rule and the
ready, willing, and able rule)
122
BURKE, supra note 14, at 3 71 ("The vendor's income and livelihood are not at
stake—the broker s are )
123
See GAUDIO, supia note 59, at 211 ("For many sellers [payment of the brokerage
commission without the proceeds from a completed sale] will necessitate the depletion of
life savings or the sale of other assets to raise if at all possible, the funds necessary to pay
the broker *)
124
See FARMSWORTH supra note 8, at 582, Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc v Johnson, 236 A 2d
843, 855 (NJ 1967)
125
As discussed supra text accompanying notes 57-58 the broker can account for this
risk by increasing the price of commission on a completed sale, while property owners are
largely incapable of dealing with it
119
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Courts should apply the Ellsworth mle when interpreting leal estate
brokerage contracts As the preceding discussion indicates, the reasomng
employed by the courts that have adopted the Ellswoith rule illustrates its
supenonty to the ready, willing, and able rule The Ellswoith rule takes better
account of the bargaining power, skill, and understanding of the bioker and the
property owner m a typical real estate transaction As a repeat player, in the
ordinary case, the broker is better situated to bear the risk of buyer default,126
to shoulder the duty of investigation into the prospective buyer's finances,127
and to contract around an adverse default position through clear and
unambiguous language 128 Moreover, interpreting ambiguous language in
favor of property owners produces a result that is more consistent with the
realities of a real estate transaction and the expectations of property owners m
those transactions 129 Furthermore, this interpretation better effectuates the
intent of the parties 13° Finally, the reasons provided m support of the ready,
willing, and able rule fail to justify its application 131
In addition to the reasons that courts have expressed m then opinions there
are thiee efficiency considerations that courts have not explicitly relied on that
also argue in favor of interpreting ambiguous language m favor of property
owners These three efficiency considerations derive from three underlying —
factors the incentives that brokers have to remain involved m real estate
transactions during the executory period, the accuracy of the relationship
between the services that brokers supply and the fees that they receive, and the
degree of broker accountability for the prospective purchaser Each of these
factors in some way affects the efficiency of real estate transactions, and each
resulting efficiency consideration supports courts' employment of the
Ellswoi th rule
When dealing with ambiguous language in real estate brokerage contracts,
courts should consider the incentives that different interpretations will give to
brokers The Ellsworth rule and the ready, willing, and able rule create
opposite incentives for brokers The Ellswoith lule creates an incentive for
brokers to remam involved m transactions through the time of closing The
ready, willing, and able rule, on the other hand, creates an incentrve for brokers
to move on to the next transaction immediately after the buyer and seller reach
an agreement
The disparate incentives that these rules produce stem from the nature of the
biokerage business Under the commission pay structure which is widely used
in the brokerage industry, a broker maximizes his profits by completing as
See supi a notes 56-57 and accompanying text
See supia notes 58-60 and accompanying text
See supi a text accompanying notes 44-45
See supia notes 74-76 and accompanying text
See supia note 44 and accompanying texi
See supia Part II
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many deals as possible A broker has limited resources and thus has a stiong
incentive to put those resources to the most profitable use Undei the ready,
willing, and able rule, these considerations prompt a profit-maximizing broker
to move to the next deal immediately after earning a commission on the first
Stated from the bioker's standpoint, it would be a waste of valuable lesources
to spend any tune at all on a deal where he has already earned everything that
he can To the contrary, under the Ellswoith rule, a broker has an incentive to
remain involved m the transaction through closing, and if the buyei breaches at
any point prior to that, the broker will not receive a commission
The counterargument is that a broker does retain an incentive to remain
involved m a deal through closing under the ready, willing, and able rule
Otherwise the broker may incur litigation costs if forced to sue to collect a
commission after buyer default during the executory period, while the broker
does not incur these costs if the deal goes smoothly.132 Under this argument,
the broker retains an incentive to remain involved because these potential
litigation costs will prevent his gam expected from moving on to the next
transaction from outstripping his expected loss from doing so Nevertheless, it
is unlikely that property owners, faced with adverse court opimons, would
refuse to pay m a sufficient number of cases to make the broker's decision to
move on to the next deal an irrational one 133 Thus, this argument likely fails
While brokers have different incentives under these different schemes of
interpretation, there remains the question of which incentive is more optimal
from a societal standpoint That is, is it better for society if the role of a broker
is confined solely to acting as a reputational intermediary, merely providing a
means for a buyer and seller to meet and subsequently attempt to work out a
deal on their own 7134 Or instead, should the broker stay active m the deal,

132
This aigument is bolstered by the fact that, in litigation under the ready, willing, and
able rule, the broker bears the burden of proving that the purchaser was ready, willing, and
able to buy on the owner's terms at the time the agreement was entered into Gaynor v
Laverdure, 291 N E 2d 617, 621 (Mass 1973)
133
The broker's determination in this situation would involve a weighing of the expected
costs of litigation m a certain percentage of cases against the expected benefit of getting a
jump on the next deal As the textual discussion indicates, the rational choice for the broker
is likely to be moving on to the next deal Under the case law m jurisdictions subscribing to
the ready, willing, and able rule, a property owner is unlikely to litigate a case where the law
is directly against him If the property owner decides to get involved in legal action, he has
a much stronger case, and thus is much more likely to proceed against, the defaulting buyer
than he is to defend against the suing broker In addition, even if the broker is forced to
recover the commission m court, the possibility of summary judgment lowers the expected
litigation costs of the broker, thereby reducing the calculated loss under this course of
action At the same time, the broker's expected benefit from getting a jump on the next deal
is hkel> to be significant
134
See 15 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 84C 01, at 84C-4 to 84C-7 (Michael Allan Wolf
ed , 2001) The Powell treatise defines a broker as "an agent who, for a commission or fee
is employed by a principal to negotiate the sale, purchase, lease, or exchange of real

2002]

ARGUING

FOR THE MINORITY RULE

223

assisting the parties m their negotiations and helping to ensure that the deal
goes through 9
From a societal peispective, the more desirable incentive stiucture is the one
that encourages biokers to lemam involved in deals
The socially optimal
function for brokers goes beyond merely mtroducmg the two parties, instead
brokers should actively participate m the deal itself, and, m so doing help the
deal to close
A structure where brokers fill this role benefits society by
preventing waste of the resources that have already been expended m bringing
the deal to the point of potential failure
Brokers are uniquely situated to
effectuate this result Not only do brokers have funds invested m the deal that
they can use to help in the negotiations, but, because they are routinely
involved in real estate transactions, they have an accumulated knowledge that
they can employ to help parties work through common sticking points
A simple example illustiates this point Suppose a property owner hires a
broker to assist m the sale of his house m exchange for a commission of 5 % of
the sale price The broker subsequently introduces the seller and a prospective
purchaser
The two parties agree on a price of $100,000 and enter into a
purchase and sale agreement During the executory period (peihaps following
a home inspection), the prospective buyer decides that he has agreed to pay too
much for the house and is willing to walk away from the deal if forced to pay
anything more than $90,000 This represents a significant peicentage of the
purchase price, and is a potential deal breaker While there is a possibility that
the buyer and seller can work something out without outside assistance
(perhaps through the buyer agreeing to lower the sale price or through some
other compromise), a more likely scenario for the deal staying mtact exists if
the broker remains involved
First, the broker has undoubtedly faced this
scenario in the past and thus can piovide a mechamsm to help the parties leach
agieement Moreover, the bioker can offer part of his commission to increase
the range of possible agreement points between the parties Faced with the
potential alternative of losing his commission entirely, the bioker may suggest
that the owner take $5000 off the asking price, while the broker will take
$2500 off his commission, possibly salvaging the deal While in tins scenano
the broker lelmquishes half of his commission, tins may provide an attractive
alternative to taking a chance on a full commission from a new buyer Starting
over with a new buyer entails the accrual of additional costs to re-list the

property to a third party " Id at 84C-4 (emphasis added) On the contiary, if the broker is
specifically employed merely as a "finder," the broker's duty is merely to "find a
prospective purchaser, introduce the parties, and then leave the negotiations to the buyer and
seller" Id at 84C-7 The determination of whether a broker was hired as a "broker' or as a
"finder" is a question of fact that depends on the agreement between the parties Id
Logically, a bioker employed as a "broker' in this sense would command a higher
commission than a broker employed as a "finder " This Note uses the term "broker ' to refer
to one "employed by a principal to negotiate the sale purchase, lease, or exchange of real
pioperty to a third party," rather than to refer to a brokei uho is employed to act as a
"findei
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property and the possible loss of the commission entirely if the property proves
difficult to resell or if the listing agreement is non-exclusive.135
Active involve from the broker during the executory period creates a much
higher likelihood that the deal will close than if the buyer and the seller are the
only parties working to complete the deal. As noted above, this helps to
prevent a waste of the resources that have already been expended on the deal
and additionally ensures that the property is sold for a value unencumbered by
tangential considerations.136 Consequently, because the Ellsworth rule creates
an incentive for broker to engage in this level of involvement, it leads to the
more efficient result, and, in this respect, it is the more desirable rule from a
societal standpoint.
Next, as the preceding discussion indicates, under the ready, willing and
able rule, brokers have an incentive not to remain involved in real estate
transactions after the point at which the buyer and seller reach an initial
agreement. If brokers do not remain involved after this point, the only thing
that brokers provide is a reputational intermediary through which buyers and
sellers may meet, leaving the parties on their own to work out the deal after the
initial agreement. Given this situation, in ready, willing, and able jurisdictions
the commissions that brokers charge are clearly excessive in relation to the
services that they provide and the risk that they bear. This, of course, is an
inefficient allocation of resources. Nevertheless, the situation is a difficult one
to resolve. Property owners will be largely incapable of correcting the
overpayment because they suffer from a collective action problem. But, on the
other hand, courts have a ready mechanism to alleviate this problem. If courts
apply the Ellsworth rule, it will force brokers either to provide services that are
more commensurate with their fees by remaining involved in transactions
through the time of closing and bearing the risk of buyer breach, or, in the
alternative, to contract around the Ellsworth rule, and in so doing to set out
exactly when they will become entitled to a commission and exactly what risk
the property owner will bear. The latter scenario will provide property owners
with a clearer understanding of their agreement with brokers and will help
them to recognize exactly what services the broker will and will not provide
and in what circumstances the broker will be entitled to a commission. This
recognition will prompt individual owners to adjust the commission rate when
brokers alter the default rule.137 This will benefit society by helping to correct
235
Under a non-exclusive listing agreement, more than one broker lists the property, and
only the successful broker earns a commission on the sale. BURKE, supra note 14, at 2:132:14 (describing the "open listing," under which the first broker to produce an acceptable
purchaser earns the commission).
136
If the property owner is forced to re-list the property after buyer breach, he may be
forced to factor other considerations into the re-list price, including the lost brokerage fee,
the lost time spent on the failed transaction, and other costs associated with the failed sale.
This may result in an asking price that does not accurately reflect the value of the property,
which in turn may hurt the accuracy of pricing in the overall market.
137
The collective action problem mentioned above will not be present in this situation,
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the existing inefficient allocation of resources in ready, willing, and able
jurisdictions.
Finally, while generally the broker acts as the agent of the seller, society
benefits from the broker being accountable, to some extent, for the provided
purchaser. If the broker produces a quality purchaser—one who completes the
transaction rather than merely signing a purchase and sale agreement—society
receives the benefits that flow from real estate deals closing more efficiently.
These benefits include a reduction in transaction costs incurred in closing and a
decrease in the amount of time that it takes for a deal to close. As a result, a
rule that makes a broker more accountable for the provided purchaser is more
desirable from a societal standpoint. Clearly, the Ellsworth rule makes a
broker more accountable for the prospective purchaser than the ready, willing,
and able rule. Though under any rule a broker faces potential reputational
harm by producing a buyer who does not complete the transaction, the
Ellsworth rule creates an additional incentive for the broker to produce a
capable buyer.
Under the Ellsworth rule the broker's commission is
completely dependent on the closing of the deal, and therefore brokers will
endeavor in the first instance to find a purchaser who will not breach.
Moreover, once the buyer and seller enter into a purchase and sale, the broker's
incentive is to close the deal as quickly and as quietly as possible. As a result,
the broker will do everything in his power to ensure that the deal goes
smoothly. These contributions from the broker will streamline the executory
period, as sellers will be provided with superior purchasers, and brokers will
lend their expertise to help move the transaction along. This will reduce the
transaction costs incurred in closing and diminish the time that it takes to close
deals, which will increase the efficiency of real estate deals and in turn benefit
society.
CONCLUSION

As the preceding discussion has indicated, the Ellsworth rule is the correct
one for courts to apply when dealing with real estate brokerage contracts. As
the reasons given by courts in their opinions illustrate, the Ellsworth rule helps
to balance the scales between property owners and brokers in real estate
transactions. Moreover, as this Note explains, the rule also benefits society by
preventing waste of the resources that have been expended on deals to the
point of potential failure, helping to establish compensation levels for brokers
that are more commensurate with the services that brokers provide and

because the broker will be the party attempting to alter the status quo. The Ellsworth rule
establishes the baseline set of services that a broker will have to provide m order to earn a
given commission. If the broker attempts to contract around this default position in clear
and unambiguous language, the services that the broker will provide and the risk that the
property owner will bear will be laid bare for the property owner. As a result, it is unlikely
that the property owner will agree to a modification to the default position unless the broker
lowers his commission.
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reducing the transaction costs of deals themselves. Each of these effects
enhances the overall efficiency of real estate transaction which benefits
society. Moreover, as a result of these considerations, the Ellsworth rule may
actually benefit brokers in the long run, as it will reduce the tangential costs
that property owners incur in real estate transactions. This will result in an
increase in the value to property owners of the services that brokers provide,
which in turn will be reflected in the commissions that brokers command.

